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Sri Lanka and Malaysia are basket cases of socio-economic policies that have resulted in 
vastly different socio-economic outcomes. Despite a vast and growing literature on ethnic 
tensions, the economic dimension of the problem remains largely unexamined; analyses 
on ethnic tensions have inevitably led to a misleading impression that both countries’ 
ethnic tensions are purely an ‘ethnic issue’ and that it has to be analyzed in the context of 
ethnic disparities of each country. This thesis addresses this misconception focusing on 
the economic dimension of the problem. The objective of the thesis is to analyze how 
economic policies can act as a stimulant to ethnic tensions or cordial ethnic relations, 
using Sri Lanka and Malaysia as case studies. The thesis shows that a high degree of 
economic openness to trade and investment ensures high growth and a disciplined 
government that is turn set the pre-conditions for ethnic peace. 
 
Chapter 2 provides definitions and explanations regarding the key terms of ethnic-related 
issues such as ethnicity and ethnic conflict and then explores the relevant literature on 
ethnic conflicts. Chapter 3 discusses the origins and evolution of ethnic preference 
policies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. More specifically, the thesis highlights the following 
major components: the background of ethnic preference policies - the origin and nature of 
the ethnic polity in Sri Lanka and Malaysia and the rationale of their ethnic preference 
policies; an analysis of the major domains of ethnic contestation and state intervention in 
both countries; and a critical evaluation of the effectiveness and impacts of such ethnic 
preference policies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. 
 
 ix
Chapter 4 provides a general theoretical and empirical framework. Using an analytical 
framework, the thesis discusses the fundamental relationship between economic activities 
and ethnic conflict. In order to explain the relationship further, it utilizes an adapted a 
game-theoretic model of conflict between ethnic groups based on their behavior. It then 
provides an empirical analysis, using a panel data set for 12 multi-ethnic countries from 
1980 to 2000, how openness, disciplined government and economic growth interact to 
create the necessary conditions for ethnic peace.  
 
Chapter 5 moves on examine the impact of economic activity on inter-ethnic relations in 
Sri Lanka and Malaysia. In this context, it provides a critical evaluation of economic 
activities and there outcome in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, a critical assessment of the socio-
economic status of ethnic communities in both countries, and a critical examination of 
effectiveness and impacts of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations. Lastly, in order 
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When countries are heavily divided along ethnic, religious, communal, and regional 
lines, they are likely to experience bouts of tensions/conflicts1 between communities 
(Annett 2001). Experience suggests that economic growth and development have an 
effect on ethnic conflict and ethnic conflict in turn influences growth and development. 
Where growth and development are successful, countries become progressively safer 
from the perils of ethnic conflict, making subsequent growth and development easier. 
Where growth and development fails, countries are at high risk of getting caught in a 
conflict-trap in which war wrecks the economy and increases the risk of conflict further. 
Ethnic conflict thus reflects not just a problem for growth and development, but a failure 
of growth and development (Collier et al. 2003).  
 
The risk of ethnic conflict is much higher in developing countries than in developed 
countries and it differs especially according to a country’s economic conditions. As a 
result, ethnic conflict is becoming increasingly concentrated in multi-ethnic developing 
countries, that is, those low-income countries that have to date failed to maintain better 
economic performance as a result of adverse economic activities, such as unfavorable 
economic policies and policy regimes. It has long been argued in the ethnic literature that 
                                                 
1 The term ‘ethnic tension/ conflict’ is used here to refer to either active or potential use of collective 
violence. Throughout this research, we will use ethnic tension, ethnic conflict and political instability 
interchangeably. 
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an appropriate policy option is one of the major factors that have contributed to economic 
development and cordial inter-ethnic relations in many multi-ethnic developing countries 
(Easterly and Levine 1997). How to overcome these bloody conflicts and manage better 
economic development through economic policies has been the key problem for many 
multi-ethnic developing countries. Since independence from colonial rule, most of these 
countries have been experimenting with different policy regimes and planning programs 
to achieve political stability and economic development. Some countries with ethnically 
divided societies have managed to maintain political stability and economic development 
while others have failed to do so (Wan 1999).  
 
The present research attempts to examine why many multi-ethnic developing countries 
have failed to maintain economic development and political stability while others with 
similar multi-ethnic structures have succeeded. Sri Lanka and Malaysia fit very well into 
this anomaly; hence they are the primary focus of this research.   
 
1.2 Sri Lanka and Malaysia experience 
In this section of the chapter, an attempt is made to provide a profile of Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, outlining some key aspects. Both Sri Lanka in South Asia and Malaysia in 
Southeast Asia were generally a colonial inheritance and there was greater similarity in 
the economic systems of these two multi-ethnic countries: both were plantation colonies 
which gave their people a relatively high standard of living even in colonial times. Sri 
Lanka gained its independence in 1948 and the Federation of Malaya was granted 
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independence in 1957. The passage to independence was more violent in Malaysia than 
in Sri Lanka.  
 
The people of Sri Lanka and Malaysia are multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, practicing several 
religions. Both language and religion, singly or combined, are primary markers of ethnic 
identity. The four major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are: the Sinhalese, Sri Lankan 
Tamils, Indian Tamils, and Muslims. Though there are more than seventy identified 
ethnic groups in Malaysia, they can be classified broadly into four major groups, namely: 
Malays/Bumiputera, Chinese, Indians and others. Four major religions are practiced by 
the Sri Lankans: Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. The Buddhism has been 
followed by the larger majority of the Sinhalese. Akin to Sri Lanka, there are four 
religions practiced in Malaysia: Islam, Buddhism, Christianity and Hinduism. Islam has 
the larger number of followers drawn from the majority Malays. Besides, three major 
languages are spoken by these distinct ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. In Sri 
Lanka, the majority Sinhalese speaks Sinhala and the Tamils (both Sri Lankan and Indian 
Tamils) and majority of the Moors speak Tamil, and the westernized elites speak 
English. In Malaysia, Malays speak Malay; most Chinese speak Chinese dialects; and 
Indians usually speak Tamil. 
 
Since the early history, ethnic groups of Sri Lanka have also been segregated in terms of 
geographical area where they have lived. The Sinhalese are concentrated in the South and 
the West of Sri Lanka. The majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils live in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, while the Indian Tamils are concentrated mainly in the tea plantations 
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of the central highlands in Sri Lanka. There is a substantial segment of Muslims who live 
in the South-Eastern parts of the country. The similar pattern of segregation can also be 
found in Malaysia. Each ethnic group in Malaysia not only differs in terms of their 
language, culture, and religion but also separated in terms of geographical location, as 
well as economic functions and occupation. Malays formed a much higher proportion of 
the population in rural areas than in city centres; Malays populated the relatively poorer 
states and primary occupations than non-Malays. The ethnic, religious, linguistic and 
other distinctions in the Sri Lankan and Malaysian societies tend to reinforce each other. 
As a result, there has been very little integration and interaction between the ethnic 
groups in both countries. Ethnicity, therefore, cuts across almost all spheres of the life.  
 
At the time of independence in 1957, Malaysia shared much in common with Sri Lanka 
in terms of economic, social and cultural factors, including ethnic composition and the 
inequalities between ethnic groups (Bruton et al. 1992). Because of its mineral wealth – 
tin and oil – Malaysia was more richly endowed than Sri Lanka. Besides, Malaysia had 
twice the land area of Sri Lanka, with a much lower population. Another important 
similarity is colonial experience in demographic change. The last phases of colonial rule 
had seen substantial (in the case of Sri Lanka) and profound (in Malaysia) demographic 
changes (Silva 2001). Partly, there was a natural increase in population under colonial 
rule, but often natural increase was overshadowed by additions to the population through 
migration. Indeed, migration often resulted in dramatic changes in the ethnic composition 
of the population during colonial rule.  
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In comparing the records of inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, at the time 
of independence, we noted that Malaysia was seen as a highly prone to ethnic tension, 
compared to Sri Lanka. At the time of independence, relative group proportions, 
conceptions of group legitimacy, political events, the relations of elites of the various 
groups, and the political culture of the two countries all suggested a Sri Lankan 
advantage rather than a Malaysian advantage (Horowitz 1989). Some key differences are: 
 
• Percentage of ethnic majority: At the time of independence, in terms of total 
population, the majority ethnic community (Sinhalese) was 70 per cent in Sri 
Lanka while it was only 50 per cent in Malaysia (Malays). 
• Settlement and citizens of minority: Tamil settlement in Sri Lanka has more than 
1,000 years history. The Sri Lankan Tamils were citizens of Sri Lanka, legitimate 
participants in the political system, and early participants in the national 
movement. The Chinese and Indians, on the other hand, were relatively recent 
migrants to Malaysia. The Chinese and Indians, by and large, were not citizens of 
Malaysia. The Chinese were not accepted as legitimate participants in Malaysian 
politics. The Malays were regarded as "sons of the soil," privileged in the 
country. The Sinhalese in Sri Lanka did not use that term in reference to them or 
make such distinctions.  
• Initial political situation: At the time of independence, ethnic relations were 
unfavorable to peaceful existence of the ethnic groups in Malaysia. During World 
War II, Chinese guerrillas, fighting the Japanese, had fought Malay villagers. 
After the war, the guerrillas emerged from the jungle, proclaimed the abolition of 
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Malay sultanates, and purported to annex Malaya to China. Until the British 
completed the re-occupation of Malaya, there were bloodbaths up and down the 
peninsula. Thereafter, the Chinese guerrillas returned to the jungle to fight the 
British and the largely Malay armed forces in the emergency of 1948-60. These 
battles had the character of ethnic hostilities, undermining the Chinese position in 
the country. In Sri Lanka, the Tamils were well represented in the Sri Lanka 
Defense Force during the World War II and in the Sri Lankan Army after 
independence. Tamil leaders had asked for ethnically balanced representation in 
parliament, but the British rejected it. Independence nevertheless found the 
Tamils with ministerial portfolios.  
• Elites: Malay and Chinese elites were divided by the structure of educational 
institutions in colonial and post-colonial Malaya. In contrast, the Sinhalese and 
Tamil elites were brought together by the educational system in Sri Lanka. In the 
case of Malaysia, the result was that Malay and Chinese leaders were not, at first, 
on intimate terms, whereas in Sri Lanka the Sinhalese and Tamils had a cordial 
relationship. There was, in Sri Lanka, genuinely inter-communal elite, sharing 
many common values. The same description would certainly not hold for Malay 
elites at independence.  
• Inter-ethnic diplomacy and political culture: Malay politicians were quite 
discriminating and cautious about whom they would deal with. Some Malay 
newspapers urged “no diplomacy with the Chinese”. The Sri Lankans, by 
contrast, had a bargaining political culture. No agreement was automatically 
foreclosed. Tamil parties dealt with several Sinhalese parties, and vice versa. 
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Party discussions often revolved around whether a better deal could not be 
obtained from some other party than the one with which negotiations were being 
conducted. For inter-ethnic negotiations, it is reasonable to assume that such a 
bargaining political culture was more advantageous than one that put premium on 
personal relations.  
 
So, on these grounds, Sri Lanka started out with considerable advantages to maintain 
better ethnic relations among the ethnic groups. Apart from those political and cultural 
factors, at the time of independence, economic activities also exerted influence on inter-
ethnic relations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka. The records of economic policies and inter-
ethnic relations clearly showed that the laissez-faire economic system was less 
supportive of economic development and inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia. On the other 
hand, the open market policy and related benefits were more supportive of economic 
development and inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. Anyone forecasting the ethnic future 
of the two countries would have predicted far more difficulty for Malaysia than for Sri 
Lanka; but later, the reverse proved to be the case. Despite those favorable conditions, 
Sri Lanka deteriorated into a state of large-scale ethnic conflict; despite Malaysia's 
unfavorable conditions, Malaysia has been successful in preventing ethnic conflict. This 
contrast is not fortuitous. Malaysia has had more difficult problems, but it has also had 
better conflict management.  
 
Many ethnic studies have pointed out that ethnic preference policies (hereafter EPPs) 
were the main reasons for this reverse cases in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Sri Lanka and 
 8
Malaysia have implemented a series of EPPs designed to benefit the politically dominant 
ethnic groups. A comparison of the records of EPPs shows that while Sri Lanka’s EPP is 
limited mainly to the question of representation in public sector employment, education 
opportunity, and public policy, Malaysia’s EPP is more all-pervasive, affecting most 
domains of society.  
 
In comparing the consequence of the EPP, positive aspects of preferential policy were 
encountered in Malaysia while negative aspects were encountered in Sri Lanka (see more 
details in Chapter 3). In Malaysia, EPPs consisted of an ambitious program of social 
engineering aimed at redistributing wealth, eradicating poverty, and redistributing society 
(Abdullah 1997). The way to unite the multi-ethnic populations visualized in the program 
was through appropriate economic policies and active government intervention to reduce 
inter-ethnic inequality by employing preferential treatments in favor of Malays. An 
important stipulation of the EPPs was that both poverty reduction and restructuring 
should be achieved in the context of rapid economic growth (Snodgrass 1980).  
 
In Sri Lanka, according to Sowell (1990), EPPs were treated as a prominent example of 
the damaging impact on a multi-ethnic society and polity. Silva (1997) points out that the 
introduction and implementation of EPPs in Sri Lanka provide an excellent beginning to 
the complex nature of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, and the political ramifications of 
rivalries between societies. The relationship between economic activities and EPPs 
shows that economic policies, government activities, and macroeconomic management 
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were less supportive of EPPs in improving economic development and promoting cordial 
inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. 
 
1.3 The research focus 
This research focuses on the impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia. Since the 1970s, Malaysia has been successful in preventing ethnic 
conflict from occurring and has managed to maintain some form of political stability. But 
Sri Lanka has been unsuccessful in preventing and resolving ethnic conflicts. Given the 
fact that Sri Lanka shared much in common with Malaysia in terms of economic, social 
and cultural factors, the key issue to be addressed in the present study is why Sri Lanka 
gradually deteriorated into a state of large-scale ethnic conflict, while Malaysia 
succeeded in maintaining sound economic performance and harmonious relations 
between ethnic groups.  
 
The following specific questions underpin the present research: How are ethnic 
boundaries created and maintained between the various ethnic groups, and what are the 
causes of ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka and Malaysia? What are the origins of EPPs in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia? What do governments in both countries hope to achieve through 
the implementation of such programs? How do they work? Do the programs achieve 
what is intended? What is the impact of such programs in both countries? What has been 
the impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations in both countries since 
independence? Why has Sri Lanka failed to maintain economic development and 
political stability while Malaysia has managed to do so? And what are the experiences 
 10
that Sri Lanka can learn from Malaysia to maintain political stability and economic 
development?  
 
A comparative study of the two countries is, therefore, not only important theoretically 
but also provides significant policy insights.  
 
The objective of this research is two-fold:  
• To analyze how economic policies can act as a catalyst or a deterrent to ethnic 
tensions, using Sri Lanka and Malaysia as case studies, and  
• To identify appropriate economic policies in order to reduce ethnic tensions in 
multi-ethnic developing countries.  
 
Based on the experiences of Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the following hypothesis is 
formulated for further examination. 
 
“Growth enhancing open-economic policy disciplines the governments and reduces 
the probability of ethnic conflicts” 
 
1.4 The organization of the thesis  
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 1 presents a brief introduction of Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia, and the specification of objectives and hypothesis. Chapter 2 provides 
various definitions and explanations regarding key ethnic-related terms. It then explores 
the relevant literature on ethnic conflicts.  In chapter 3, the origins and evolution of 
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ethnic preference policies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia are discussed. More specifically, the 
chapter highlights the following major components: the background of EPPs – the origin 
and nature of the ethnic polity in Sri Lanka and Malaysia and the rationale of their EPPs; 
an analysis of the major domains of ethnic contestation and state intervention in both 
countries; and a critical evaluation of the effectiveness and impacts of EPPs in Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia. 
 
Chapter 4 develops a theoretical model and provides an empirical analysis. In this 
chapter, first we discuss the fundamental relationship between economic activities and 
ethnic conflict by using an analytical framework. Thereafter, in order to develop our 
theoretical analysis, we set out an elementary game-theoretical model of conflict between 
ethnic groups based on their behavior. Finally, the chapter provides an empirical 
analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 explains the impact of economic activity on inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia. The chapter is further divided into three parts; a critical evaluation of 
economic activities and its outcome in Sri Lanka and Malaysia; a critical assessment of 
the socio-economic status of ethnic communities in both countries; and a critical 
examination of effectiveness and impacts of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations. 
To bring the thesis to a close, Chapter 6 provides a summary of the major findings of the 







Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict: General Concepts 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In many countries in the world, population is divided into diverse groups according to 
factors such as language, culture, and religion. Although these factors are identified as 
important building blocks of ethnicity, it is often not certain which of these would 
become the defining variable for a group, which is the one that identifies and 
distinguishes it from all others. In many regions (e.g. Northern Ireland, the Middle East, 
North Africa, and South Asia) religion remains a very important source of ethnic identity 
or conflict, while in other regions (e.g. Belgium Cameroon, Canada, and Spain) it is 
language. 
 
Clearly, ethnicity is as much a key feature in most developing countries as it is in 
developed countries. And yet, like any human phenomenon, it is involved in a baggage 
of definitional problems. The next section is, therefore, devoted to defining key terms in 
the present study. The subsequent section reviews the literature on ethnic studies.  
 
 
2.2 Definition of key terms 
This section attempts to define key terms that have been used in the study in order to 
conceptualize their meanings. Both the ethnic terms [such as ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic 
boundaries’, and ‘ethnic conflict’] and the non ethnic related terms [such as economic 
 13




The meaning of ‘ethnicity’ depends on the meaning of several other concepts, such as 
‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic identity’. An ethnic group is a culture or subculture whose 
members are readily distinguishable by outsiders based on traits originating from a 
common racial, national, linguistic, or religious source (Wikipedia, The Free 
Encyclopedia). The concept of ethnic group refers to ethnicity as a collective 
phenomenon. Ethnic identity is quite personal and individual; and it has many facets. It 
can be based on geography, nationality, ancestry, family, culture and sub-culture, 
religion, language, race – or any combination of these. Ethnic identity is essentially a 
relationship between groups which take its character from the identity of self and other 
by which they are distinguished as groups. Ethnicity has a primordial or ascribed quality, 
but it is also true that ethnic identity is shaped by historical experiences. It takes shape on 
the basis of primordial characteristics such as religion, language, race, caste, etc., (Shils 
1957; Geertz 1963). These characteristics differentiate a particular group from other 
groups in the society and also determine their status. On the other hand, some scholars 
such as Dugan and Apel (2003) believe that ethnicity is situational or contextual. In this 
case, ethnicity is multi-dimensional and is used for a collective action (Phadnis 1945).  
 
Derived from the measuring of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic identity’, ethnicity can be said 
to have objective and subjective dimensions. Indeed, Stavenhagen (1996) stresses that 
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objective and subjective factors are necessary for the existence of an ethnic group. 
Objective aspects of ethnicity are those which can be observed as facts in the existence of 
institutions, including that of kinship, descent, and overt behavior patterns of individuals. 
The objective factors can be listed: language, religion, territory, social organization, 
culture, race, and common origin. The subjective dimensions of ethnicity refer to 
attitudes, values and preconceptions whose meanings have to be interpreted in the 
context of the process of communication. The subjective factor is any particular 
combination of the factors chosen by a group to assert its identity, which is then used as a 
common resource to achieve a certain goal. 
 
Together, the objective and subjective dimensions of ethnicity allow us to have a further 
persecutor. That is, ethnicity is a kind of consciousness about the status successes and 
problems of an ethnic group (Brass 1991). It also connects mobilization of an ethnic 
group in order to fight for its share in economic resources and the power structure which 
they consider to have been denied them due to the perceived discriminatory policies by 
the state. It can be said that ethnicity is the manipulation and mobilization of group 
identity against structured inequalities, induced discriminations of power politics. It may 
be pointed out here that ethnic mobilization does not take place among disadvantaged or 
minority group alone. It may also be used by the advantaged groups in order to pressurize 





2.2.2 Ethnic boundaries 
At the outset, it must be said that ‘ethnic boundaries’ is used to refer to the creation and 
maintenance of relationship between ethnic groups which are shaped culturally, socially, 
and politically.  The following three areas are where ethnic boundaries are most likely to 
occur: cultural policies, constitutional framing and development planning.  
 
In the field of cultural policies, language and education have always created group 
grievances that have had the potential to spark off ethnic boundaries and subsequently 
conflict. Language is one of the most important factors in determining ethnic and 
national identity. This recognition often includes a strong socio-economic argument that 
becomes more obvious in the modernization process around the world. The decision 
about a national or official language is important for the modernization process, offering 
economies of scale in the educational sector. Education is regarded as the second major 
field in the realm of cultural policies, where the aspirations of ethnic groups and the 
central government collide. The allocation of resources to education gives a first 
description about the general situation in the process of economic development. The 
distribution of educational resources can be used to examine how far certain groups are 
favored or discriminated by educational policies and their implementation.  
 
Language and education have a great impact on the recruitment policies of the public 
sector because the modern state requires literate bureaucrats. As the state is mostly the 
biggest employer in developing countries, this predominance is now perceived with 
greater suspicion. The competition over language, education, and employment has 
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created many domestic conflicts in most multi-ethnic countries, where state governments 
follow similar policies against minorities.  
 
The second issue that contributes to the creation and maintenance of ethnic boundaries is 
constitutional framework; that includes questions of symbolic representation, 
government, citizenship, electoral systems, quotas, and personal laws. The constitution of 
each country always contains symbolic representations, enabling each country to assume 
a distinctive character. The formulation of a constitution automatically raises the issue of 
how a national language, flag, state religion, national celebration day or capital should be 
defined. Often these symbols of the state are expressions of ethnic boundaries.  
 
The next important area that is affected by a constitution is the electoral system. The 
Proportional Representation (PR) systems, which are meant to ensure better 
representation of minority groups, are of special relevance in multi-ethnic countries. But 
PR systems also include a number of aspects that may exclude minorities from the 
electoral process. One point is the registration of parties. At the same time, it may also be 
used to exclude parties that represent minorities from mainstream politics. Finally, a 
separate electorate is another indicator where constitutional framing is connected with 
ethnicity, which may provide a minimum political representation of ethnic minorities. In 
contrast to this, a separate electorate forces ethnic minorities to vote only for their 
representative and this may outweigh their political representation. Apart from political 
competition, minority ethnic groups in remote areas can be especially adversely affected, 
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when the lack of state resources is linked to political deliberations to discriminate against 
these groups. 
 
Within the constitutional framework of a country, another important area is quotas and 
the policies of affirmative action. They are regarded as a mechanism in order to improve 
the socio-economic backwardness of certain groups such as the ‘Bumiputera’ in 
Malaysia. These policies make it necessary to establish clear-cut rules of membership, 
thereby strengthening ethnic identities and hence boundaries. A similar difficulty can be 
observed when specific laws are introduced to religious groups to regulate personal 
matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The privileges involved by granting 
special treatment to preserve cultural identity are often mistrusted by other groups that 
are denied these privileges.  
 
The third key mediating factor in the creation of ethnic boundaries is development 
planning. Development planning offers a broad spectrum of activities where investment 
in a country’s development can have an adverse effect on economic development 
policies. Given the scarce flow of resources, most governments in developing countries 
have often adapted their development strategies to the blueprints of the international 
donor community. After many years of investment, the situation in many developing 
countries is still characterized by underdevelopment, which is creating inequalities 
between societies. Historically, this is quite common in the process of modernization.  
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But in developing societies where governments are regarded to be the main engine of 
national development and where ethnic cleavages are stronger than class affiliations, the 
uneven distribution of resources is more likely to trigger new forms of ethnic 
mobilization. The uneven allocation of resources in infrastructure can be interpreted as a 
discriminatory measure of central governments. Of special importance are migration and 
land settlement projects. They may alter the ethnic distribution of the local population, 
and thus influence the electoral outcome in respective areas. 
 
2.2.3 Ethnic conflict 
Sambanis (2000) defines ‘ethnic conflict’ as a type of conflict that causes more than one 
thousand deaths, challenges the sovereignty of an internationally recognized state, occurs 
within the recognized boundaries of that state, and includes the state as one of the 
principal combatants and rebels with the ability to mount an organized military 
opposition to the state. The term ‘ethnic conflict’ is used here to refer to either active or 
potential use of collective violence between two ethnic communities who are contesting 
political and economic dominance.  
 
Ethnic conflict is an essential part of life and an agent of change that influences every 
relationship in most multi-ethnic developing countries. Thus, ethnic conflict cannot be 
attributed to one event or development (Mohamed 1994). Causes of ethnic conflict 
(personal, communal, or international) as well as the means to deal with it must be 
sought in the totality of the human environment: the physical, social, economic, and 
political. There can be no doubt of the serious consequences of ethnic conflict for 
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economic development. Ethnic conflict is believed to have strong adverse effects on 
economic prosperity. However, to date, the evidence on this matter is scarce, probably 
because it is difficult to know how economies would have evolved in the absence of 
ethnic conflict. 
 
Since 1960, it has been identified that 79 civil wars have erupted globally (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2001), some of them ongoing. Almost all ethnic conflicts have been in 
developing countries, whose economic growth and development are apt to be obstructed 
by the resulting human capital losses, reduced investments, infrastructure destruction, 
and market activity disruptions. Ethnic conflict can drive away foreign direct investment, 
an important source of funding, as foreign investors redirect their funds to less risky and 
more politically stable countries. The long-run and short-run economic prospects of civil-
war-torn nations are adversely affected by such hostilities. 
 
2.2.4 Economic openness 
Socio-economic factors have always played a leading role in conflicts, but the relative 
importance of economic openness has increased as a result of recent developments, such 
as democratization, economic reforms, and globalization. The term “economic openness” 
refers to a country’s accessibility to free movement of goods, services, capital, labor, 
technologies, and information across national borders. In other words, the concept of 
economic openness suggests that economies benefit from international trade, 
international capital transactions, and the international exchange of knowledge and 
information. In every country, economic openness is an inevitable process that affects 
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governments, firms, and societies in many ways. Particularly, in many economies it has 
been identified that economic openness is a necessary condition for effective governance 
and economic as well as social advancement. One of the potential benefits of economic 
openness, especially for developing countries, is an improvement in their international 
standing in terms of economic and political contexts. By creating higher interdependence 
among countries, mutually beneficial trade and investment reduce the likelihood of 
conflict and encourage states to look for peaceful solutions. Therefore, economic 
openness is statistically and substantially significant in reducing the likelihood of ethnic 
conflict either directly or indirectly via economic growth. 
 
How does economic openness affect ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic developing 
countries? Topics like this engender a heated debate. A substantial body of literature has 
identified a positive linkage between high degree of economic openness and ethnic 
conflict.  Others have failed to demonstrate this linkage. One of the unresolved issues in 
such researches is the inappropriate quantitative measurement of the concept of 
‘economic openness’. There is no single universally accepted technique for measuring 
the ‘openness’ of an economy to international trade. Though there are a variety of 
measures used as proxy for economic openness,2 the majority of the empirical studies 
define openness of an economy as the ratio of trade (export plus imports) to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). For the purposes of this investigation, we use the same ratio as 
proxy for openness to determine the relationship between the degree of openness and 
other economic variables.  
                                                 
2 Measures of openness are: Trade dependency ratio, Growth rate of exports, Tariff averages, Collected 
tariff ratios, Coverage of quantitative restrictions, Black market premium, Trade bias index, Sachs and 
Warner index and Leamer’s openness index. 
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Although there are debates concerned with linkages between economic openness and 
ethnic conflict, there is still need for more rigorous inquiry. In this regard, we can see 
that there are two different lines of argument, new-liberals and structuralists, on the 
relationship between economic openness and ethnic conflicts. While neo-liberal theorists 
believe increased economic openness is beneficial for the multi-ethnic developing 
countries, structuralists refer to the potentially negative effects of openness such as 
increased inequality and community disarray. Structuralists claim that economic 
openness (trade and foreign direct investment) is a form of capitalist exploitation of 
developing societies and that it promotes impoverishment, inequality, and injustice in 
many developing countries. With greater levels of impoverishment, inequality, and 
injustice, the likelihood of ethnic conflict increases, because marginalized or 
disadvantage groups want to end their grievances.  
 
On the other hand, liberals posit that greater economic openness encourages economic 
growth, which has a direct pacifying effect for the country and an indirect one through 
the promotion of democracy. They maintain that economic openness increases 
investment opportunities, creates job opportunities in newly-built production plants, 
brings technology diffusion and increases the tax base, thereby leading to more growth. 
Further, they explain that economic growth brings about ethnic peace, both directly and 
indirectly via democracy. The rationale behind the direct relationship is that if there is 
greater economic growth and prospect of long-term prosperity, opportunity costs for the 
formation of rebel groups grow and fewer people are willing to participate in these 
activities. The motivation of the rebellion can only be carried out if it is financially viable 
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(Collier and Hoffler 1998). With higher recruitment costs, the financial viability of 
rebellion decreases. More clearly put, the opportunity costs of a rich citizen are higher 
since s/he has more to lose from participating in a rebellion than a poor person. In 
addition, liberals explain that economic growth also brings about ethnic peace via 
democracy. An improvement in the standard of living substantially raises the probability 
that political institutions will become more democratic over time. They further add that 
democracy allows increased political participation and, therefore, channels grievances 
into non-confrontational forums. According to them, the highly repressive and highly 
non-repressive regimes face less conflict situation, while intermediate regimes face more.  
 
From the above two approaches, it can be said that the liberal argument relatively 
supports the recent empirical work. Further, the liberal argument provides a much better 
fit to real-world relationships between economic openness, growth and ethnic conflict.  
 
2.2.5 Economic growth and development 
Economic growth is a positive change in the level of production of goods and services by 
a country over a period of time. In other words, it refers to an increase in a country's 
ability to produce goods and services. It is usually brought about by technological 
innovation and positive external forces. The growth in GDP is usually a good indication 
of economic growth, but in an economy for which earnings from overseas are substantial 
in relation to GDP, it is better to look at Gross National Product (GNP). The advantage of 
economic growth is that an increase in real national income allows more goods for 
consumption. For economic growth to happen, a country must either acquire more 
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resources, or discover ways of using available resources more efficiently. The main 
sources of sustained growth are increases in labor supply, increases in physical or human 
capital, and increases in productivity brought about by technological progress. In the 
short run, output levels can often be raised simply by better utilization of existing idle 
resources. Today, the study of economic growth is in principle based on cross-country 
analysis of the relationship between economic growth and a range of variables that may 
account for the differences in growth rates. Important variables are education, 
demographic patterns, natural resource abundance, private and government saving, 
physical capital stock, economic or development policy, the quality of public institutions, 
and geography. 
 
Economic development has traditionally been defined in terms of growth of GNP, or per 
capita GNP. That is, standards of living can be raised if growth in output outpaces 
growth in population (Case and Fair 1996). Today, most economists measure 
development also in terms of matters of distribution and social benefits. These may 
include reductions in poverty, unemployment, and income inequalities as well as 
improvements in literacy, nutrition, schooling, and health conditions (Todaro 1992). 
Beyond economic criteria, development may be described as a process of social, political 
and ideological transformation. For example, important issues concern urbanization, the 
rise of science and technology, social mobility, intellectual diversity and division of 
labor, protection of property rights, and social and economic equalization. In Todaro’s 
view (1992), these changes are meant to help a society achieve three main objectives, 
first, to increase the availability of basic goods, such as food, shelter and health and 
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widen their distribution to all members of society; second, to raise incomes, provide 
more jobs and better education, and promote cultural and humanistic values in order to 
raise individual and national self-esteem; finally, to expand the range of human choice, 
open up economic and social opportunities and encourage political empowerment and 
participation.  
 
2.2.6 Disciplined government  
The role of a government in an economy can be divided into three broad categories: a 
contributor of institutions, promoter of economic growth, and provider of income 
distribution. The government can perform all these activities through a number of 
channels: it reduces information asymmetries about economic environment; it reduces 
risk and enforces property rights and contacts, determining who gets what and when; and 
it restricts the actions of politicians and interest groups, making them accountable to 
citizens. The government is thus likely to have an important impact on economic and 
political activities in general.  
 
The quality of governance has long been recognized as an important component of an 
economic welfare and political stability. Attaining good governance is inherently 
difficult: historically, there has been far more instances of bad governance than good 
ones. Good governance entails the existence of efficient and accountable institutions – 
political, judicial, administrative, economic, and corporate – and entrenched rules that 
promote development, protect human rights, respect the rule of law, and ensure that 
people are free to participate in, and be heard on issues, relating to their lives. According 
to the United Nations Development Program (2002), the quality of governance advances 
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sustainable development for three reasons. First, enjoying political freedom and 
participating in the decisions that shape one’s life are fundamental human rights. Second, 
the quality of governance helps to protect people from economic and political 
catastrophes. Third, the quality of governance can promote sustainable development by 
empowering citizens to influence policies that promote growth and prosperity and which 
reflect their priorities. Quite clearly, growth and development cannot be achieved in the 
absence of good governance. Among other things, good governance ensures the most 
efficient utilization of already scarce resources in the promotion of development, 
enhances participation, responsibility, and accountability; and has the potential to release 
people from poverty as state legitimacy is recognized and entrenched. Therefore, 
bringing about improvements in the quality of life and reducing the level of inequality is 
a function not only of the resources available but also of the economic and social 
priorities and policies of a government.  
 
2.2.7 Democracy 
Democracy is a form of government under which the power to alter the laws and 
structures of government lies ultimately with the people. Under such a system, legislative 
decisions are made by the people themselves or by representatives who act through the 
consent of the people, as enforced by elections and the rule of law. Democracy has the 
potential for both disciplining governments into delivering reasonable economic policies 
and providing a framework in which people can negotiate mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Hence, democracy reduces the risk of war directly, through the enhanced capacity to 
mediate disputes, and indirectly, through higher income. Moreover, most of the political 
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science literature has considered democracy as the only political variable that may affect 
the probability of civil war. Most studies of political conflict suggest that the type of 
political system makes a difference in a nation’s level of political conflict. These studies 
suggest that the more democratic a nation, the less likely it will experience high levels of 
political violence. Some empirical findings in cross-national research support these 
arguments, showing that nations with higher levels of democracy and political 
development tend to experience lower levels of political violence (Gurr 1993; 
Ziegenhagen 1994).  
 
2.2.8 Why do ethnic conflicts occur? 
Most ethnic conflicts, since the end of Cold War, have been fought in multi-ethnic 
developing countries (Easterly and Levine 1997; Sambanies 2001). Multi-ethnic 
developed countries seem to be spared this destructive and horrible phenomenon. What is 
it in multi-ethnic poor countries that cause ethnic conflict? The motivation of engaging 
ethnic conflict may be determined by the joint set of determinants. Theoretical and 
empirical evidence shows that various economic, political and cultural factors motivate 
ethnic conflict in many countries.  
 
With respect to economic factors, the evidence shows that less degree of economic 
openness (closed economy), poor quality of governance, low and slow income growth, 
high unemployment rate, poverty and highly unequal income distribution and primary 
export dependency have been suggested as possible causes of ethnic conflict. Among the 
political factors, the type of political regime is considered as an important determinant 
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factor. The states which operate at an intermediate level of democracy and semi 
democracies are the most prone to ethnic conflict. To consider cultural factors, ethnic and 
religious diversity (measured by the index of ethno-linguistic and religious 
fractionalization) are identified as the most important determinant factors for the risk of 
ethnic conflict. The index of ethnic fractionalization is positively associated with the 
probability of ethnic conflict.  
 
There is evidence that various economic, political and cultural factors are involved in 
ethnic conflict. Uneven economic development is often accompanied by a large increase 
in the incidence of ethnic conflict. Inequalities in income and levels of living, imbalances 
in access to education, employment and other opportunities may also cause ethnic 
tension and conflicts. Even in a homogeneous society, inequitable distribution of the 
benefits of economic and social development has caused social strife and tension. The 
possibilities for such social conflicts are even greater in a multi-ethnic society like 
Malaysia if socioeconomic imbalances among ethnic groups continue to persist. Such 
imbalances can easily find expression in ethnic conflicts and tension, which can lead to 
social and political instability. Esman (1994) affirms that there are indeed economic 
dimensions to most instances of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries. 
Esman further argues, for example, that the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is basically about 
economic values, or that the Quiet Revolution is mainly about employment opportunities 
for educated Quebecois, or that Malays are concerned primarily with closing the 
economic gap. The following literature review section provides more details about the 
determinants of ethnic conflict.   
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2.3 Review of literature 
Several ethnic studies focus on multi-ethnic countries, attending to the relative impact of 
the varied economic, political and social factors. These studies suggested that there are 
three different views about the determinants of ethnic conflict (Collier et al. 2003). Those 
on the political left tend to assume that it is due to economic factors, economic 
inequalities or a deep-rooted legacy of colonialism. Those in the political center tend to 
assume that it is due to political factors, a lack of democracy and that violence occurs 
where opportunities for the peaceful resolution of political disputes are lacking. Those on 
the political right tend to presume that ethnic conflict is due to cultural factors, 
longstanding ethnic and religious hatreds. With this brief introduction, the following 
section provides some of the important reviews related to ethnic studies.  
 
Among the economic, political, and cultural factors most consistently implicated in civil 
wars are those related to economic factors (Gurr 1994; Sachs and Warner 1995; Easterly 
and Levine 1997; Collier 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Elbawadi and Sambanis 
2000a; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Bussmann and Schneider 2003b; Gudrun 2003), a state’s 
regime type ((Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000a; Henderson and Singer 2000; Hegre et al. 
2001; Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002), and cultural composition (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Ellingsen 2000; Elbawadi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002) 
respectively. In terms of determinants, the current literature review section is divided into 




2.3.1 Economic factors and ethnic conflicts 
Economic factors and their influence on ethnic conflict have been a topical issue in recent 
ethnic studies literature and most of these studies accept that economic factors and ethnic 
conflict can not be separated (Sachs and Warner 1995; Easterly and Levine 1997; Collier 
and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Elbawadi and Sambanis 2000a; Fearon 
and Laitin 2000; Bussmann and Schneider 2003b; Gudrun 2003), Also, it has long been 
argued in the comparative politics literature that better economic activities create 
conditions conducive to ethnic harmony. Table 2.1 provides a bird’s eye view of the 
existing literature on ethnic conflict in terms of economic factors.   
 
According to Gurr (1994), people will be more satisfied with a higher level of economic 
development and prosperity and will, therefore, be less willing to resort to rebellious and 
violent actions. Sachs and Warner (1995) believe that the welfare effects of foreign 
economic liberalization are direct. Their cross-national comparison shows that 
developing countries that are economically open experience higher rates of economic 
growth and can better prevent ethnic conflict than countries with closed economies.  
 
Easterly and Levine (1997) found that ethnically diverse societies have slower economic 
growth and political instability than ethnically homogeneous societies as a result of 
political conflict and lack of cooperation across ethnic groups. They argue that ethnic 
diversity has a particularly negative impact on economic outcomes in sub-Saharan 
Africa, which has suffered from a series of destructive ethnic conflicts in recent years 
and is the most ethnically diverse and the poorest region in the world.  
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Table 2.1: Ethnic conflict and Economic factors: A summary 
Study Hypothesis Result Policy Implication 




Higher level of economic 
development and prosperity 
reduces violent actions. 
Economic 
performance willing 
to resort to rebellious 









experience higher rates of 
economic growth and can 
better prevent ethnic conflict 
than countries with closed 
economies. 
Economic openness 
is better policy option 
for multi-ethnic 
developing countries 







Africa’s poor growth is 
associated with political 
instability. 
Higher economic 
growth can prevent 
political instability.  
Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) 
Civil wars have 
economics causes. 
The higher is the per capita 
income the lower is the risk 
of civil war. 
Higher economic 






economic pleasure.  
The determinants of 
insurgency are mainly 
economic not political. 
Economic well being 




Ethnic conflicts in 
Africa are mainly 
due to poor 
economic 
performance. 
Slow income growth, low per 
capita income, and total 
population are all 
significantly positively 









Does free trade 
reduce the risk of 
internal war?  
Long-term openness seems to 
reduce the likelihood of 
armed conflict. 
 
Free trade has a 
conflict-reducing 
effect. 
Gudrun (2003) Whether horizontal 
inequalities affect 




between ethnic groups seem 
to be positively related to 
domestic ethnic conflict.  
And vertical inequality is 
negatively related to 
domestic ethnic conflict. 
Social horizontal 
inequality seems to 
be positively related 
to conflict outbreak. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
Also Easterly and Levine claim that diverse countries exhibit poor public policy 
performance along a range of dimensions, including greater foreign exchange distortion, 
slow financial development, poor schooling outcomes, and less investment in physical 
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infrastructure. Thus, they use this evidence to argue that diversity leads to slow growth 
through poor public policy choices.  
 
Following Easterly and Levine (1997), Fearon and Laitin (2000) similarly argue that the 
determinants of insurgency are mainly economic, and not political. They test the 
empirical fit of their theoretical model and find that primordialism, nationalism, and 
cultural or civilizational cleavages have no explanatory power as determinants of either 
the magnitude or prevalence of civil war. They contradict neo-liberal theory by arguing 
that lack of democracy is not an important determinant of the prevalence of war once 
they control for the level of economic growth, which they find to be the most salient 
determinants of civil war prevalence. They also assert that civil war will occur when its 
economic opportunity costs are low and that lack of democracy and ethnic fragmentation 
are non-significant correlates of war. 
 
Evidence provided by Collier and Hoeffler (2001) shows that ethnic conflicts in Africa 
are mainly due to poor economic performance. They argue that, civil wars in Africa are 
fundamentally driven by lack of economic opportunities rather than by political or other 
grievances such as repression against particular social groups. In other words, slow 
income growth, low per capita income, natural resource dependence, lower male 
secondary education enrollment, rebel military advantages, and total population are all 
significantly positively associated with the onset of civil conflict. 
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One of the disputed consequences of global economic integration is the possible effect 
that foreign economic liberalization exerts on social cohesion. Bussmann and Schneider 
(2003b) examine the contradictory claims for the developing world. They examine the 
following questions: does free trade reduce the risk of internal war? And does the process 
of liberalization increase the likelihood of armed conflict? Their results indicate that 
long-term openness as expressed through trade to GDP ratio seems to reduce the 
likelihood of armed conflict. According to Bussmann and Schneider (2003b), free trade 
has a conflict-reducing effect and that it can affect the preferences and norms of conflict 
regulations. They also claim that foreign economic liberalization does not increase the 
risk of conflict. Trade is a particularly interesting issue because it is uncontested that it 
has beneficial effects on the general welfare of a country but simultaneously involves 
highly redistributive nature of the trade liberalization process. In a comprehensive 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between trade and civil conflict, Bussmann and 
Schneider (2003b) found that in the long run trade promotes domestic political stability; 
they did not find any evidence to suggest that the process of trade liberalization leads to 
an increase in instability. 
 
Gudrun (2003) argues that horizontal inequality may also be an opportunity factor, and 
proposes a synthetic theory of horizontal inequality and ethnic conflict. He analyzes the 
relationship between such horizontal inequalities among the two largest ethnic groups in 
a country and their effects on the incidence and onset of domestic ethnic conflict, 
respectively. The main finding of his study is that horizontal inequalities between ethnic 
groups seem to be positively related to domestic ethnic conflict. Furthermore, he found 
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some evidence indicating that vertical inequality is negatively related to domestic ethnic 
conflict. 
 
There is also a growing body of recent literature on the causes, initiation, and duration of 
ethnic conflict, which indicates that ethnic conflicts are determined by economic factors.  
Henderson and Singer (2000) provide a systematic analysis of the extent to which 
cultural, political, and economic factors are associated with civil wars in post-colonial 
states of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The growth literature indicates that civil 
wars, other ethnic conflicts, and state failure generally have deleterious effects on 
economic growth (Barro 1991; Barro and Lee 1994; Sala-I-Martin 1997; Murdoch and 
Sandler 2002). The empirical economic growth literature has been growing at an 
exponential rate since the last decade. Barro and Lee (1994) estimate an endogenous 
growth model that includes both the duration and the occurrence of civil war as an added 
explanatory variable. They found that civil war has a negative but insignificant effect on 
the growth rate of per capita income after adjusting for other factors that influence 
economic growth. When they measured civil war as the duration of the war, they found a 
positive, though statistically insignificant, relationship between civil war and economic 
growth. Sala-I-Martin (1997) uses the incidence of civil war and finds a significantly 
negative growth effect of war. Using the augmented neoclassical growth model of 
Mankiw et al. (1992) with civil war incidence and intensity as added regressors, they find 
that the incidence of civil war has a moderately negative impact on the levels of per 
capita income and substantially negative impacts on the growth rates of per capita 
income in neighboring countries. Mankiw et al. (1992) found that the greater the 
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intensity of the civil conflict, the greater the spatial spillover effects. They also found that 
the impact of civil war on income levels was short-term in nature. Boswell and Dixon 
(1990) as well as Muller and Weeds (1990) found that high rates of economic growth 
reduce the incidence of violent rebellion and ethnic conflict.  
 
There are two widely accepted schools of thought that explain the relationship between 
economic development and ethnic conflict (Richardson and Shinjinee 1996). According 
to mainstream and Marxist development scholars, one school of thought economic 
development would inevitably reduce the potential for ethnic conflict, since growth 
would be rapid and the resulting benefits diffused through all levels of society. Until the 
1960s, most of the post colonial independence seemed to confirm this theory, but in the 
late 1960s, rising inter-ethnic conflicts in many new countries increased doubts.  
 
A second and more persistent school, World Bank (WB) staff members, held those 
economic development policies and those relevant to maintaining political stability could 
be formulated in separate compartments. They argue, political involvement takes an 
increased interest in economics.  From late 1960s to 1995, political changes of many 
multi ethnic countries proved both views wrong. Yet in multi-ethnic developing countries 
that did well economically, economic benefits were not distributed to all segments of 
society. This led some ethnically diverse countries such as Sri Lanka, Malaysia and 
Indonesia to implement deferent policies that benefited some sections of the society 
disproportionately. Disparity over the benefits of development creates political instability 
and contributes to outbreaks of ethnic conflict.   
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Further, Findlay (1996) observes that in Southeast Asia economic growth and effective 
governance have led to a decline in internal ethnic conflict in Malaysia since 1970s while 
poor economic growth, inter alia, in the Philippines and Burma has allowed their internal 
conflicts to persist. He continues that targeted policies of ‘shared growth’ enable 
governments to establish their legitimacy and win public support by ensuring that 
economic development benefits all major groups, thereby reducing the likelihood of 
insurgencies. Findlay maintains that economic processes loom large as factors leading to 
civil wars in Asia while Collier and Hoeffler’s (1998, 2001) analysis implicates 
economic factors in civil wars in Africa. 
 
Abeyratne (2004) showed that fundamental contradictions in national development 
policy throughout the post independence era were at the heart of the Sri Lanka’s ethnic 
conflict. While acknowledging that, economic discrimination and inequality among 
social groups have received much attention as causes of ethnic conflicts and, subsequent 
civil wars. Abeyratne clearly points to the need to go beyond the popular ethnic 
dimensions and to look at the limitations and fundamental contradictions in the overall 
development process go as to in broaden the understanding of the economic roots of 
ethnic conflict. Abeyratne and Rotrico (2002) found that political unrest and ethnic 
conflicts were the products of the political economy of Sri Lanka’s own development 
process. 
 
Roslan (2001) argues that government intervention under the New Economic Policy 
(here after NEP) in Malaysia has succeeded in generating economic growth and 
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development of the country in general and the development of the Malays particular. 
According to Roslan, the ethnicity-oriented policy provided a better solution to the 
Malaysian ethnic problem. Ali (1991) asserts that although the basis of inter-ethnic 
tension in Malaysia is economic, it has given a misleading cultural interpretation. 
Abdullah (1997) reviews the Malaysian experience in rectifying the economic and social 
imbalances through a comprehensive system of affirmative action policies. He concludes 
that in the twenty-year period of the policy implementation, its objectives have largely 
been achieved, with the Malays of Malaysia becoming socially and economically better 
off today than they were in the late 1960s.  
 
Like economic growth and development, other economic factors such as inflation, 
unemployment, and natural resource dependence also have influence on ethnic conflict. 
A cross-national study by Gurr and Duvall (1973) showed a direct relationship between 
economic decline and ethnic conflict. They indicate that a high inflation and 
unemployment levels induce uncertainty within different societal groups. According to 
Franzosi (1989), political strikes vary directly with high levels of inflation and 
unemployment rates, although the relationship may be coorelational rather than causal. A 
number of researchers (Balasuriya 1978; Silva 1997; Herath 2002; Abeyratne 2004) 
indicate that unemployment is one of the major issues which affect inter-ethnic relations 
in Sri Lanka.  
 
Different scholars tell different stories about how resource dependence can lead to, or 
lengthen civil wars. According to several recent studies, a country’s natural resource 
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dependence is highly correlated with the likelihood that it will suffer from civil war. 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2001) assert that rely heavily on the export of natural 
resources face a much higher risk of civil war than resource-poor states. Using different 
sets of data, De Soysa (2002) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) have confirmed this 
finding. Fearon (2001) also finds that resource dependence is correlated with the duration 
of civil wars, although not with the incidence of civil war. Recent studies have also noted 
natural resources to be a key explanation for the outbreak of civil war (Berdal and 
Malone 2000; Collier et al. 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003). 
 
2.3.2 Political factors and ethnic conflicts 
There are many studies that explain political factors as the main cause of ethnic conflict 
in multi-ethnic countries (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000a; Henderson and Singer 2000; 
Hegre et al. 2001; Sambanis 2001; Reynal-Querol 2002). Ethnic competition, cleavages, 
and conflicts become a serious challenge to governments. Therefore, in multi-ethnic 
societies interaction between ethnic groups and government is important from the 
viewpoint of socio-political dynamics, particularly in the context of nation-building. 








Table 2.2: Ethnic conflict and political factors: A Summary 





The relatively higher 
prevalence of war in 
Africa is not due to the 
ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation of its 
countries, but rather to 
high levels of poverty, 
failed political institutions, 
and economic dependence 
on natural resources. 
Low political rights are 
significantly and 
negatively correlated 
with the incidence of 
war.  
 
The strategy to prevent 
civil wars in Africa 
should be based on 
promoting political 
freedom and molding a 
governance framework 






The presence of semi-
democracy increases the 
likelihood of civil war. 
The practices of semi-
democracy are 
associated with an 
increased likelihood of 
civil war. 
A multifaceted 
strategy of full 
democratization is 
required to reduce the 
likelihood of civil war 
in post-colonies states.  
Hegre et 
al. (2001)  
 
Semi-democracies are 
more likely to experience 




and harshly authoritarian 
states have few civil 
wars, and intermediate 
regimes are the most 
conflict-prone. 
The most reliable path 
to stable domestic 
peace in the country is 
to democratize as 




Ethnic wars are 
predominantly due to 
political, rather than 
economic grievances.  
Living in a bad 
neighborhood, with 
undemocratic neighbors 
or neighbors at war, 
significantly increases 
ethnic war. 
Politics is more 
important than 
economics in causing 
ethnic civil war and 
ethnic heterogeneity 
significantly increases 




The combination of 
political system and 
democracy level has a 
high explanatory power on 
the probability of ethnic 
civil war. 
Middle-level 
democracies are more 
prone to civil war than 
high level democracies 
and high level 
autocracies. 
The establishment of 
consociational 
democracies can 
prevent ethnic wars 




Elbawadi and Sambanis (2000a) found that low political rights are significantly and 
negatively correlated with the incidence of war. Using recently developed models of the 
overall prevalence of civil wars in 161 countries between 1960-1999, they draw lessons 
with special reference to Africa, showing that the relatively higher prevalence of war in 
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Africa is not due to the ethno-linguistic fragmentation of its countries, but rather to high 
levels of poverty, failed political institutions, and economic dependence on natural 
resources. They argue that the best and fastest strategy to reduce the prevalence of civil 
war in Africa and prevent future civil wars is to institute democratic reforms that 
effectively manage the challenges facing Africa's diverse societies. In subsequent papers, 
Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) found that democracy is negatively associated with ethnic 
conflict and that ethnic conflict prevalence is positively associated with ethnic 
fractionalization.  
 
Henderson and Singer’s (2000) results of logistic regression analyses corroborate 
previous findings that the practices of semi-democracy are associated with an increased 
likelihood of civil war. Among the cultural, political, and economic factors, semi-
democracy has the greatest impact on the probability of civil war, which suggests the 
greater role of political than economic or cultural factors in post-colonial civil wars. The 
findings suggest that a multifaceted strategy of full democratization and economic 
development is required to reduce the likelihood of civil war in post colonial states.  
 
Hegre et al. (2001) found that middle-level democracies are more prone to civil war than 
high level democracies and high level autocracies. According to them, coherent 
democracies and harshly authoritarian states have few civil wars, and intermediate 
regimes are the most conflict prone. Further, they found that domestic violence also 
seems to be associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or 
greater autocracy. Based on an analysis of the period 1816-1992, they concluded that 
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intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to 
stabilize from a regime change.  
 
Sambani (2001) argue that identity wars are predominantly due to political grievance 
rather than lack of economic opportunity. Using a new data set that he compiled of 161 
countries observed annually over a forty-year period, Sambani found that the lack of 
democracy is a significant predictor of the onset of ethnic civil war. Also Sambani found 
an important new result is that living in a bad neighborhood, with undemocratic 
neighbors or neighbors at war, significantly increases a country’s risk of experiencing 
ethnic civil war. 
 
Reynal-Querol (2001) analyzes the role of political systems in preventing ethnic 
conflicts. She develops a simple theoretical model that captures the basic relationship 
between the political system and rebellion. The important question that this research 
analyzes is the political characteristics that can prevent or promote civil wars. In her 
research, Reynal-Querol explained that the combination of political system and 
democracy level has a high explanatory power on the probability of ethnic civil war. 
From the empirical analysis she shows how the structure of a political system is an 
important mechanism that can affect the probability of civil war in a democratic system. 
Moreover, she found empirically that the establishment of consociational democracies 




2.3.3 Cultural factors and ethnic conflicts 
There is a large literature devoted to analysis of the relationship between cultural factors 
and ethnic conflicts. Most of this has been empirical (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; 
Ellingsen 2000; Elbawadi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002). These studies 
suggest that there are two key cultural elements involved in ethnic conflicts: ethnic 
diversity and religion. Table 2.3 summarizes the existing literature on ethnic conflict and 
social factors. 
 
Table 2.3: Ethnic conflict and Social factors: A Summary 







significant and strong 
determination of the 
duration and the 
probability of civil 
wars.  
The relationship between civil 
wars and ethnic diversity is 
non-monotonic; Highly 
fractionalized societies are no 
more prone to war than highly 
homogeneous ones. 
A country with two 
similarly sized ethnic-
linguistic groups could 
reduce the risk of civil war 
either by partition or 
equally well by union with 







Multi-ethnicity does increase 
the propensity of domestic 
violence. 
The country's political 
regime and socioeconomic 









societies have a higher 
risk of suffering a civil 
war than homogeneous 
societies 
Ethnic fractionalization is 
positively, robustly, and non-
monotonically associated with 
the probability of war 
incidence.  
A quadratic interaction term 
of religious and ethnic 
diversity is negatively 
associated with the incidence 
of civil war. 
Political variables are 
important and that they 
should be carefully 
integrated in any 
framework designed to 
better understand the 






societies are more 
prone to intense 
conflict. 
 
The most important result is 
the importance of religious 
polarization and animist 
diversity in explaining the 
incidence of ethnic civil war. 
The religious differences 
are a social cleavage more 
important than linguistic 
differences when analyze 
the development of a civil 
war. 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Many studies have directly addressed the issue of ethnic diversity and its effects on 
ethnic conflicts. Several authors have interpreted the finding of a negative relationship 
between ethnic diversity and growth to be a consequence of the high probability of 
conflict associated with a highly fractionalized society. 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) focus on the role of ethnic diversity in triggering civil war. 
Using an index of Ethno Linguistic Fragmentation3 (ELF), they found that more 
fragmented societies are not more prone to civil war than the rest, but that the danger of 
civil war increases when society achieves mid level values of the index ELF. They used 
the concept of ethnic fragmentation as a proxy for the coordination costs of a rebellion 
arguing that the greater the ethnic fragmentation, the greater the coordination costs and 
the lower the risk of onset of civil war. However, their empirical evidence revealed that 
ELF is actually not a significant determinant of the onset of civil war; and that ethnic 
dominance is actually harmful since it allows an ethnic group to oppress the minority, 
thus significantly increasing the risk of onset of civil war. 
 
                                                 
3 ELF measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from a given country do not speak the 
same language. The scale thus goes from 0 (totally homogenous country) to 1 (totally fractionalized 
country). For example, the value 0.50 for a country implies that there is a 50–50 chance that two 
individuals will come from different ethnic groups. The data on ethnic fractionalization were computed by 








21   ni ............1=  
The population shares of ethnic groups in a country are denoted P1, P2, P3,…, Pn. It can be calculated 
fractionalization values for each of the selected countries in the sample based on data on ethnic affinity. 
The calculation procedure may be illustrated with the example of Malaysia: In Malaysia, three ethnic 
groups were registered in the 2000: Malays (65 per cent), Chinese (26 per cent) and Indians (7.7 per cent).  
Applying above formula based on these data, we got the following result:  1- (0.652 + 0.262 + 0.082) = 0.51. 
Hence, the probability that two individuals selected at random from Malaysia will be from different ethnic 
groups is 0.51.  
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Ellingsen (2000) investigates the relationship between multi-ethnicity and domestic 
conflict. She found that the different aspects of multi ethnicity (the size of the largest 
group, the number of groups, and the size of the minority group) are important in 
explaining domestic conflicts. Her results provided an important role to socioeconomic 
variables in reducing the level of conflict. According to Ellingsen result, multi-ethnicity 
does increase the propensity of domestic violence. She concluded that the country's 
political regime and socioeconomic level are more important in predicting domestic 
conflict. 
 
However, after those initial findings Elbawadi and Sambanis (2000a) found that 
ethnically polarized societies have a higher risk of suffering a civil war than 
homogeneous societies. They used a random effects panel probit estimator to identify the 
key variables that influence the incidence of war. Their main concern was to identify the 
impact of ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization on the probability of violent 
conflict. They found that the net effect of ELF on the incidence of civil war was an 
additive sum of its influence on war onset and war duration. Ethnic fractionalization was 
positively, robustly, and non-monotonically associated with the probability of war 
incidence. At the same time, they found that a quadratic interaction term of religious and 
ethnic diversity was negatively associated with the incidence of civil war.  
 
In their subsequent paper, Elbawadi and Sambanis (2002) examined how wars start, how 
they end and identify how much war we are likely to observe in any given period? To 
answer this question, they combined recent advances in the theory of civil war initiation 
and duration and developed the concept of war incidence, which denotes the probability 
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of observing an event of civil war in any given period. They tested the theories of war 
initiation and duration against this new concept using a five-year panel data-set of 161 
countries. Their analysis of war incidence corroborates most of the results of earlier 
studies on war initiation and duration and enriches those results by highlighting the 
significance of socio-political variables as determinants of the risk of civil war. Their 
results conclude that the net effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the incidence of 
civil war is an additive sum of its influence on war onset and war duration. Ethnic 
fractionalization is positively, robustly, and non-monotonically associated with the 
probability of war incidence. At the same time, they that a quadratic interaction term of 
religious and ethnic diversity is negatively associated with the incidence of civil war.  
 
Reynal-Querol (2002) analyzes the effect of ethnic division on civil war using a time 
series of cross-sections for 138 countries from 1960 to 1995, organized in five-years 
periods. In her paper, Reynal-Querol show that the importance of religious polarization 
and animist diversity in explaining the incidence of ethnic civil war. She argued that 
polarization indices are more suitable to proxy latent religious conflicts. They show 
empirically that religious polarization and animist diversity are the most important factors 
that explain the incidence of ethnic civil war. Therefore the results suggest that religious 
divisions are more important than language divisions and natural resources in explaining 
social ethnic conflicts. Overall, their results suggest that religious divisions are more 




There is also a growing body of recent literature indicates that ethnic conflicts are 
determined by social factors. Horowitz (1985) argues that the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and civil wars is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous 
and highly heterogeneous societies and more conflicts in societies where a large ethnic 
minority faces an ethnic majority. Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that ethnic diversity 
has had a particularly negative impact on economic outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA).Yet the impact of ethnic diversity on local collective action in SSA remains 
largely unexplored empirically. In addition to political-economic factors, the roles of 
ideology, ethnicity and religion in civil wars in Africa are emphasized. The seminal 
article of Easterly and Levine on ethnic diversity in economics shows how ethnic 
diversity affected growth rates across countries during the post-war period, using a 
dataset on national ethno-linguistic diversity compiled by Russian anthropologists during 
the 1960s. Fearon and Laitin (2000), focusing on prevalence and conflict magnitude, 
found no evidence of a significant association between risk of civil war and the degree of 
ethnic heterogeneity.  
 
Silva (1997) provides an excellent introduction to the complex nature of Sri Lanka’s 
ethnic problems and the political ramifications of rivalries between the Sinhalese and 
Tamils. He examines the scope and impact of affirmative action programs in Sri Lanka, 
focusing on three themes: university admissions policies, language policies, and 
employment in the state sector. Silva found that the introduction of this program was a 
key factor, sometimes triggering and aggravating ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka. 
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2.3.4 Justification of the literature studies  
A vast literature has theorized, quantified, and analyzed in detail the economic, political 
and social causes of conflict in developing countries. This literature has been dominated 
by the analysis of large-scale civil wars based on evidence from extensive cross-sections 
of countries across several years. Although some studies have suggested that conflicts are 
largely associated with economic motivations, several other studies have suggested that 
political and cultural factors have been responsible for the onset of civil wars, riots, 
insurrections, other forms of civil upheavals and crime. Even though a significant 
number of studies have focused on the analysis of the determinants of civil wars and their 
duration and have centered on economic causes, there are, however, very few studies 
concerned with inter-ethnic conflicts. 
 
The present research addresses some of these gaps in the literature. The present research 
provides an analysis of the economic determinants of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic 
developing countries and the relative merits of specific means of reducing and/or 
preventing the onset and the proliferation of ethnic conflict, taking into account the 
possible endogenous nature of ethnic conflict.  
 
 2.4 Summary 
A two-pronged approach was adopted in chapter 2. First, given the importance of the key 
terms, namely, ethnicity, ethnic boundaries, ethnic conflict, economic openness, 
discipline government, economic growth and development and democracy in the present 
study, it was necessary to define them. Second, the literature on ethnic studies was 
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reviewed. Together the explanation of key terms and the review of selected studies those 
served to provide a conceptual framework for the ethnic study. Chapter 3 is devoted to 
examine the EPPs in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.  








































Ethnic preference policies in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As we have pointed out in Chapter 1, there has been a belief among academics, 
journalists as well as politicians that ethnic preference policies were the main reasons for 
the different inter ethnic relation in Sri Lanka and Malaysia (Tambiah 1996; 
Samarasinghe 1984; Manogaran 1987; Lee 2000; Silva 2001). In order to find the validity 
of this proclamation, it is essential to shed some light on the ethnic preference policies in 
Sri Lanka and Malaysia. The present chapter therefore, discusses the origins, evolution 
and implications of EPPs in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. More specifically, the chapter 
highlights the following major components:  
 
• a brief background of EPPs – the origin and nature of the ethnic polity in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia and the rationale of their EPPs;  
• an analysis of the major domains of ethnic contestation and state intervention 
(e.g., politics, administration, business, education, culture, and religion) in both 
countries; and  






3.2 A Brief background of ethnic preference policies 
Affirmative action is more than just an economic policy. In its ‘ideal’ conceptualization, 
it also embodies the political principles of restructuring and redistribution and the moral 
ethos of equity and justice (Ratuva 2002). In many multi-ethnic countries, EPPs are 
continuous because they engage fundamental questions about fair access to or just 
distribution of valued resources (Nevitte and Kennedy 1986). The Report of the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights (1984) describes EPPs as ‘any measure, beyond 
simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct or compensate for 
past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from recurring in the future.’ 
Most countries in the world practice EPPs in different ways and different degrees but 
often justified by the same reasons. The EPPs could be compensatory or used to bridge 
the economic and socio-political gap between groups or empower disadvantaged groups.  
 
The EPPs in America started in the 1960s as a form of compensation and also 
empowerment for blacks, disadvantaged by slavery. India’s EPPs attempt to empower 
the lower castes, especially the “untouchables” to incorporate them into mainstream 
economic and political life. Malaysia’s EPPs, which started under the NEP in 1970, was 
meant to restructure the economy to give indigenous Malays more economic power. 
South Africa’s EPPs since 1994 has largely targeted blacks as a broad category, while in 
Fiji, indigenous Fijians have been the major beneficiaries (Ratuva 2002). Therefore, in 
many countries, the EPPs are known as a corrective measure for reducing discrimination 
and ensuring proportional representation of the underprivileged ethnic groups. 
Regardless of the names given to them, EPPs are constructed to maintain certain ethnic 
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outcomes. It can be said that EPPs are part of a nation-building process that addresses the 
grievances of the marginalized.  
 
EPPs have been frequently used in government contracts, university admission policies, 
and in hiring and promotional decisions in both the public and private sectors. Further, 
these policies have always been controversial, thus subjected to both legal and legislative 
attacks. In other words, EPPs raise a number of questions: to what extent do favoritism 
and bias persist, especially in a systemic way? To what degree have EPPs been effective 
in providing otherwise unavailable opportunities in areas such as education, employment, 
and business? And to what extent do EPPs unfairly deprive qualified minorities 
opportunities in these areas.  
 
Given the multi-ethnic character of nearly all postcolonial countries, the imposition of 
EPPs regularly resulted in accentuating the relations between the majority and minority 
ethnic groups. Given that the present study is focused on Sri Lanka and Malaysia, it is 
important to trace the evolution of EPPs in order to examine their implicit strategies and 
to explore how these policies have eventually contributed to the preconditions in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia. How each nation constructs its preferential policies and how 
effective these policies are in changing ethnic differentials depends, to a large extent, on 
the political power of the beneficiary ethnic group. In Malaysia and Sri Lanka, the group 




3.3 Ethnic preference policies in Sri Lanka 
This section is divided into two parts. The first part describes the EPPs in Sri Lanka. The 
second part relates the EPPs to specific issues such as language, religion, education, 
employment, land settlement, and policy decision.  
 
3.3.1 Evolution of ethnic preference policies 
Sri Lanka is a prime example of a country where a system of ethnic preferences and 
privileges has been steadily expanded from the time of independence to the present day. 
Since independence, two distinct stages have been noted in the development of EPPs in 
Sri Lanka (Oberst 1986).  
 
The initial stage lasted for twenty five years after independence. It was marked by 
attempts of the majority ethnic group to claim their rightful place in the society, which 
they lost under the colonial rule. Attempts such as ‘Sinhala Only’ policy, standardization 
and land settlement program were made by the Sinhalese to restrict the influence of Sri 
Lanka’s minority communities. By the mid 1970s, this policy had succeeded in restoring 
the Sinhalese to a position of dominance and ensured that they maintained that position.4 
The second, and subsequent, stage was marked by policies that enforced the minority 
ethnic group’s compliance with the Sinhalese-dominated state. Before independence, Sri 
Lankan Tamils played an important role in the political and administrative life of the 
country, mainly due to their enthusiasm for higher education. After independence, 
                                                 
4 Even though the Sinhalese received their rightful place in the 1970s, the benefits were not shared with the 
majority of rural Sinhalese. Only well established urban districts such as Colombo and Kandy received 
more benefits than rural areas.  A similar pattern was identified in the minority ethnic group as well: only 
Jaffna district received more benefit than other areas.  
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attempts by the majority Sinhalese to reverse the perceived dominant influence of the 
Tamils resulted in increasing tensions between the two ethnic communities, which have 
unfortunately continued till tension.   
 
3.3.2 Ethnic preference in language 
One of the important ethnic policy issues in early Sri Lankan politics concerned to 
language. It has tended to divide Sri Lanka rather than contribute toward the creation of 
unity in the society.  
 
Language has been one of the main sources of controversy between the Sinhalese and the 
Tamils since the post-independence period. When the British ruled Sri Lanka, an alien 
language – English – was imposed upon the people. As soon as the British left the Island, 
the replacement of English language emerged as an important point of confrontation. Up 
to the 1950s there had been consensus among the elites about the need to replace English 
with Sinhalese and Tamil jointly. The demand had been especially articulated by the 
Sinhalese and Tamil educated intelligentsia, who had been excluded from the highest 
administrative and professional jobs, even after independence. During the years 1953-
1956, however a swift change from the progressive claim for the use of both languages to 
the demand for Sinhala to be the only official language took place. The Sinhalese 
educated intelligentsia and the Buddhist clergy insisted that Sinhala be declared the only 
national language of the country.  
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However, the first post-independence government took the position that Sinhala and 
Tamil would be given parity as national languages after English had been phased out. In 
1956, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party government won the election on the campaign 
promise to establish Sinhala as the official language of the country, replacing English. In 
1956, the victory of SWRD Bandaranaike on a platform of Sinhalese nationalism led him 
to declare Sinhala as the country's official language. The ‘Sinhala only’ policy meant that 
employment in the public sector and university education was determined by the 
knowledge of the Sinhala language. The policy was clearly aimed, in part, to reduce the 
large numbers of English-speaking people (mostly Tamils) in the civil service and to get 
more rural Sinhala speakers into universities (Marshall 1990). As a result of the ‘Sinhala 
only’ policy, opportunities for the Tamil in education and employment were drastically 
and negatively affected. Communal tension continued from 1956 onwards as Tamils 
became increasingly frustrated. Although limited compromises were designed and 
adopted to appease Tamil sentiments, such as the 1959 Tamil Language Special 
Provision Act and the 1978 Constitution's granting of national language status to Tamil, 
the overall position of the minority ethnic community has deteriorated since the 
introduction of Sinhala as the official language. 
 
Whereas the Sinhalese perception was that the ‘Sinhala only’ policy was a long overdue 
remedy to the injustice done in the past (where only the English educated Sinhala and 
Tamil elite enjoyed the privileges of the state), the Tamil elite political leadership saw 
opportunities and potentials reduced for the English-educated elite Tamils under this new 
arrangement. Interestingly too, a large number of English educated Tamils and Sinhala 
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professionals left the country in the late 1950s and early sixties when the vernacular 
educated Sinhalese began to fill the ranks of the state after the introduction of Sinhala as 
the official language. While it was only a matter of impact on their social and economic 
dominance for the upper class Sinhala elite, for the Tamils, it was also an issue of 
language, which mobilized sentiments of identity. The Tamils were forced to gain 
competency in Sinhala, which was not merely an alien language to them but also a 
language associated negatively with Sinhalese domination. 
 
The charge of discrimination with respect to minority languages lies not in the absence of 
a ‘parity of status’ in all regards, but in denying the minority their reasonable language 
rights. This is exactly what the reasonable use of Tamil legislation in Sri Lanka was 
designed to achieve. The official Language Act of 1956 defined the status of Tamil and 
guaranteed its use as the medium of education and instruction up to the highest levels, 
and ensured that it could be used in the courts, parliament, and as a medium for entry into 
employment, and for all economic and cultural purposes. In addition, Tamil was declared 
a national language under the 1971 constitution. Indeed, Sri Lanka is the only sovereign 
state to have conceded to Tamil the status of a national language even though only a 
small proportion of the world's Tamils live in Sri Lanka. Thus, Tamil features in the 
national insignia, the currency, postage stamps, and in all official documents. English is 
also a national language to assuage other minorities apart from the Tamils. In practice 
today, Tamil is given virtual parity of status with Sinhalese and English in areas of such 
as education, politics, and legal systems.  
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3.3.3 Ethnic preference in religion 
Another key issue of EPP is the role of Buddhism in Sri Lanka.  Buddhism holds a very 
special place in the identity of the Sinhalese. After independence, most of the Sinhalese 
felt aggrieved at the treatment Buddhism received during the colonial period.  It is not 
surprising that the religion was enshrined in the constitution (Oberst 1986). The 
constitution of 1978 states in Article 9 that ‘the republic of Sri Lanka shall give 
Buddhism the foremost place and accordingly it shall be the duty of the state to protect 
and foster the Buddha Sasana’. Thus, Buddhism is accorded a special place above other 
religions practiced in Sri Lanka. Since 1956, successive governments have actively 
promoted Buddhism, while guaranteeing the rights of members of other religions. It has 
been noted that, since independence, Buddhists have played a major role in the political 
life of Sri Lanka.  
 
Besides the role religion plays in politics, it is important in education. In Sri Lanka, 
religion is a mandatory subject in the school curriculum. Parents and children may 
choose whether a child studies Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, or Christianity. Religion is 
taught in schools from an academic point of view. Further, there are separate ministries 
in the government that address religious affairs. These include: The Ministry of Buddha 
Sasana, the Ministry of Muslim Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Hindu Affairs, and the 
Ministry of Christian Affairs. Each ministry is empowered to deal with issues involving 
the religion in question. Despite the constitutional preference for Buddhism, a number of 
major religious festivals of other faiths are celebrated as national holidays.  
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Clearly, discrimination based on religious differences is much less common in Sri Lanka 
than in other multi-ethnic developing countries. There is no indication of preference in 
employment in the public sector or university entrance on the basis of religion. There are 
reports though, that members of various religious groups show preference to members of 
their own group or denomination in hiring in the private sector. But this practice is linked 
to the country's ongoing ethnic problems and does not appear to be based principally on 
religion. 
 
3.3.4 Ethnic preference in education  
Education is another area in which policies are implemented to support the majority 
community in Sri Lanka. Education has been given high priority by the government and 
people. As in many other developing countries, education is considered the main key to 
social mobility.  
 
One consequence of this emphasis on education has been very stiff competition for 
admission to universities in Sri Lanka. Since independence, university admissions have 
been determined on the basis of examination in the three languages used in the country – 
Sinhala, Tamil, and English. Only those with the highest scores were admitted. For many 
years, the number of students admitted on the basis of the Tamil language exams 
exceeded the number that would have been expected from this group on the basis of their 
percentage of the population. This was partly due to their higher rate of literacy in 
English and of the excellent facilities for education in the schools of the Jaffna5 district 
                                                 
5 Jaffna is located in the northern part of the Sri Lanka, and refers to the capital city, peninsula, adjacent 
islands, hinterland and home city of Sri Lankan Tamil. It had been the second largest city in the country for 
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from which many of them entered the universities (Silva 1997). In the 1969-1970 
intakes, for instance, the Tamils had just over 35 per cent of the admissions to the faculty 
of science; in engineering and medicine it was as high as 45 per cent. 
 
In the 1970s, the United Front (UF) government became concerned with the poor 
performance of the Sinhalese students. Since then, major developments have occurred in 
the field of education.  Primarily, this concern led to a series of attempts to provide 
positive action for the Sinhala-medium students. In 1970 the UF government enacted the 
first of a series of policies of preference to protect Sinhalese students by limiting the 
number of university placements available to other students. Initially, the UF coalition 
introduced a system of ‘standardization’, which ensured that the number of students 
qualifying for university entrance from each language group was proportionate to the 
number of students who sat for university entrance examination in that language.6  All 
marks were reduced to a uniform scale so that the number of students qualifying in each 
language became proportionate to the number sitting the examination in that medium. 
                                                                                                                                                 
several decades, till recent times. The Jaffna peninsula is actually almost an island; only the narrow 
causeway known as Elephant Pass – for once elephants did wade across the shallow lagoon here connects 
Jaffna with the rest of Sri Lanka. Jaffna is low lying; much of it is covered by shallow lagoons, and has a 
number of interesting islands dotted offshore. In all, it covers 2560 square km (999 square miles).  
 
The Jaffna peninsula is one of the most densely populated areas of Sri Lanka, inhabited largely by Tamil-
speaking people. It is also known as the cultural capital of Sri Lankan Tamils. The local citizens are Hindu, 
Catholics, Muslims and Christians. Jaffna suffered under the Portuguese and Dutch occupations of the 
17th-18th cent. Tobacco, rice, coconuts, palmyra palm, and vegetables are grown; fishing is an important 
occupation. The main industries there are salt, cement, chemical, and tobacco production. In the current 
unsettled situation in the northern part of Sri Lanka, many residents have moved out of the Jaffna 
peninsula, and thus the population has been reduced considerably. 
 
6 Prior to this, individuals entered universities on the basis of national competitive examinations marked on 
a uniform basis. Those who scored highest gained access to different faculties in universities irrespective of 
their ethnicity or districts from which they came. While there was no inherent bias, Tamils from Jaffna and 
Colombo did particularly well.  
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Late in 1970 the government introduced a lower qualifying mark for students who took 
the examinations in Sinhala medium, in order that a politically acceptable ratio of Tamil 
to Sinhalese students could be admitted to the science, engineering and medical faculties 
of the University of Ceylon. 
 
The result was that Tamil students had to obtain higher aggregate marks than their 
Sinhalese counterparts to gain admission to science, engineering and medical faculties of 
the university. De Silva (1984) explains the consequences of these policies, ‘the 
qualifying mark for admission to the medical faculties was 250 out of 400 for Tamil 
students, whereas it was only 229 for the Sinhalese’. This difference was applied not only 
for one faculty but considered for all other faculties (Ahmed 1996). By the early 1980s, 
the policy had proven a statistical success: in 1983 only 22 per cent of medical students 
and 28 per cent of engineering students were Tamils. Worse still, this same pattern of a 
lower qualifying mark applied even when Sinhalese and Tamil students sat for the 
examination in English. In short, students sitting for the examination in the same 
language, but belonging to two ethnic groups, had different qualifying marks. 
 
In 1972, a district quota system was introduced in order to benefit those who did not have 
adequate access to educational facilities within each language group. This system was 
apparently worked in favor of rural areas and backward communities. In fact, it gave a 
decided advantage to the rural Sinhalese, the Muslims and the rural Tamils. Those who 
suffered most from the change were undoubtedly the Tamils of the north specially Jaffna 
district, although the Sinhalese in the city of Colombo and the crowded Colombo district 
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fared badly too. These changes had a serious impact on the demographic patterns of 
university entry.7 In 1977, the language based admission policy was abolished and since 
that time various adjustments have been introduced on the basis of merit, district quotas, 
disadvantaged area quotas, and such other measures. The policies described in this 
section were all meant to help restore the rural people especially the Sinhalese 
community to their “rightful” place of dominance in the society. Limiting educational 
opportunities for Tamils was reflected in declining percentages of Tamils in the skilled 
and professional areas of government service. 
 
The argument has been put forward that standardization of marks and the district quota 
system for university admissions was an oppressive measure directed against the Tamils. 
These schemes did not disadvantage the Tamils; they rather established a level playing 
field. The standardization and the district quotas were for promoting equity in the context 
of a rationing of the limited educational opportunities. Once again, the facts tell a 
different story. Incidentally, the Tamils had been favored with regard to education in 
colonial times. The privileged position of the Tamils continued during independence, but 
the government sought to provide educational facilities to those who had been deprived 
of it hitherto, whether they were Sinhalese, Muslims or even Tamils. Further, it will be 
seen once again that there is no systematic bias to be identified in terms of the provision 
of schooling. One significant figure is that 27 per cent of all schools in the country are 
                                                 
7 Tamil representations in the Faculty of Medicine and Engineering fell from 48.9 per cent and 48.3 per 
cent respectively in 1969 to 27.8 per cent and 19.1 per cent respectively in 1977, while Sinhalese 
representation in all disciplines increased quite dramatically. Sinhalese representation in the Faculty of 
Medicine and Engineering were 49.9 per cent and 51.7 per cent respectively in 1969 and 68.0 per cent and 
79.5 per cent respectively in 1977.  
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classified as Tamil-medium schools, giving the Tamils a favorable Index of Advantage at 
least on the basis of this index alone.  
 
3.3.5 Ethnic preference in employment 
Employment in public service offers us another opportunity to see how governments in 
Sri Lanka have utilized a preference policy to promote the major ethnic community in Sri 
Lanka. During the colonial period, the public service was the main source of high-status 
jobs in Sri Lanka. After independence, competition for jobs in the public service 
increased, especially with the rapid expansion of educational opportunities in Sinhalese 
areas. 
 
The Jaffna Tamils and the Burghers profited from a disproportionately strong 
representation in the higher administrative services during the colonial period; the 
reasons for this state of affairs are well-known. The prospects for agricultural expansion 
in the Jaffna peninsula were limited due to physical factors that were less favorable than 
in other parts of the country. Besides, the man-land ratio had been unfavorable. The 
Tamils, therefore, felt a special need to seek a living outside Jaffna. A job within the 
government service was considered attractive from both the remunerative and status 
viewpoints. As a result of the establishment of numerous Christian missionary schools, 
the educational opportunities, especially with regard to education in English, have been 
advantageous for the Tamils. That is, the Tamils received a disproportionate number of 
government jobs available in the colonial administration (Only the Colombo district 
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could match this privileged position of Jaffna). Therefore, many Sinhalese believed that 
the British had shown preference to the Tamils.  
 
During the colonial period, Sri Lanka was dominated socially and economically by those 
who were able to obtain Engligh-based education. A large gap of social status and culture 
existed between the English-speaking elite and the vernacular educated. The effect of this 
schism was that a large vernacular educated Sinhala population was effectively prevented 
from obtaining employment in the private and public sectors. To correct this situation, 
most Sinhalese were willing to utilize their numerical strength to install a government 
that would make a significant move in this direction. Such a move, of course, was likely 
to be seen as a direct attempt to prevent Tamils from obtaining employment 
opportunities.   
 
The introduction of the Sinhala only policy in 1956 implied that Sinhala became the 
official language of the government administration. Knowledge of Sinhala became a 
prerequisite for employment in the government services, and those already employed 
were supposed to learn Sinhala within a certain period. The introduction of ‘Sinhala 
only’ language policy and the limiting of educational opportunities for Tamils have 
witnessed a general increase of the Sinhalese proportion in the skilled and professional 
areas of government service and a corresponding decline of the Tamil proportion. The 
Sinhalese composition of administrative service increased from 53.9 per cent in 1948 to 
85.2 per cent in 1979; general clerical service from a 53.7 per cent in 1949 to 93.6 per 
cent in 1980; and general accountant service from a 40.5 per cent in 1948 to 60.8 per cent 
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in 1979. The Tamils composition of administrative service declined from 24.7 per cent in 
1948 to 13.1 per cent in 79; general clerical service from a 40.7 per cent in 1949 to 5.4 
per cent in 1980; and general accountant service from a 46.2 per cent in 1948 to 38.6 per 
cent in 1979. Table 3.1 shows the changes of ethnic composition of public service for 
selected years.  
 
Table 3.1: Sri Lanka: Composition of public service 1948, 1979/80 

















































   Source: Samarasinghe (1984), Peiris (2001) 
 
According to Bastiampillai (1995), from 1956 onwards, Sinhalese-dominated 
governments have discriminated against non-Sinhalese in recruitment exercises. Within a 
matter of years after 1956 the ethnic composition of the public service became Sinhalese-
dominated. By 1979 and 1980 the representation of the Sinhalese in the higher ranks of 
occupations had thus reached beyond the proportion of their population and minorities 
were underrepresented in the public sectors and corporation sector.  
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As a result of the nationalization programs which started in the 1960s, government has 
emerged as a major employer. The continuous political dominance by the Sinhalese is 
certainly reflected in their employment preference policies. These policies on behalf of 
the Sinhalese were perceived by the Sinhalese as the rectification of anomalies created 
during the colonial period; the same action was perceived by the Tamils as a grievous 
erosion of their rights. There have been some attempts to change this situation since the 
early 1990s, but the government sector is still overwhelmingly biased towards the 
Sinhalese with regard to employment.  
 
It has been argued that as a result of the ‘Sinhala only’ policy opportunities for the 
Tamils in public sector employment have been drastically and negatively affected. The 
counter argument to this is that after the World War II, most of the rural Sinhalese have 
been affected by the two changes: rapid increase in population growth and fall in prices 
for primary agricultural products. The most significant effect of these changes was the 
alteration of the aspiration of the people. The Sinhalese, who had previously been 
satisfied to live off the land, which was now inadequate for their sustenance, began to 
demand that the government job opportunities should be made available to them also. A 
government job has a higher rating than any other occupation in the country; besides, it 
provides the individual a fixed income and a pension. Standing in the way of the 





3.3.6 Ethnic preference in land settlement 
Ownership of and access to land has also been a contentions issue in ethnic politics in Sri 
Lanka over the years with the Sinhalese colonization of traditional Tamil areas being a 
case in point. Consider the Eastern Province, where land is plentiful and irrigation is 
available through several government-funded irrigation development schemes (e.g. the 
Mahaweli Development Program).  
 
Successive governments since the 1950s have encouraged landless Sinhalese from the 
South to settle in these areas, which were relatively sparsely populated. There was, for 
example, an official plan in the mid-1980s to settle 30,000 Sinhalese in the dry zone of 
Northern Province, giving each settler land and funds to build a house. Tamil spokesmen 
accused the government of promoting a new form of "colonialism," but the government 
asserted that no part of the island could legitimately be considered an ethnic homeland 
and thus closed to settlement from outside. Settlement schemes were popular with the 
poorer and less fortunate classes of the Sinhalese. These development schemes radically 
altered the demographic composition of the North and the East, and evoked negative and 
hostile responses from the Tamils who lived there.   
 
The Tamils have strongly resented these colonization schemes, which they consider a 
deliberate attempt by the government to convert Tamil majority areas into Sinhalese 
majority areas, thereby changing the voting patterns and the balance of power in a given 
district. From the government’s point of view, reclaiming the jungle and wasteland of 
peripheral areas was a crucial government development activity. The problem that most 
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urgently needed to be tackled was that of landlessness, which was more acute among the 
Sinhalese than the Tamils. The government also believes that settling more Sinhalese in 
the North and East would help find short and long term solutions to inter-ethnic problem. 
 
Hardly any Tamils settled in Sinhalese areas under official auspices. The Tamil 
leadership has for a long time claimed that those who live in particular areas should 
enjoy preferential treatment in land settlement. This question has, therefore, appeared in 
all inter-communal negotiations that have taken place in the post-independence period. 
The Bandaranaike Chelvanayagam Pact of 1957 (see Appendix 3.1) invested the 
proposed regional councils with the power to select candidates for colonization schemes. 
This demand has, however, been opposed by the Sinhalese as an undue attempt to secure 
large territories of sparsely populated land exclusively for the Tamils (De Silva 1984).  
 
Another claim by the Tamils is that the Land Settlement Policy of the government has 
been discriminatory. The government disagrees and arguing that in all settlements of the 
region land has been set aside for Tamil occupiers in proportion to their population. The 
government of Sri Lanka also disagrees with the claim that because land development 
schemes have been in areas claimed for Eelam8 they should be settled by only the 
Tamils. The Tamils can claim discrimination in this respect only if the land allocated to 
them in the new settlement schemes is less than the proportion of their population. 
Furthermore, the government continues, Tamils have the right to buy land in any part of 
                                                 
8 Eelam is the name given to a separate Tamil state for which rebels in the northern and eastern provinces 
of Sri Lanka are fighting. The concept of Eelam, a Tamil homeland in the Sri Lankan island, was proposed 
by the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in 1976. TULF was a coalition of Tamil parties who 
campaigned in the 1977 elections for an independent state for Tamils in Sri Lanka.  
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Sri Lanka and have been doing so in recent times. On the contrary, it is the Sinhalese 
who are prevented from buying land in the North, a policy which was initially instituted 
under colonialism.  
 
3.3.7 Ethnic preference in policy decision 
One of the main concerns in EPPs in Sri Lanka has been limited control over significant 
policy decisions which directly affect the minority ethnic groups. Two of the major 
issues raised by this concern are discussed here.  
 
The first major issue is the location development projects in Tamil areas. The Mahaweli 
River Project and the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) are located in predominantly Sinhalese 
areas and largely benefit the Sinhalese. The Tamils feel that they have not received a fair 
share of the project available, thus, losing out on the income and jobs generated by such 
projects. Indeed, the Mahaweli project has resulted in a large number of settlers being 
given land in newly irrigated areas. Although Tamils comprise 11.6 per cent of the total 
population of Sri Lanka, Tamil settlers in the Mahaweli scheme comprise only 1.3 per 
cent of the total number of settlers placed in the project as of 1985 (Upreti 2001). Find 
Table 3.2 below, which summarizes the allocation of land to settler, from the three major 
ethnic groups in the Mahaweli project. Table 3.2 shows that a large majority of the 
settlers in Mahaweli irrigation project have been Sinhalese compared to others. While 
96.9 per cent Sinhalese settled in this project, only 1.3 per cent Tamils and 1.7 per cent 
Muslims were provided the opportunity to do so.  In the system G, none of the minority 
was provided land.  
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Table 3.2: Sri Lanka: Ethnicity of settlers in Mahaweli irrigation  
systems in 1985 
 Sinhalese (No. and %) Tamils (No. and %) Muslims (No. and %) 
System B 5790     (92.6) 323     (5.2) 137      (2.2) 
System C 9508     (98.9) 14      (0.1) 91       (0.9) 
System H 22156     (96.3) 27      (0.1) 822       (3.6) 
System G 754      (100) 0 0 
Total 38208      (94.0) 364      (1.3) 1050       (1.7) 
Source: Reprinted from Oberst (1986). Original source is a working paper submitted by Sri Lanka to all 
parties’ conference, November 1985. 
 
Moragahanda North Central Province Canal system is one interesting case with regard to 
government policy decisions.  This is one of the major sub-systems of the overall 
hydraulic design of the initial ‘Mahaweli Master Plan’ (a twenty-one year outline of a 
plan published in 1967). It has, however, not been implemented by the government 
because if it had been implemented, its principal beneficiaries would have been the 
Tamils of the far north (Peiris 2001). Not surprisingly, the Tamils believe that they have 
not benefited from the income and jobs generated by major development projects.   
 
The Free Trade Zone is one of the major industrial development projects, which started 
with the introduction of a liberalize policy stance in 1977. Employment opportunities for 
the Tamils in the FTZ were also limited, since industrial enterprises sponsored by foreign 
aid had not been established in Tamil districts. Government regulations prohibited the 
establishment of certain categories of industries outside the FTZ, which is located around 
the city of Colombo (capital of Sri Lanka). Many of the labor-intensive industries that 
were located in the FTZ employed Sinhalese inhabitants of the South rather than Tamils 
from the North, where thousands of educated youths are unemployed.  
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The second major issue concerns regional autonomy, which brings to the fore 
maintenance of law and order. Since independence, the majority of police and armed 
forces in the Tamil areas have been Sinhalese (Burger 1987). Related to this problem has 
been the inability of officers to exert control over their subordinates. On several 
occasions since 1977, the police and armed forces in the Tamil areas have gone on 
rampages against innocent Tamil civilians (Amnesty International 1983). Although these 
attacks against Tamil civilian sharply subsided in 1987, the Tamils mistrusted the 
Sinhalese, where there protection was concerned.   
 
In sum, one must note that from pre-independence until 1956, the Sri Lankan elites –  
whether in the civil service, business, academia, or other professions – were 
overwhelmingly Western-educated, English-speaking ‘gentlemen,’ whose ranks were 
over-represented by Tamils and Christian Sinhalese. Therefore, the motivating force 
behind the EPPs has been the belief held by many Sinhala Buddhists that they were the 
victims of discrimination. To correct this bias, policies of preference favoring the 
Sinhalese were introduced. Unfortunately, the EPPs enacted during the post-colonial 
period, and which protect the Sinhalese, failed to process and respond to the Tamil’s 
demand. This failure, of course, is one of the main causes of inter-ethnic tensions in Sri 
Lanka.  
 
3.4 Ethnic preference policies in Malaysia 
As in the earlier discussion of EPPs on Sri Lanka, this section is divided into two parts. 
The first part describes the EPPs in Malaysia. The second part relates the EPPs to 
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specific issues such as culture, education, employment, and policies in other financial 
activities.  
  
3.4.1 Evolution of ethnic preference policies 
During the 1970s, EPPs were introduced in Malaysia under the NEP to eliminate the 
socio-economic imbalances between Malays (Bumiputera) and non-Malays (non-
Bumiputera), which had been created by colonialism. With the 13 May 1969 racial riots, 
the National Alliance government was finally convinced of the necessity of 
implementing EPPs to create a more balanced society, by systematically discriminating 
against the Chinese and the Indian (predominantly Tamil) populations of Malaysia. 
 
The NEP marked a fundamental change in government policy and a major turning point 
in the history of Malaysia. According to Crouch (2001), since the 1970s, almost all 
policy issues in Malaysia have been affected by ethnicity, including language, education, 
government, employment, business licenses, immigration, internal security, foreign 
policy, or virtually everything else. The government began to assume a more active role 
in the economy. The result is that the government's EPPs have slowly narrowed the gap 
and have probably contributed much to the political stability in Malaysia. 
 
3.4.2 Ethnic preference in culture  
During the colonial period in Malaysia, no one ethnic group’s culture was given a 
privileged status and there was no conception of a common national culture. The colonial 
state moreover practiced an essentially non-intervention policy in the cultural 
development of the colony with all ethnic groups having equal access to and freely 
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practicing their respective culture in the colonial public space. The post-colonial state 
played, in contrast, an increasingly interventionist role in the cultural development of the 
society and actively promoted the public presence of Malay culture and the official status 
of the Malay language.   
 
In the Malayan Federal Constitution of 1957, Bahasa Malaysia was recognized as the 
official language, with special provision made for the uplifting and betterment of the 
Malay race. There was an inter domain equation in the original formation of EPPs in 
Malaysia: while Malays agreed to a liberal provision of citizenship extended to non-
Malays, the policies of making Islam as the official religion, recognizing the Malay 
rulers as heads of states, and endorsing Malay as the national language were accepted by 
non-Malays (Crouch 2001). Thus the stage was set for the government to create national 
consciousness and unity by coercion. Islam was also recognized as the official religion in 
a secular state, with provisions for the freedom of practice of other religions and their 
propagation, subject to state laws which may control or restrict their propagation among 
persons professing the religion of Islam. In fact, the Malaysian constitution defines 
“Malay” as a person who habitually speaks Malay, professes Islam and conforms to the 
Malay custom.  
 
With the unequal relation between the Malay and non-Malay cultures formally 
recognized and written into the 1957 Constitution, the cultural terrain became fiercely 
contested. For instance, during the 1960s, the majority of Malays and non-Malays held 
opposing views on culture, religion, and language (Guan 2000). On the one hand, 
 71
popular Malay opinion strongly backed the dominant and privileged position of Malay 
culture and expected the state to uphold and promote Malay culture and the official status 
of Malay language. Consequently, the perceived slow progress made by the state in 
advancing Malay culture and language led to increasing numbers of Malays, especially 
the Malay cultural nationalists, to become disenchanted with the United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO) leaders.  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1969 ethnic riots, the Malay-dominated government 
proceeded, forcefully, to reconstitute the public cultural landscape. In the 1970s, 
pressures from the Malay cultural nationalists pushed the government to aggressively 
implement various policies and projects to advance the presence of Malay cultural and 
Islamic symbols in the official and public spaces. In order to implement the public 
presence of Malay cultural and Islamic symbols and practices, the government 
inadvertently encroached upon spaces originally occupied by the Chinese cultural and 
religious symbols and practices. In addition, the National Culture Policy (NCP) was 
implemented in 1971 to amplify the symbolic presence of Malay culture and Islam in the 
public space. Further, since the 1980s, pressures from the resurgence of Islam among the 
Malays have led the government to introduce more measures to enhance the 
“Islamicization” of the society. 
 
As a result of the pressure by the Malay cultural nationalists in the 1970s, the public 
standing of Chinese culture became subjected to varying government regulations and 
control. Particularly, the public display of a number of non-Malay (e.g. Chinese) cultural 
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and religious symbols was strongly discouraged, and gradually marginalized by the 
government. Therefore, Chinese culture lost much of its historical relative autonomy. 
This in turn generated much anxiety among the Chinese about the future of their culture 
in the country. The majority of Chinese had forcefully and persistently advocated to no 
avail equality of status and treatment for every culture in the society, Mandarin as one of 
the official languages, equal treatment of Chinese culture and religion, and equal 
recognition of and rights to education in their mother tongue.  
 
Fortunately, since 1990s, the relationship between the Malays and non-Malays has been 
remarkably peaceful, even cordial. Also, the government has generally scaled down the 
promotion and propagation of Malay cultural symbols, language and practices. The 
Malays generally feel secure about the dominance of their language and culture in the 
society; the non-Malays have come to accept the subordinate position of their languages 
and cultures. In fact, with the state’s relaxation of its intervention in the cultural arena, 
the Chinese community has taken the opportunity to reclaim more spaces for their 
cultural symbols and practices. 
 
3.4.3 Ethnic preference in education 
A series of educational policies were implemented by the government to support the 
Malay community. In the 1961 Education Act, partly due to the pragmatics of 
consociation politics, the ruling elites agreed upon a compromise solution; the state will 
recognize vernacular primary schools but not the Chinese-medium secondary schools. 
This solution was, however, rejected by a large number of Malay cultural nationalists and 
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Chinese-educated Chinese, but for entirely different reasons. The Malay cultural 
nationalists objected because they felt strongly that Malay should be the only medium of 
instruction and that a Chinese education would not help to promote national unity. 
Conversely, the Chinese-educated Chinese objected because, they argued that they had 
the rights, as guaranteed in the constitution, to be educated in their mother tongue. 
 
Since 1970s, three major developments have occurred in the field of education. The first 
was the National Education Policy, which was implemented in 1971 to make Malay the 
main medium of instruction in all state-run educational institutions (from primary 
schools to universities). The second one was the rapid expansion of post-secondary 
educational institutions. Last is the extension of the ethnic quota system in a more 
comprehensive way to post-secondary education. All these developments have changed 
the ethnic imbalance in the provision of education.  
 
In particular, the conversion to Malay as the sole medium of instruction began in 1970 at 
the primary level, and in each succeeding year Malay was introduced in a higher class 
until the process was completed by 1982.  The process of conversion led to the lowering 
of standards initially, but it also gave the Malays an added advantage in that they had 
access to higher education. Many Malays who qualified for university admission were 
supported by generous government stipends. After the ethnic crisis in 1969, the 
admission quotas for Malays were raised, and for the first time, admission quotas were 
applied to specific fields of study. Thus, Malay quotas were applied not only for 
admission but also for entrance to specific subjects within universities. As well, the 
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system of government bursaries and scholarships for higher education had a much greater 
pro-Malay bias than the quota system for university admissions. Practically, all Malays 
attend university with a government bursary, which is adequate to support the full cost of 
attending a university. In addition, there were a large number of government scholarships 
available for advanced university study abroad. For example, of the successful candidates 
for such scholarships between 1980 and 1984, 96.1 per cent were Bumiputera and 3.9 per 
cent were non-Bumiputera (Ling et al. 1988). 
 
As a result of these preference policies, Chinese education was strongly discouraged and 
gradually marginalized. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Chinese primary and 
independent secondary schools were regularly beset with political and financial 
challenges. Politically, the Chinese feared that the state would invoke the 1961 Education 
Act and convert the Chinese primary schools into Malay-medium schools. Financially, 
the Chinese primary schools received only a small amount of the total public allocation 
for education. Under the NEP, Chinese National-Type Primary Schools (which use 
Mandarin as the main medium of instruction, but which also teach in Malay and English) 
received smaller state funding than state schools that teach in Malay. For example, 
during the period of 1971- 1978 the Malaysian government provided only about 7 per 
cent of the total public allocation for Chinese primary education even though they 
enrolled more than 25 per cent of the total primary school students. In addition, the 
government did not build nor allow the Chinese community to build new Chinese 
primary schools. This led to overcrowded schools in areas that had large concentration of 
Chinese. In terms of teachers, the schools faced perpetual shortage of qualified teachers 
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and had to continue to depend on hiring temporary teachers. Consequently, these schools 
suffered from shortage of teachers and textbooks, overcrowding, and poor facilities. 
 
For the independent Chinese secondary schools, the situation was even more depressing. 
Not only did the government fail to provide them with funding, but also it imposed 
various restrictions: ‘refused to approve the establishment of new schools or branches for 
existing independent schools, replaced permanent permits with temporary permits that 
require yearly renewal, delayed and obstructed the approval of teaching permits’ (Kua 
1990). At the tertiary level, with the introduction of the quota system in 1971, the already 
limited opportunity of Chinese students to receive tertiary education further shrank 
considerably. For example, between 1970 and 1980 Chinese enrolment in three 
universities (University Malaya, University Kebangsaan Malaysia, and University Sains 
Malaysia) dropped from 48.9 per cent of total enrolment to 26.5 per cent, whereas the 
Malay share rose from 40.2 per cent to 66.2 per cent during the same period (Ling et al. 
1988). The fact that the state stopped recognizing the diplomas from independent 
Chinese secondary schools also meant that graduates from those schools could not enter 
the public local colleges and universities, unless the students sat for the national 
examinations. Lacking adequate financial and institutional backing from the state, the 
Chinese devised their own solutions to overcome the obstacles presented by the NEP.  
 
To summarize, with regard to ethnic representation in education, preferential policies 
contributed to considerable progress in the Malay community. There is evidence that the 
state’s provision of special preferences in education has been very effective in increasing 
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the representation of the hitherto underrepresented Malays in education. In fact, the 
figures demonstrate that the policy has led to an overrepresentation of Malays in the 
public education system while adversely affecting non-Malays, especially the Chinese. 
 
3.4.4 Ethnic preference in employment 
During the British colonial period there was a significant imbalance in terms of 
employment between Malay and non-Malays. Malays were employed in the primary 
sector, while non-Malays were largely employed in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
Besides the difference in the pattern of employment, there were also significant 
differences in terms of occupation. In the British colonial period a small group of 
English-educated Malays joined certain occupations in the civil service as well as 
administrative service, while a large number of ordinary Malays were left out. As a 
result, the professional, technical, sales and managerial jobs were mostly occupied by 
non-Malays.  
 
Since independence, many changes have occurred in the employment sector. Particularly 
in the administrative service, the government established a recruitment ratio in favor of 
Malays. The top administrative and elite positions were occupied by Malays. Malays 
dominated the top policymaking positions in the public service. Most of the 
administrative positions were filled almost exclusively by Malays who were promoted at 
a rapid rate to fill the gaps created by the “Malaysianization” of the public services. The 
EPP, thus, led to Malays occupying the most senior political and administrative positions 
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and created a pattern of Malay dominance over major institutions of the state, such as the 
legislature, cabinet, bureaucracy, defense, police, and judiciary (Crouch 1996). 
 
With regard to ethnic representation in public sector employment, the Malay preferential 
policies have had considerable impact. In 1968, Malays remained underrepresented in the 
education service (32.2 per cent) and the medical service (10.1 per cent) (Puthucheary 
1978). By 1984, the percentage of Malays had considerably improved in some 
professional public services, including the education service with 55 per cent, the 
medical service with 29 per cent and the accounting service with 51 per cent (Sarji 1989). 
In Malaysia, where the government is the major employer, the public sector employment 
accounted for about 15 per cent of total employment in 1985. Between 1970 and 1985, 
the Malaysian government provided 75 per cent of new public service jobs to Malays. 
 
In terms of combined public and private sector employment in professional services, 
between 1990 and 1999, on the one hand the Malay participation increased from 20.7 per 
cent to 28.9 per cent. On the other hand, this policy reduced the non-Malay participation 
in both the public and private sector employment in professional services. In both public 
as well as private sector, between 1990 and 1999, the contribution was decreased from 






3.4.5 Ethnic preference policies in other financial activities 
The Malay special rights or preferences in the economic and business sphere were 
intensified by the state in the early 1970s, and such an agenda included a broad range of 
policy measures.  
 
In general, the introduction of the pro-Malay preference policies and the perpetuation of 
the Malay “special position” showed clearly the economic nature of Malays-Chinese 
relations. The special privileges accorded the Malays were aimed at enabling them to 
compete with the Chinese for economic resources, employment and places of study in 
higher education. The implementation of pro-Malay policies was supported by the 
introduction of the NEP. Under the NEP, quotas and the special privileges of the Malays 
were fully implemented and regulations introduced to ensure greater Malay participation 
in the commercial, industrial and social sectors. The non-Malay groups, on the other 
hand, felt that they were more and more restricted in economic opportunities. 
 
Particularly, the NEP aimed to raise Malay ownership and participation in industrial and 
commercial activities to 30 per cent by 1990; a similar plan to develop a Malay 
commercial and industrial class was continued in the New Development Policy (NDP). 
In this regard, the government introduced the Industrial Coordination Act of 1975, which 
required that any non-Malay firm with capital and reserves funds worth more than 
M$250,000 (Malaysian dollars) and more than 25 employees must demonstrate at least 
30 per cent Bumiputera equity ownership or participation to obtain approval or renewal 
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of business licenses (Lee 2000). The government could deny any non-Malay firm a 
license if it failed to satisfy this requirement. 
 
In addition, the government did not only create institutions such as the Bumiputera 
Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC), Majlis Amanah Rakyat (MARA), Bank 
Bumiputra, Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PERNAS), and the State Economic 
Development Corporations (SEDC) to provide credit and technical assistance to Malay 
business entrepreneurs, but also asked major business firms and corporations to facilitate 
the promotion of Malays to higher management positions (Chua 2000). In the property 
market, Bumiputeras were also given a considerable percentage of discounts on the 
original price; in the business sector, they were awarded extra business incentives, 
especially tax incentives (US. Department of State 1999). In fact, during the first twenty 
years of NEP, the government of Malaysia established various state trust funds for 
Malays to expand their ownership of corporate assets. Since the mid-1980s, it has also 
practiced privatization policy, awarded 61.2 per cent of privatized assets or companies 
(equivalent to M$8.1 billion) to Malays, thereby creating a number of Malay tycoons 
who can compete with their Chinese counterparts (Jayasankaran 1999). 
 
It is argued that the EPPs in Malaysia were directed against non-Malays. The counter 
argument is that, as a result of ethnic riots the Malaysian government had to manage the 
ethnic tensions by expanding the interests of Malays as a dominant ethnic group rather 
than mediating the interests of all ethnic communities. The state provided a set of 
altruistic rationales for ethnic preferential policies. It is pointed out that under even the 
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British rule, the colonial policy makers tried to justify these preferential policies in the 
name of ensuring the welfare of the Malay rulers and their subjects and preserving the 
traditional way of Malay lifestyle disrupted by the immigrant communities and cultures 
(Means 1986). During the current postcolonial period, the agenda of preferential policies 
has been advocated by the government on the ground that these policies would assist the 
economically disadvantaged Malay population, eliminate rural (mostly Malay) poverty, 
and reduce interethnic income inequalities (Yeoh 1999; Lee 2000). 
 
The above discussion shows that preferential policies in Malaysia have had some success 
in terms of increasing the representation of Malays in education and administration, 
expanding their ownership and participation in business and commerce, and reducing 
their poverty levels. However, the original objectives of these policies to increase Malay 
ownership of capital to 30 per cent and to substantively reduce income inequalities 
between major ethnic groups have not been achieved. In addition, the role of preferential 
policies to enhance interethnic unity and political stability still remains questionable. 
Further, according to many critics, preferential policies may have produced adverse 
outcomes, such as the worsening economic inequality within the Malay community, 
growing dissatisfaction of non-Malay citizens, rising cases of patronage-based relations 
between ethnic groups, and falling standards of national competitiveness and efficiency. 
 
3.5 Evaluation of EPPs in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
At this point it is important to evaluate EPPs in Sri Lanka and Malaysia in order to 
explore how these policies eventually contributed to enhancing inter-ethnic relation in 
the respective countries.  
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During the colonial period and the early period of independence, minority ethnic 
communities in both Sri Lanka and Malaysia enjoyed privileges and favors which were 
not shared by the larger ethnic communities. This was confined to the disproportionate 
share of each ethnic group in the major income earning activities such as public service, 
professions and other economic activities (e.g. ownership of capital and commercial and 
financial activities). At the time of independence, the minority community was 
overrepresented in the public service and professions relative to the proportional size of 
their population. Since independence, successive governments have been concerned with 
eradicating the special privileges and disproportionate advantages enjoyed by elitist 
groups and minorities and have made earnest endeavors to right the wrongs suffered by 
disadvantaged communities. In order to ensure proportional representation of the 
underprivileged ethnic groups, the governments of Sri Lanka and Malaysia introduced 
EPPs. Over the last four decades (since 1956 in Sri Lanka and 1970s in Malaysia), the 
EPPs have taken away some of the privileges enjoyed by the minority ethnic groups. 
Most of the communities in Sri Lanka and Malaysia have, in a spirit of justice and 
fairness, come to terms with the loss of the exclusive privileges that they had enjoyed so 
far; others have not. 
 
Although the EPPs are perceived as a corrective measure in both countries, the trigger for 
EPPs in Malaysia and Sri Lanka differed from each other. In Malaysia, the government 
recognized the EPPs as one of the necessary policy options for the country in 1970s. At 
the time of independence in 1957, the statistics showed that the Malay ethnic community 
lagged behind the non-Malays in various sectors of the economy and in the distribution 
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of wealth, investments, and ownership of capital. By the middle of the 1960’s, the Malay 
ethnic community was getting increasingly frustrated amid calls for greater involvement 
of government in improving their economic position. Confronted with such a situation, 
the government of Malaysia realized that none of its policies and planning programs 
could reduce inter-ethnic tension without the implementation of EPPs. But in Sri Lanka, 
though the minority ethnic community enjoyed a privileged position in some of the 
economic activities such as education and public sector employment, there were no such 
differences between the ethnic communities in terms of economic contentment. It would 
appear, therefore, that this situation did not warrant any kind of EPPs in Sri Lanka.   
 
In comparing the consequences of the implementation of the EPPs in both Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, it is worth noting the positive effects in Malaysia and the negative impacts in 
Sri Lanka. Even though Malaysia has been more extreme in the implementation of EPPs 
compared with Sri Lanka, ethnic tension reduced in Malaysia while it increased in Sri 
Lanka. Given this fact, it is necessary to clarify under what condition Malaysia EPPs 
succeeded while Sri Lanka failed to do so. The EPPs in Malaysia were implemented 
under the assumption that the Malays needed economic protection from the non-Malay 
immigrants. The way to unite the multi-ethnic population visualized in the program was 
through appropriate economic policies and active government intervention to reduce 
inter-ethnic inequality by employing preferential treatments in favor of the Malays. To a 
great extent, therefore, it can be said that the implementation of EPPs in Malaysia was 
successful as it improved the socio-economic positions of the long neglected and 
economically backward Malay group and eliminated the identification of ethnic groups 
on the basis of their economic standing. Malaysia also put in place appropriate economic 
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policies and planning programs to ensure better standard of living for all citizens at the 
right time. As a result, the country placed itself on the path to healthier economic growth 
and development. Overall income inequality and inter-ethnic and rural-urban inequality 
have declined since the mid-1970s. The expanding economic pie via open economic 
policy option made it easier for the Chinese to accept preferential treatment of the 
Malays, including Malay domination of Malaysian politics and the bureaucracy. The 
structural changes brought about by the EPPs, moreover, were accompanied by political 
and economic stability. 
 
But in Sri Lanka, the implementation of EPPs provides an excellent introduction to the 
complex nature of country’s ethnic relations, and the political ramifications of rivalries 
among societies (Silva 1997). These policies are often founded on competing perceptions 
of deprivation which in turn give rise to rival notions. In Sri Lanka, while implementing 
EPPs, the country has experienced closed economic policy, resulting in stagnant 
economic growth and lower level of standard of living. Therefore, unlike Malaysia, the 
closed economic policy option and its effects such as low level of economic growth, and 
poor governance did not provide economic contentment among the society. This shrank 
the size of the economic pie made it more difficult for the Tamils to accept preferential 
treatment given to the Sinhalese.  
 
Thus, in the case of Sri Lanka, the implementation of EPPs led to the over representation 
of the majority ethnic community in all economic activities that were previously enjoyed 
by the minority ethnic group. In the case of Malaysia, the implementation of the EPPs 
achieved its purpose as a corrective measure by reducing the inequality gap between the 
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various ethnic groups; also, the EPPs in Malaysia did not increase majority 
overrepresentation in income earnings and economic activities as happened in Sri Lanka.  
 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter we have discussed the EPPs in two Asian countries, Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia. This discussion was undertaken against the backdrop that EPPs are generally 
perceived as an essential corrective measure taken by governments in multi-ethnic 
countries to address the various concerns of the marginalized ethnic group/s. Three main 
issues were highlighted in the chapter. First, given the different historical and 
geographical circumstances of Sri Lanka and Malaysia, the backgrounds to the EPPs in 
each of the countries were described. The second section focused on the implementation 
of EPPs as it related to specific areas of the respective countries (e.g. culture, education, 
employment, etc.). The last section took a critical stance by comparing the 
implementation and impact of the EPPs in both countries.  
 
From these three issues what we have found that the current inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia not only depend on EPPs but also depend on the economic factors. 
To identify the economic factors that relate to the causes of inter-ethnic relation we need 
to focus on the theoretical and empirical analysis. We now turn to theoretical and 






Appendix 3.1: Bandaranaike - Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 
On 26 July 1957, an agreement was entered into between Mr.S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 
Prime Minister of Ceylon and Mr.S.J.V. Chelvanayagam, Leader of the Thamil Arasu 
Katchi (Federal Party) - the Bandaranaike Chelvanayakam Pact. 
Statement of the General Principles of the Agreement: 
 
Part A 
• Representatives of the Federal Party had a series of discussions with the Prime 
Minister in an effort to resolve the differences of opinion that had been growing 
and creating tension.  
• At the early stages of these conversations it became evident that it was not 
possible for the Prime Minister to accede to some of the demands of the Federal 
Party. 
• The Prime Minister stated that, from the point of view of the Government, he was 
not in a position to discuss the setting up of a Federal Constitution, or regional 
autonomy or any step which would abrogate the Official Language Act. 
• The question then arose whether it was possible to explore the possibility of an 
adjustment without the Federal Party abandoning or surrendering any of its 
fundamental principles or objectives. 
• At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the government's 
Draft Regional Council Bill to see whether provisions can be made under it to 
meet, reasonably, some of the matters in this regard which the Federal Party had 
in view. 
 
The agreements so reached are embodied in a separate document. 
• Regarding the language the Federal Party reiterated its stand for parity but in view 
of the position of the Prime Minister in this matter they came to an agreement by 
way of an adjustment. They pointed out that it was important for them that there 
would be recognition of Tamil as a national language and that the administrative 
work in of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces should be done in Tamil. 
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• The Prime Minister stated that as mentioned by him earlier it was not possible for 
him to take any steps that would abrogate the Official Language Act. 
• Use of Tamil; After discussions it was agreed that the proposed legislation should 
contain recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority of Ceylon and 
that the four points mentioned by Prime Minister should include provision that, 
without infringing on the position of the Official Language as such, the language 
of administration of the Northern And Eastern Provinces be Tamil, and any 
necessary provision be made. 
 
For non-Tamil speaking minorities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
• Regarding the question of Ceylon citizenship for the people of Indian descent and 
the Citizenship Act, the representatives of the Federal Party forwarded their views 
to the Prime Minister and pressed for an early settlement. 
• The Prime Minister indicated that this problem would receive early consideration.  
• In view of these conclusions the Federal Party stated that they were withdrawing 
their proposed Satyagraha. 
 
Part B 
1. Regional areas to be defined in the Bill itself by embodying them in the Schedule 
thereto. 
2. That the Northern Province is to form one regional area whilst the Eastern 
Province is to be divided into one or more regional areas. 
3. Provision is to be made in the Bill to enable two or more regions to amalgamate 
even beyond provincial limit; and for one region to divide itself subject to 
ratification by Parliament. Further provision is to be made in the Bill for two or 
more regions to collaborate for specific purposes of common interests. 
 
 
DIRECT ELECTIONS  
4. Provision is to be made for the direct election of Regional councilors. Provision is 
to be made for a delimitation commission or commissions for carving out 
electorates. The question of MPs representing districts falling within regional 
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areas to be eligible to function as chairman is to be considered. The question of 
Government Agents being Regional Commissioners is to be considered. The 
question of supervisory functions over larger towns, strategic towns and 
municipalities is to be looked into 
 
SPECIAL POWERS 
5. Parliament is to delegate powers and specify them in the Act. It was agreed that 
regional councils should have powers over specified subjects including 
agriculture, cooperatives, lands and land developments, colonization, education, 
health, industries, fisheries, housing, social services, electricity, water schemes 
and roads. Requisite definition of powers be made in the Bill. 
 
COLONIZATION SCHEMES 
6. It was agreed that in the matter of colonization schemes the powers of the regional 
councils shall include the powers to select allotters to whom land within their area 
of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to be employed 
for work on such schemes. The position regarding the area at present administered 
by the Gal Oya Board in this matter requires consideration. 
 
TAXATION AND BORROWING 
7. The powers in regard to the Regional councils vested in the Minister of Local 
Government in the draft bill to be revised with a view to vesting control in 
Parliament wherever necessary. 
8. The Central Government will provide block grants to the regional councils. The 
principles on which the grants will be computed will be gone into. The regional 









Analytical explanation, theoretical and empirical analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction  
As we have seen in the previous chapters, there is a substantial body of literature now 
exists that addresses various aspects of ethnic conflicts. What is lacking in this literature 
is a coherent theoretical framework that puts together the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle in 
order to enhance our understanding of the causes of the problem and to enable us to 
formulate policies that lead to ethnic peace. This chapter thus focuses on the theoretical 
and empirical analysis to identify the hypothesized factors that relate to the causes of 
ethnic peace or conflict. 
 
This chapter will attempt to identify the relevant economic factors related to ethnic peace 
or conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries. The chapter divided into three parts:  
• The first part describes the linkage within economic factors and between 
economic factors and ethnic conflict. In order to verify the connection within 
economic factors and between economic factors and ethnic conflict, this part also 
provides some supportive evidence.  
• The second part explains the theoretical model. The model describes how two 
ethnic groups struggle to maintain their political options and provides a possible 
solution to avoid ethnic conflicts in a country.   
• The last part provides empirical results. We select twelve multi-ethnic developing 
countries from 1980 to 2000 and test whether economic factors highly correlate 
with ethnic conflicts. We now turn to the analytical explanation. 
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4.2 Analytical explanation 
There is no simple formula for designing economic activities that will offer a balance 
between economic performance and inter-ethnic relations; but, there are some common-
sense strategies. First, economic growth facilitates, and may even be a necessary 
condition for, the successful management of ethnic peace. By increasing the material 
resources of society, economic expansion makes it possible to provide material benefits 
to members of all ethnic groups. Everyone benefits and no individual or group is harmed 
or deprived. Second, the government ought to provide more – job opportunities, business 
licenses, credit and other socio-economic benefits to the relatively disadvantaged in order 
to mitigate their grievances and satisfy their aspirations for material improvement and 
greater justice. Last is the need to reduce or avoid sharp disparities in terms of economic 
satisfaction among ethnic groups. Without a higher level of economic performance and 
appropriate policy strategies, it is difficult to provide reasonable economic benefits with a 
reasonable degree of equity across ethnic groups. Thus, appropriate economic activities 
and only appropriate economic activities provide the means to benefit all ethnic groups in 
terms of economic as well as political context. 
 
In this context, the proposed research identifies the degree of economic openness as one 
of the main economic activities that can exert influence on ethnic conflict, either directly 
or indirectly, via three major transmission mechanisms such as the quality of governance, 
the level of economic growth, and the stage of poverty and inequality. If a country 
experiences a high degree of economic openness, then the expected influence on ethnic 
conflict will differ compared with a country that has less degree of economic openness 
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(closed economy). The two different influences, according to degree of economic 
openness, can be explained with the help of Diagrams 1 and 2.  
 
The diagrams depict that the degree of economic openness (trade and foreign direct 
investment (FDI)) increases or reduces the probability of the ethnic conflict, not directly 
but through their beneficial effects on economic growth and a disciplined government 
with or without ethnic preference policies. It is common for every multi-ethnic country to 
experience ethnic preference policies; therefore, we include ethnic preference policies 
with the quality of governance. Indeed, economic growth and a disciplined government 
will be important intervening variables in this analysis, but we are also concerned with 
poverty and inequality among the ethnic groups, and especially relative deprivation.   
 
Diagram 4.1 describes what a closed economic situation leads to: the probability of ethnic 
conflict via less disciplined government (with or without EPPs), low economic growth 
and increased relative deprivation resulting from poverty and inequality. The logic of our 
argument is quite simple: a closed economic environment can increase the risk of ethnic 
conflict: On the one hand, trade and FDI restriction fail to bring about significant 
structural changes in the economy and drag the economy into a deep and prolonged 
stagnancy; on the other hand, the situation also leads to more complicated bureaucratic 
bottlenecks, rent-seeking activities, and political patronage. In other words, both 
economic stagnancy and poor quality of governance increase poverty and inequality, 
creating discontent and a feeling of relative deprivation. Eventually the situation leads to 
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ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict then becomes a cause of poor economic growth and results 
in discontent and a feeling of relative deprivation.  
 















Source: Compiled by the Author  
 
Diagram 4.2 explains the outcome of an open economic environment: it leads to the 
potential of ethnic peace via a highly disciplined government (with or without EPPs), 
high economic growth and decrease in relative deprivation, resulting from reduction of 
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poverty and inequality. In this case, ethnic peace then becomes a cause of high economic 
growth and results in decrease of discontent and a feeling of relative deprivation.  
 




















Source: Compiled by the Author  
 
In order to analyze the theoretical relationship between each economic activity, it is 
necessary to start with a discussion of the causal variables such as degree of economic 
openness, the quality of governance, economic growth and relative deprivation. The 
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following section will provide more details about the degree of openness and ethnic 
conflict. 
 
4.2.1 Degree of economic openness and ethnic conflict 
Before we examine the relationship between the degree of economic openness and ethnic 
conflict, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the degree of economic 
openness and other economic activities. The following section provides a brief analysis 
of each economic activity. 
 
Degree of economic openness and disciplined government: Many studies on 
comparative political economy (Rodrik 1995; Shang 2000; Molanaa et al. 2004; Neeman 
et al. 2004) have developed several arguments to explain the consistent finding that the 
degree of economic openness is associated with the quality of governance. In our view, a 
high degree of economic openness can be found, for example, in Singapore where, 
various instruments were launched to reduce trade distortions and transparency in 
governance and bureaucracy adopted to improve economic performance and equality 
within the society. A country like Singapore where there is a high degree of economic 
openness would find it optimal to devote more resources to building good institutions. In 
equilibrium, such an economy may display less corruption and a higher quality of 
government than less open economies. Several authors have documented that more open 
countries tend to have a lower level of corruption and higher quality of governance 
(Alberto and Ditella 1999; Gatti 1999; Treisman 2000).  
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The quality of governance can be assessed by using measures of government 
intervention, public sector efficiency, public goods provision, size of government, and 
political freedom. In this section, we use Index of Government Effectiveness (IGE)9 as a 
measure of the quality of government.10 The IGE refers to the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of a 
government’s commitment to policies (Kaufmann et al. 2002, 2003, and 2005). It is, 
therefore, a measure of the quality of government inputs. This index can take values 
between -2.5 and 2.5, with the higher or positive values indicating greater government 
effectiveness.  
 
In order to study the relationship between economic openness and the quality of 
governance, a number of developed and developing countries were selected and classified 
in terms of openness status and degree of government effectiveness. Using openness data 
from Neeman et al. (2004) and government effectiveness data from Kaufmann et al. 
(2005) we found that more openness of an economy towards international trade leads to a 
disciplined government. As shown in Table 4.1, all closed economies, with the exception 
of Estonia, are characterized by a poor and a medium degree of governance. In contrast, a 
large number of open economies exhibit a wide range of governance with a majority of 
them offering average and good quality of governance.  
                                                 
9 This index is one of six indices developed to measure governance. Kaufmann et. al. (2002, 2003 and 
2005) draw 194 different measures from 17 different sources of subjective governance data constructed by 
15 different organizations. These sources include international organizations, political and business risk 
rating agencies, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations. 
 
































Algeria, Bangladesh, Chad, Belarus, China, 
Croatia, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guyana, India, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Malawi, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Romania, Russia,  Senegal, Syria, 









































Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech 
Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El 
Salvador, The Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, South 
Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, 
FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen. 
 
60 countries 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Botswana, Canada, Chile, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, 





29  countries 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
To sum up the link between economic openness and the quality of government, as 
mentioned earlier, openness can minimize conflict with a reduction of relative 
deprivation among various ethnic groups. This is possible through the quality of 
government activity and improvement of social welfare.  
 
Degree of economic openness and economic growth: There is a strong consensus among 
economists that openness to trade, even if combined with elements of direction and 
protection, tends to promote economic welfare. Economists (Dollar 1992; Levine and 
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Renelt 1992; Frankel and Romer 1999; Sachs and Warner 1995; Dollar and Kraay 2001), 
political scientists (De Soysa and Oneal 1999), and sociologists (Firebaugh and Beck 
1994) are among several scholars who have found that countries with more open 
economies tend to have higher growth rates. Dollar (1992); Levine and Renelt (1992); 
Frankel and Romer (1999); Dollar and Kraay (2001) all argue that trade, or trade reform, 
is an important determinant of differences in either incomes or growth. Indeed, economic 
openness can stimulate economic growth by enhancing the international flow of 
knowledge and innovation and by allowing economies of specialization, not only in the 
production of goods, but also in the generation of new knowledge and new inputs into 
production. This raises the hope of countries to eventually reach a higher level of welfare, 
whether measured as per capita income or improvement in the living standard of their 
citizens or the reduction in the number of poor people. Therefore, a high degree of 
economic openness is likely to speed up the rate of economic growth by leading to larger 
economies of scale in production due to the positive spillover effects emanating from 
technological developments in industrial countries than the less degree of economic 
openness. It is probably the failure to achieve this condition in many multi-ethnic 
developing countries that explains the low level of economic performance with political 
instability in these countries.  
 
Although several studies covering different groups of countries and different periods 
have found that trade openness is an important determinant of economic growth, the 
evidence reveals ambiguous results about this relationship. While some countries’ 
experience provides a positive linkage between degree of economic openness and 
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economic growth, other countries’ experience fails to demonstrate this linkage. There are 
a number of countries which have experienced high economic openness with higher level 
of economic growth. As a result of high degree of economic openness, formerly closed 
economies, such as China, India and Vietnam have experienced considerable economic 
growth and reduction in poverty after modernizing their economies through foreign trade.  
 
In order to clarify the relationship between the degree of economic openness and 
economic growth, we used trade openness (exports +imports / GDP) as a proxy for 
degree of economic openness and growth rate of real GDP per capita as a proxy for 
economic growth. Further, we selected 16 countries (developed and less develop 
countries) and two different periods (1981-1990 and 1991-2000) and categorize them in 
terms of degree of economic openness and level of economic growth. From this 
categorization, we found ambiguous results (see the results in Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2: Relationship between degree of openness and growth: 1981-2000 
Openness Growth rate of Real GDP 
per Capita 
 



















































The main findings from the above table can be summarized into four categories:  
• Category A: Countries which have maintained a high degree of trade openness 
with high economic growth. Also, it indicates the positive relationship between 
openness and growth. While increase economic openness from 1981-1990 to 
1991-2000, economic growth also increased in the same period.  
• Category B: Countries which have maintained a less degree of trade openness 
with high economic growth. In the mean time, it shows the positive correlation 
between them. While increase economic openness from 1981-1990 to 1991-2000, 
economic growth also increased in the same period.  
• Category C: Countries which have maintained a high degree of trade openness 
with high economic growth. But, it indicates a negative relationship between 
them. While increase economic openness from 1981-1990 to 1991-2000, 
economic growth decreased in the same period. 
• Category D: Countries which have maintained a low degree of trade openness 
with low economic growth. Also, it specifies the negative connection between 
them. While increase economic openness from 1981-1990 to 1991-2000, 
economic growth decreased in the same period. 
 
Based on the above discussion, the relationship between openness and growth can not be 
confirmed. In order to confirm the relationship, we tested the relationship between the 
degree of economic openness and ethnic conflict and presented the results in Figure 4.1. 
For the assessment, we used economic openness data11 from Bussmann et al. (2003b) and 
                                                 
11 CACAO index measures exchange arrangements and exchange restrictions on an ordinal scale ranging 
from 0 “closed” to 7 “open”. It is based on a combination of trade policies and institutional arrangements. 
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ethnic war data from State Failure Task Force Report (2004) and presented the 
relationship between the degree of economic openness and ethnic conflict from 1980 to 
2000. Figure 4.1 shows that the number of open economies and the number of ethnic 
wars have raised from 1980 to 1992.12 Since then, while the number of open economies 
increased the number of ethnic wars decreased.  
 
            Figure 4.1: Relationship between trade openness and  
        ethnic war in the World: 1980 - 2000 
 
          Compiled by the Author:  Source: State Failure Task Force Report (2004), Bussmann et al. (2003b) 
 
Even though the experience revealed the ambiguous result regarding economic openness, 
it must be noted that growth-enhancing open economic policy is one of the necessary 
conditions for reducing ethnic conflicts via improving quality of governance. The 
subsequent section provides further information regarding the relationship between 
quality of governance and ethnic conflict.    
 
                                                 
12 With the help of Current Account and Capital Account openness (CACAO) index, Martin and Schneider 
(2002) show that a majority of developing countries have become more open to the world economy during 

































4.2.2 The quality of governance and ethnic conflict 
Good governance is an essential ingredient of ethnic peace. During the past two decades, 
governance has become a key concept in the international development debate and policy 
discourse. Probably, the most challenging issue facing multi-ethnic nations today 
concerns the establishment of quality governance that can effectively deal with ethnic 
diversity and allow different groups to co-exist peacefully. For instance, the government 
of Singapore played (and still plays) an active role in managing its ethnic society as well 
as developing the economy; and the government has increasingly been challenged to 
maintain an even and balanced perspective on the issues of ethnicity and race. To 
maintain ethnic balance, the government of Singapore provides legal protection to 
minorities, promises freedom from expropriation, and grants freedom from repudiation of 
contracts. Further, it facilitates cooperation with public services in order to make a given 
amount of ethnic fractionalization less damaging for development.  
 
The quality of governance and economic growth: Why is it that some developing 
countries experience rapid economic growth while others fall far behind?  Recent 
empirical studies suggest that good governance is one of the key distinguishing factors 
between high growth and low or negative growth countries. Economists, historians, and 
political scientists have long been engaged in a debate on whether, and to what extent, 
good governance correlates with economic growth. La Porta et al. (1998) presented a 
historical approach involving legal origins to prove that good governance is correlated 
with economic growth. Many other economists pointed out that the effective institutions 
are good for economic growth. The prevailing view is that poor governance disrupts 
economic activity by imposing costs that distort the efficient allocation of resources in an 
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economy. On the other hand, the institutional approach postulates that most of the 
economic effects are the consequences of ineffective institutions. It has been proved by 
events in many developing countries that good governance correlates with economic 
growth.  
 
In our view, poor governance is a significant contributor to low economic growth, a 
stifled investment, ineffective provision of public services, and increased inequality. The 
goal of a disciplined government as a promoter of economic growth can be reached in 
many ways: getting the country into ‘the right business’; creating a comparative 
advantage in ‘the right business’; providing infrastructure; setting standards, 
responsibility to provide skilled labor and entrepreneurship; and creating demand. 
Though the quality of governance is an important determinant of economic growth, it 
should also be noted that the quality of governance depends on the level of economic 
growth as well, since wealthy countries can afford good governance. Poor governance is 
a significant contributor to low economic growth;13 in turn, lower level of economic 
growth leads to poor level of governance. 
 
Figures 4.4A to 4.4D above present a scatter plot of log GDP per capita against the index 
of government effectiveness in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002, showing a close relationship. 
The GDP per capita data is from Pen World Table 6.1 and government effectiveness data 
                                                 
13 This was the main story in Sri Lanka from 1956 to 1977; as a result of poor governance (political 
favoritism and widespread corruption), most of the periods of Sri Lanka’s economic growth were 
insignificant. Further, World Bank (2001) studies suggest that the contributions to growth of physical 
investment and total factor productivity in sub-Saharan Africa have been low in comparison with other 
regions and have declined over time. These trends have reflected inefficiencies in resource allocation, poor 
delivery of public goods (notably health care and education), and the high risk of doing business in many 
parts of the region.  
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are from Kaufmann et al. (2005) and cover the following 28 multi-ethnic developing 
countries.14  
 
Figure 4.2: Relationship between government effectiveness and growth: 1996, 1998, 
2000 and 2002 (selected multi-ethnic developing countries) 
 
                          Figure 4.4A                 Figure 4.4B 














































log GDP = 3.57+0.49GE











































log GDP = 3.54+0.39GE
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                                  Figure 4.4C                                                          Figure 4.4D 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
                                                 
14 Algeria (ALG), Angola (ANG), Azerbaijan (AZE), Bangladesh (BAN), Burundi (BUR), Chad (CHA), 
Ethiopia (ETH), Georgia (GEO), Guatemala (GUA), India (IND), Indonesia (INDO), Kenya (KEN), 
Lebanon (LEB), Malaysia (MAL), Mexico (MEX), Morocco (MOR), Nigeria (NIG), Pakistan (PAK), 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Philippines (PHI), Rwanda (RWA), South Africa (SAF), Sri Lanka (SRI), 
Thailand (THA), Turkey (TUR), Uganda (UGA), Zaire (ZAI), Zimbabwe (ZIM).  
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These Figures (4.4A – 4.4D) clearly indicate a very strong positive correlation between 
index of government effectiveness and growth in all selected periods. In the case of 
Figure 4.4A, the simple regression coefficient is 0.49; its associated t-statistic is 6.3; and 
government effectiveness alone accounts for 61 per cent of the variance in log GDP per 
capita (R2 = 0.6112). As shown in Figure 4.4B, the simple regression coefficient is 0.39; 
its associated t-statistic is 4.1; and government effectiveness alone accounts for 39 per 
cent of the variance in log GDP per capita (R2 = 0.3913). According to Figure 4.4C, the 
simple regression coefficient is 0.44; its associated t-statistic is 4.4; and government 
effectiveness alone accounts for 43 per cent of the variance in log GDP per capita (R2 = 
0.4281). The last figure (4.4D) indicates that the simple regression coefficient is 0.58; t-
statistic is 6.0; and government effectiveness alone accounts for 58 per cent of the 
variance in log GDP per capita (R2 = 0.5802). The evidence thus indicates that there is a 
close correlation between the quality of governance and economic growth.  
 
The quality of governance and poverty & inequality: While higher economic growth is 
key to economic development, its unequal distribution – as a result of poor governance – 
can lead to social unrest. Among all the factors that influence the rapidity and substance 
of economic growth, it is now clear that the quality of governance is also one of the 
decisive factors. Ineffective governance leads to poverty and income inequality in many 
ways: it reduces economic growth, the level and effectiveness of social programs; and 
perpetuates an unequal distribution of asset ownership, unequal access to education as 
well as employment opportunities. Once a country is characterized by poor governance, 
only the better connected individuals in society, who belong mostly to high income 
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groups as well as government supporters, obtain the most profitable government projects 
and other benefits. This leads to reduction in social and economic welfare. Ultimately, 
poor governance is less likely to improve the distribution of income and make the 
economic system more equitable.  
 
It can be said that good governance ensures an enabling environment for poverty 
reduction. There is strong evidence that effective governance matters for growth and 
poverty reduction. But establishing the rule of law, tackling corruption, reforming public 
services, and getting democracy and markets to work in poor countries is not easy. The 
challenge is particularly acute in some low income countries which have very weak 
policies, institutions, and governance (World Bank 2002). Among the countries that have 
sustained an impressive record of economic growth in recent decades, Malaysia provides 
an unusual – and perhaps unique – record.15 The next section provides the details in 
relation to economic growth and ethnic conflict. 
 
4.2.3 Economic growth and ethnic conflict  
Economic growth facilitates and may even be a necessary condition for, the successful 
management of ethnic conflict. Economic growth leads to ethnic peace, both directly and 
indirectly via the reduction of poverty and inequality.  
 
The rationale behind the direct relationship is that by increasing the material resources of 
society, economic expansion makes it possible for governments to provide material 
                                                 
15 Malaysia’s ethnic tension in 1960s clearly explained this situation. As a result of laissez-faire economic 
system, there was a high horizontal inequality between ethnic groups though the economy experiences a 
higher level of economic growth. 
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benefits to members of all ethnic groups. Particularly, more can be provided to the 
relatively disadvantaged in order to satisfy their aspirations for material improvement and 
greater justice. Everyone benefits in this positive sum game, and no individual is 
deprived. Thus, economic expansion, and only economic expansion, provides the means 
to benefit all. The logic that ‘economic growth facilitates ethnic peace’ is relatively 
simple: since a country has greater economic growth experience and the prospects of the 
long-term prosperity, as mentioned in Collier and Hoffeler (2001), opportunity costs for 
the formation of rebel groups grow and a smaller number of people are keen to 
participate. This implies that the opportunity costs of wealthy people are higher since 
they have more to lose from participating in a rebellion than poor persons.  
 
Economic growth also brings about ethnic peace indirectly via the reduction of poverty 
and inequality among communities. Economic growth is one of the most important 
factors in helping to reduce poverty and inequality, but it is not sufficient. The 
relationship between growth and poverty on the one hand and inequality on the other 
hand is one of the central questions in economics which have attracted considerable 
attention. At first, many studies tended to assume that there must be an inverse relation 
between economic growth and poverty and inequality. Unfortunately, that is not 
absolutely clear. The literature on this issue flourished in particular after the seminal 
work of Kuznets (1955), where he postulated a specific nonlinear, inverted-U shaped, 
dynamic relationship between growth and income inequality, the so-called “Kuznets 
curve.” At a very low level of income, groups and individuals, although poor, are not 
conscious of deprivation; however, at middle levels of income, they become aware of the 
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potentialities created by greater levels of income and so they become discontented. Even 
though various theories were suggested to explain this dynamic relationship, some 
present evidence shows both the optimistic and pessimistic relationships between growth 
and inequality. 
 
Since the mid 1970s, South Korea has been perceived as not only an exemplar of rapid 
economic growth, but also as a society where substantial reductions in inequality and 
poverty seem to have been largely a reflex of economic growth. Another successful 
country is Malaysia where since the introduction of New Economic Policy in 1970, the 
horizontal inequality and poverty have been gradually reduced and the country has 
achieved a very credible growth record. These successes have been achieved – unlike 
their counterparts in East Asia – while having a racially diverse population. In the mean 
time an ambiguous result is found in the US. During the 1930s through 1940s income 
became more equal while economic decline was followed by growth. From the 1950s 
through the 1970s, the income gap lessened during booms and expanded during slumps. 
From the late 1970s forward, income inequality worsened fairly consistently, whether the 
economy was stagnating or growing.  
 
In order to verify the relationship further, we selected some developed and developing 
countries and categorized them in terms of their economic performance and inequality. 
To measure economic performance we used GDP per capita (PPP, USD, 2001) from 
Human Development Report (2003) (Table 12 and for the inequality data Table 13). 
Table 4.3 categorized the countries according to their economic performance and 
inequality. As can be seen in Table 4.3, most developed countries experienced less 
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inequality compared with the developing countries. It should be pointed out here that 
some of the multi-ethnic developing countries (for example, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and 
Indonesia) also experienced low level of inequality.  
 










20-30 Hungary, Denmark, 
Czech Republic, Japan, 
Sweden, Norway, 
Belgium, Finland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia  
Macedonia, Croatia Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine  
Rwanda 
30-40 Austria,  Luxemburg, 
Canada, South Korea, 
Spain, Netherlands, 
France, Germany, the 
UK, Switzerland, 
Australia, Israel, Greek, 





Algeria, Lithuania,  
Latvia, Belarus,  













40-50 USA, Singapore, Hong 
Kong 
Turkey, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Iran, 
Thailand, Uruguay, 
Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Panama, 
Malaysia, Venezuela, 










Bissau, Burkina Faso  
50-60 South Africa El Salvatore, Mexico, 
Colombia, Chile, 
Paraguay 
Papua New Guinea, 
Guatemala, Lesotho, 
Zimbabwe, Honduras 




                   --- 
Brazil, Botswana Swaziland Central African 
Republic, Sierra 
Leone 
70-80                    --- Namibia              ---             --- 
Compiled by the Author: Source: United Nations Development Program (2003), Tables 12 and 13. 
Rich countries: GDP/Capita more than 10,000 (PPP, USD, 2001). Rather rich countries: 5,000-10,000. 
Rather poor countries: 2,000-5,000. Poor countries: less than 2,000. 
 
From the above evidence, we can say that it is possible to have both positive and negative 
relationships between growth and inequality across nations. It is important to note that 
economic growth does not automatically fuel equality; growth only promotes equality if 
policies and institutions to support equity are in place. Therefore, the effectiveness of 
economic growth in reducing inequality depends upon how the benefits of growth are 
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distributed. In this context, governments need to work on creating more equity in the 
distribution of income as well as other resources.  
 
To evaluate the relationship between economic growth and ethnic conflict, poor 
economic growth is highly correlated with the emergence of ethnic conflict, either 
directly or indirectly via reduction of poverty and inequality; however, the causes of 
potential ethnic conflict are dynamic in nature, rather than as a result of economic growth 
alone. It must be pointed out here that economic growth alone mitigates ethnic conflict. 
To ensure this statement, we have some supportive evidence. In Canada, for instance, 
strong economic expansion in the 1960s aroused high expectations among the Quebecois, 
exacerbating conflict; recession in the late 1970s raised doubts that Quebec could prosper 
as an independent unit and dampened separatist fervour. In Malaysia, two decades of 
rapid growth – from 1950 to 1970 – have not significantly reduced ethnic tensions. 
Therefore, we can conclude that while there is a negative relationship between economic 
growth and ethnic conflict, some of the evidence failed to prove this link. The succeeding 
section will attempt to provide the detail of the poverty, inequality and ethnic conflict. 
 
4.2.4 Poverty, Inequality, Deprivation and Ethnic conflict 
While poverty and inequality are not the same thing, they are the root causes of 
deprivation. Poverty is defined as the lack of some fixed level of material goods 
necessary for survival and minimal well-being.  Inequality, on the other hand, refers to a 
comparison between the material level of those who have the least in a society and the 
material level of other groups in that society. Consequently, a country in which everyone 
is poor will have poverty but no inequality.  Likewise, a fairly well-off country can have 
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inequality but no poverty. Poverty is generally regarded as absolute deprivation, and 
inequality as relative deprivation.  
 
There are different opinions about the impact of poverty and inequality in the probability 
of ethnic conflict; and this is still heavily debated in the literature (Alesina and Perrotti 
1996; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Indranil and Mishraz 2004). High poverty and 
inequality among ethnic groups accompany ethnic conflict because marginalized and 
poor people are unhappy with their economic status, which makes it harder to reach 
political harmony among various groups with higher and lower incomes.  
 
If a country experiences a high degree of inequality, the poor and deprived groups are 
confronted with groups that are relatively better off.  If marginalized frustration grows to 
a certain level, who are supposed to fight for what they perceive to be justice. This is 
what the relative deprivation aspect of ethnic conflict would predict. In fact, relative 
deprivation occurs when individuals or groups subjectively perceive themselves as 
unfairly disadvantaged over others perceived as having similar attributes and deserving 
similar rewards (their reference groups). The research on the relative deprivation model 
first introduced by Davies (1962) and then Gurr (1970) considered the concept of relative 
deprivation as the most important factor in creating grievances and mobilizing people for 
conflict behavior. The theory also claims that political violence can increase when a 
society’s population become relatively well educated but fail to receive a commensurate 
level of income. In sum, when the poor and marginalized compare themselves to the rich, 
this can lead to unhappiness, stress, and alienation.  
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Reduction in poverty and inequality reduces the potential for ethnic conflict by providing 
formal channels for the expression of grievances, thus affecting ethnic peace positively. 
As mentioned previously, economic stagnation and inequality are generally regarded as 
typical grievance factors. If a country experiences a high level of economic growth and a 
low level of inequality, eventually the relative deprivation between ethnic groups will 
reduce ethnic peace in the country.  
 
Overall, each and every economic activity interrelated and directly or indirectly 
influences ethnic peace or conflict. From the above analysis, it can be noted that there are 
ambiguous relationships within economic activities and between economic activities and 
ethnic conflict. Therefore, without analyzing theoretical and empirical models we can not 
confirm the relationship. The second part of this chapter, therefore, will attempt to 












4.3 Theoretical model of ethnic conflict  
This section is devoted to a theoretical explanation. For the purpose of our argument, we 




We use a simplified version of Gershenson and Grossman’s (2000) model. The original 
model identified the factors that determine whether civil conflict ends or never ends. In 
order to explain whether civil conflict ends or never ends, the original model focused on 
how the values that rival groups attach to political dominance relate to each other and to 
the technology of conflict. According to this model, when the ratio of values attached to 
political dominance is relatively high, and there is a possibility for peace in a country. 
And when the ratio of values attached to political dominance is relatively small, peace is 
achieved whenever the initial challenging group becomes politically dominant. When the 
ratio of values attached to political dominance is neither too large nor too small, peace is 
never achieved.   
 
We found that the Gershenson and Grossman model can be applied to explain inter-
ethnic relations in multi-ethnic developing countries. Our main contribution is, however, 
to modify the original model so that a testable hypothesis can be drawn, and to provide 
some empirical evidence. In this section, we focus on the political options of different 
ethnic groups and their ‘economic satisfaction’ as formative factors for ethnic peace or 
conflict. Moreover, if the population of a particular country is equally divided between 
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two ethnic groups then it is possible for either one to be politically dominant. But, the 
experience of many multi-ethnic developing countries shows that the percentage of ethnic 
composition is not equal. As a result of unequal composition between ethnic groups, the 
chance of obtaining political dominance is always higher in the majority group than the 
minority group. Therefore, Gershenson and Grossman’s argument cannot be used in 
multi-ethnic developing countries where the percentage of ethnic composition is not 
equal. To examine ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries, we selected 
political options and economic satisfaction as important instruments rather than political 
dominance as used by Gershenson and Grossman.  
 
4.3.2 Assumptions of the model 
We assume that there are two ethnic groups, majority (MA) and minority (MI) struggling 
to succeed with their political options; the majority ethnic group will always express 
support for political unity of the country while the minority ethnic group will seek to gain 
political independence. When the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining political 
unity in the country, the decision of the minority ethnic group, whether to agree or 
challenge the political option of the majority ethnic group, depends on their economic 
contentment. If the minority ethnic group is economically well-off then their motivation 
to challenge the majority ethnic group is weakened. On the other hand, if the minority 
ethnic group is economically poor compared with the majority, and then their motivation 
to challenge the majority ethnic group becomes stronger. Therefore, the economic 
satisfaction of minority ethnic groups is considered a major factor in our formulation of 
the adapted model.  
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In our model, we presume that initially the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining 
political unity of the country. With this assumption, this analysis raises the following 
questions:  
• First, does the minority ethnic group agree or challenge the political option of the 
majority ethnic group?  In other words, does the political unity of the country lead 
to ethnic peace or ethnic conflict?  
• Second, if the minority ethnic group challenges successfully the political option of 
the majority ethnic group and it gains political independence, would the majority 
ethnic group agree or attempt to regain its political option by challenging the 
minority ethnic group?    
  
Suppose either of the ethnic groups agrees with the other’s option, then there is a chance 
for ethnic peace; if neither of the ethnic groups agrees with the other’s option, then there 
is no chance for ethnic peace. In this analysis, economic satisfaction of ethnic groups is 
the major determinant in deciding whether to agree or to challenge the other’s political 
option.  
 
4.3.3 The consequence of political options 
We assume that ethnic groups maximize expected benefits they seek by engaging in the 
contest to achieve their political options. Let UMA denote the expected payoff for the 
majority ethnic group should it succeed in retaining political unity of the country. This is 
equal to the product of its probability that the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining 
political unity of the country in the next period (PMA) and the value that majority ethnic 
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group attaches to retaining political unity of the country in the next period (XMA), minus 
the amount that the majority ethnic group spends on defending its political option (DMA). 
Thus, while the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining political unity of the country, 
it chooses DMA to maximize UMA, where 
 
MAMAMAMA DXPU −=                                 (1) 
 





X ), economic resources 
available to majority ethnic group. DMA is the nonnegative amount that the majority 
ethnic group spends on defending its political option. 
 
The expected payoff for the minority ethnic group, VMI, is equal to the product of the 
probability that the minority ethnic group gains political independence (1-PMA) and the 
value that the minority ethnic group attaches to gaining political independence in the next 
period (XMI), minus the amount that the minority ethnic group spends on challenging the 
political option of the majority ethnic group (CMI). Therefore, while the majority ethnic 
group initially succeeds in retaining political unity of the country, the minority ethnic 
group chooses CMI to maximize VMI, where 
 
( ) MIMIMAMI CXPV −−= 1                      (2) 
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X ), economic resources 
available to the minority ethnic group. CMI is the nonnegative amount that the minority 
ethnic group spends on challenging the option of the majority ethnic group.  
 
This analysis further assumes that the initial resources available to the majority ethnic 
group and the minority ethnic group are sufficient to finance the implied amounts of 
spending, DMA and CMI. 
 
In order to focus on the implications of differences in the values that the ethnic groups 
attach to their political option, the analysis makes two assumptions.  
 
• First, we assume that XMA is not necessarily equal to XMI.   
• Second, we take both XMA and XMI as given.  
 
Also to determined the probability that the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining 
political unity of the country, we assume that PMA depends on DMA, CMI and θ. According 





DP θ+=                 (3) 
 
                                                 
16 A Contest Success Function (CSF) is a mathematical relation whose inputs are the amounts of resources 
devoted to conflict by each one of the contestants and whose output is the division of the contested prize 
between them, or the (average) expected likelihood of success for each one of the contestants. For an 
extensive treatment of CSF, see Skaperdas (1996), and Hirshleifer (2001),  
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Equation (3) relates the probabilistic result of an ethnic conflict to the amounts that the 
two ethnic groups spend on the contest for their political options. If a minority ethnic 
group agrees to the political option of the majority ethnic group, then CMI equals zero.  
 
In equation (3) the nonnegative parameter θ measures the effectiveness of spending by 
the minority ethnic group on challenging the political option of the majority, relative to 
the effectiveness of spending by the majority ethnic group on defending its political 
option.  
 
In equation (3), PMA is an increasing function of DMA and a decreasing function of CMI. 


























According to equation (3), to allow for the possibility that by spending sufficient amount 
on defending its political option the majority ethnic group can prevent a challenge to its 
policy option, the analysis presumes that the majority ethnic group is a Stackelberg 
leader17 in the contest for political options. Therefore, if initially the majority ethnic 
                                                 
17 There are two possible equilibriums: Stackelberg-leader and Stackelberg-follower. In the Stackelberg-
leader, the leader chooses the policy that optimises his objectives by taking into account the policy response 
of the follower. In the Stackelberg-follower, the leader lets the follower take the lead. The strong player can 
choose the equilibrium that suits his objectives. If the dominant ethnic group were not a Stackelberg leader, 
then it would take as given the amount of spending by the other ethnic group on challenging its political 
option. With the probability that the majority ethnic group succeeds with its political option given by 




group succeeds in retaining political unity of the country in choosing DMA, it needs to 
consider both the direct effect of DMA on UMA and the indirect effect of DMA on UMA 
through the effect of DMA on the choice by the minority ethnic group of CMI. In contrast, 
in choosing CMI the minority ethnic group takes the option by the majority ethnic group 
of DMA as given.  
 
In order to determine whether the initial political option of a country results in ethnic 
peace or ethnic conflict, we begin by solving the choice problem of a minority ethnic 
group. To maximize its expected payoff, VMI, the minority ethnic group chooses CMI to 













V    
 
As pointed out earlier, assuming that DMA is positive, equations (2) and (3) imply either 







V    with 0>MIC                               (4.1) 






V    with 0=MIC                  (4.2) 
 
According to condition (4.1), if a minority ethnic group prefers a positive value for CMI 
( 0>MIC ), then CMI is such that the marginal benefit of CMI in increasing the probability 
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that minority ethnic group gains political independence equals the marginal cost of CMI. 
On the other hand, condition (4.2) says that if a minority ethnic group prefers CMI equal 
to zero ( 0=MIC ), then at CMI equal to zero the marginal benefit of CMI equals or less 














DXDC   for MIMA XD θ<<0                 (5.1) 
 
0=MIC     for MIMA XD θ≥               (5.2) 
 
The amount MIXθ  is the minimum amount that a majority ethnic group must spend on 
defending its political option in order to prevent a potential challenge from the minority 
ethnic group. In other words, if the majority ethnic group spends at least MIXθ  on 
defending its political option, then the minority ethnic group agrees to the political option 
of the majority ethnic group.  
 
Equation (5.1) states that, if a majority ethnic group chooses DMA less than MIXθ  
( MIMA XD θ< ), then condition (4.1) obtains. It means that the amount that a majority 
ethnic group spends on defending its political option is insufficient to prevent a potential 
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challenge from the minority ethnic group. In this case, CMI is positive. Equation (5.1) 
















On the other hand, equation (5.2) states that if a majority ethnic group chooses DMA equal 
to or more than MIXθ  ( MIMA XD θ≥ ), then condition (4.2) obtains. It means that the 
amount that a majority ethnic group spends on defending its political option is sufficient 
to prevent a potential challenge from the minority ethnic group. In this case, there is no 
challenge from the minority ethnic group; as a result CMI equals zero.  
 
4.3.4 Agreement or challenge? 
We now consider the choice problem of the majority ethnic group. In order to maintain 
ethnic peace, the analysis is interested especially in the conditions under which the 
majority ethnic group chooses DMA as large as MIXθ .  
 
In order to maximize its expected payoff, UMA, the majority ethnic group chooses DMA to 
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Accordingly, equations (1) and (3) imply either that UMA has an interior maximum at a 







U  with MIMA XD θ<<0                 (6.1)  






U   for all MIMA XD θ<                 (6.2) 
 
Equation (6.1) indicates that if the majority ethnic group chooses DMA less than MIXθ , 
then DMA is such that the marginal benefit of DMA in increasing the probability that the 
majority ethnic group will succeed in retaining political unity of the country equals the 
marginal cost of DMA. The marginal benefit of DMA includes both a direct effect of DMA 
on PMA and an indirect effect of DMA on PMA via the effect of DMA on CMI. 
 
Alternatively, equation (6.2) states that if the majority ethnic group chooses DMA equal to 
MIXθ  then for all values of DMA less than MIXθ  the marginal benefit of DMA exceeds the 
marginal cost.  Therefore, the majority ethnic group would interest especially in the 




















∂ , , as calculated from equations (3), (5.1) and (5.2), 
conditions (6.1) and (6.2) imply that 
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X                (7.1) 
 




X                    (7.2) 
 




X  is smaller than 2θ, then condition (6.1) [ MIMA XD θ<  ] 
obtains. With MIMA XD θ< , equation (5.1) implies that the minority ethnic group spends a 





X  is smaller than 2θ, the initial political option of the majority ethnic group 








θ is the amount that the majority 
ethnic group chooses to spend on defending its political option, which is less than MIXθ  
and an insufficient amount to prevent a potential challenge from the minority ethnic 
group. 
 




X is as large as or larger than 2θ, then 
condition (6.2) [ MIMA XD θ= ] obtains. From the equation (5.2) it can be said that this 





X is as large as or larger than 2θ, then the minority ethnic group agrees to the 
political option of the majority ethnic group results in ethnic peace. In this situation, 
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MIXθ  is the amount that the majority ethnic group chooses to spend on defending its 
political option. 
 




X is smaller than 
2θ, then the majority ethnic group does not spend sufficient amount on defending its 
political option to prevent a challenge from the minority ethnic group. Therefore, ethnic 
conflict persists as long as the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining political unity 
of the country.  
 
4.3.5 Can ethnic peace be achieved?   
If the majority ethnic group’s success in retaining political unity of the country results in 
ethnic conflict, then, in the absence of an appropriate exogenous disturbance, such as an 
increase XMA, a decrease XMI and a decrease θ, that is the potential for ethnic conflict will 
continue as long as a political option of majority ethnic group remains. Suppose that the 
challenge of minority ethnic group succeeds and gains political independence, how does 
the majority ethnic group respond? 
 
The analysis of the implications of a minority ethnic group that gains political 
independence is analogous to the analysis of the implications of a majority ethnic group 
that succeeds in retaining political unity in the country. Assuming that the minority ethnic 
group is now the Stackelberg leader, and it chooses DMI (the minority ethnic group 
spends on defending its political option) to maximize UMI (the expected payoff for the 
minority ethnic group gains political independence), where  
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MIMIMIMI DXPU −=                                                                                        (8) 
 
where PMI is the product of the probability that the minority ethnic group gains political 
independence in the next period and XMI is the value that minority ethnic group attaches 
to gaining political independence in the next period. The majority ethnic group now 
chooses CMA (the amount that the majority ethnic group spend on challenging the 
political option of the minority ethnic group) to maximize VMA (the expected payoff for 
the majority ethnic group), where18  
 
( ) MAMAMIMA CXPV −−= 1                     (9) 
 
where (1-PMI) is the product of the probability that the majority ethnic group succeeds in 
retaining political unity of the country in the next period and XMA is the value that 
majority ethnic group attaches to retaining political unity of the country in the next 
period. In order to determine the probability that the minority ethnic group gains political 





DP θ+=                     (10) 
 
                                                 
18 This analysis implicitly assumes that the resources now available to the minority ethnic group and 
majority ethnic group are sufficient to finance the implied amounts of spending, DMI and CMA. 
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In the equation (10) the nonnegative parameter θ measures the effectiveness of spending 
by the majority ethnic group on challenging the political option of the minority ethnic 
group relative to the effectiveness of spending by the minority ethnic group on defending 
its political option. 
 
Performing calculations analogous to the derivation of equation (7), we obtain the 




X  is smaller than 2θ, then the 
minority ethnic group does not spend sufficient amount on defending its political option 
to prevent a challenge from the majority ethnic group. Therefore, ethnic conflict persists 
as long as the minority ethnic group gains political independence in the country.  
 
4.3.6 The implications of the analysis 
Accordingly, our analysis has the following implications for the evolution of ethnic 
peace: 
 




X   ⇒  MIMA XD θ=    ⇒ 0=MIC     
then the initial political option of the majority ethnic group results in ethnic peace. As 
long as condition (I) prevails, the minority ethnic group agrees with the political option of 
the majority ethnic group. On the other hand,  
 




X    ⇒  MIMA XD θ<    ⇒  0>MIC    
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Therefore, the minority ethnic group challenges the political option of the majority ethnic 
group, leading to ethnic conflict in the country.  
 








X ≤< θ                  
then the initial political option of a majority ethnic group results in ethnic conflict. As 
long as both the first part of condition (III) prevails and the majority ethnic group 
succeeds in retaining political unity of the country, ethnic conflict continues. But, if and 
when the minority ethnic group succeeds in challenging the political option of the 
majority ethnic group, then there is chance for ending ethnic conflict. As long as the 
second part of condition (III) prevails, the majority ethnic group agrees with the political 
option of the minority ethnic group. 
 
     








X       
 
then there is no chance for ethnic peace. As long as both the first part of condition (IV) 
prevails and the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining political unity of the country, 
the minority ethnic group will challenge the political option of the majority ethnic group. 
And as long as the second part of condition (IV) prevails, whenever the minority ethnic 
group gains political independence, the majority ethnic group challenges the political 
option of the minority. Further, when both parts of condition (IV) prevails, neither of the 
ethnic groups agrees with the political option of the other ethnic group. In this case, 
ethnic peace is never achieved in the country.  
 126
4.3.7 The degree of economic openness and ethnic peace or conflict 











X ). It is true that when the 
available resources increase in a country, better economic opportunities for people are 
provided, resulting in improvement of economic satisfaction for both the majority and 
minority ethnic groups. As can be seen in our analytical framework, this experience 
occurs where the country has a high degree of economic openness (open economic 
policy). An open economic policy leads to increased economic growth and quality of 
governance; as a result, it is likely to increase available resources in the country and 
decrease poverty and inequality in the society.  
 
In such a situation, the majority ethnic group can spend sufficient amount of DMA to 
prevent a potential challenge from the minority ethnic group. As a result, there is no 
challenge from the minority ethnic group and CMI equals zero. In the mean time, high 
economic contentment increases the value that majority ethnic group attaches to retaining 
political unity of the country in the next period (XMA). On the other hand, high economic 
satisfaction reduces the value that the minority ethnic group attaches to political 
independence in the next period (XMI). As we explained earlier, a high economic 
satisfaction will reduce the motivation to challenge an existing political option: the 
minority ethnic group is not eager to fight for political independence in the country, 
thereby lowering the value of XMI. Overall, high economic contentment leads to cordial 
relations between the majority and the minority ethnic groups: either ethnic group will 
agree with the other’s political option. As a result, there is chance for ethnic peace. 
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If we assume that initially the majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining political unity 
in the country and the country experiences a high degree of economic openness, as 
explained before, the value of XMA will increase and the value of XMI will decrease. As a 




X  goes up. In the mean time, as a result of high economic 
contentment, the amount of challenging the political option, CMI, reduces, resulting in the 




X  and 
there is eventually ethnic peace in the country. For openness to increase the probability of 
ethnic peace, it must be the case (for a given value of θ) that 0>∂
∂∂
Open
XX MIMA . 
 
On the other hand, we assume that initially a majority ethnic group succeeds in retaining 
political unity in a country where a country has low level of economic openness (closed 
economic policy). The closed economic policy option leads to decrease in economic 
growth and the quality of governance; as a result, it is likely to increase poverty and 
inequality in the society. Because of limited resources, the majority ethnic group is 
unable to spend sufficient amount of DMA to prevent potential challenge from the 
minority ethnic group. When there is a chance for a challenge from minority ethnic 
group, then the amount CMI becomes positive. It is also worth noting that economic 
discontent decreases the value that the majority ethnic group attaches to retaining 
political unity of the country in the next period (XMA). On the other hand, economic 
discontent increases the value that the minority ethnic group attaches to being politically 
independent in the next period (XMI). The poor economic situation will increase the 
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motivation to challenge an existing political option: the minority ethnic group is willing 
to fight for political independence in the country: therefore, the value of XMI goes up. 




X  goes down. Given poor economic conditions, the amount 
of challenging for the political option, CMI, will increase, allowing the parameter θ to go 




X . Eventually ethnic conflict 
occurs in the country. Overall, the economic discontent leads to relative deprivation 
between ethnic groups. And when neither of the ethnic groups agrees with the other’s 
political option, there is chance for ethnic conflict.  
 
The findings of our result can be explained by figure 4.3. We assume that the majority 
ethnic group initially succeeds in retaining political unity of the country.  
             
 
    Figure 4.3: Ethnic peace or conflict  
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The area A shows that there is no ethnic conflict; the area B indicates a situation where 
ethnic peace is achieved whenever the minority ethnic group gains political independence 
via a successful challenge; and the area C describes the situation where ethnic peace is 
never achieved. First we see from Figure 4.3 that when XMA is sufficiently large relative 





obtained. In this case the minority ethnic group agrees with the current political option of 
the majority ethnic group. There is no ethnic conflict (area A). Further, we see from 









X ≤< θ is obtained. In this case, even though the minority ethnic group does 
not agree with the current political option, the majority ethnic group would agree with the 
political option of the minority. The initial political option of the majority ethnic group 
results in ethnic conflict; but ethnic conflict ends whenever the minority ethnic group 
succeeds in gaining political independence (area B). 
 
Lastly, we see from Figure 4.3 that, if θ is larger than ½ and if XMA is neither too large 








X  is 
obtained. In this case neither ethnic group would accept the political option of the other 
group. The initial political option of the majority ethnic group results in ethnic conflict; 
but ethnic conflict does not end whenever the minority ethnic group succeeds with its 
political option. Therefore, ethnic peace is never achieved (area C).  
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To sum up, the model clearly explained that economic happiness is the most important 
factor that can reduce ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries. Now we turn 






















4.4 Empirical analysis 
The theoretical model presented in the previous section cannot be utilized directly for 
empirical testing because of the lack of necessary data. However, the key implications of 
the model can be tested indirectly by formulating an appropriate econometric model. In 
this section we formulate an econometric model to test how a high degree of economic 
openness lowers the probability of major ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic developing 
countries. For empirical testing we use a panel model based on 12 multi-ethnic countries 
for the time period from 1980 to 2000. 19 
 
4.4.1 Econometric Model 
To model the relationship between economic activities and ethnic relations, we develop 
three econometric equations. The first equation provides the relationship between 
economic openness and economic growth, the second explains the relationship between 
economic openness and the quality of governance, and the third describes the impact of 
economic openness, economic growth, and the quality of governance on ethnic conflict. 
In each equation we include a set of control variables to isolate the effect of the key 
variables of our concern. The three equations are as follows: 
 













                                                 
19 Our sample consists of 12 multi-ethnic developing countries: Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
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We now turn to a discussion of the variable we used in the model. 
 
Equation A:  
The dependent variable of the first equation is growth rate (Growth), measured as the 
annual growth rate of GDP per capita in logarithmic form and taken from World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2004). The minimum and maximum values of 
these data range from 228.3 to 4840 USD 
 
The independent variables of this equation are economic openness (Openness), 
disciplined government (DG), Inflation (Inf), human capital (HCap), physical capital 
(PCap), population growth (Popg), democracy (Demo) and ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF).  
 
Economic openness and economic growth: In order to estimate economic openness 
(Openness), we rely on a customary measure Trade Dependency Ratio that calculates the 
sum of exports and imports divided by GDP with data from the Penn World Tables 
(PWT) version 6.1 (Summers et al. 2002). Even though the majority of ethnic studies use 
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the trade dependency ratio to proxy economic openness, to improve our empirical result, 
we use one more openness index to measure economic openness, called ‘composite trade 
openness index’ (Gwartney et al. 2001). The index is estimated from the following 
indicators: revenues from taxes on trade as a share of the trade sector, mean tariff rate, 
standard deviation of tariff rates, composite tariff rating, difference between the official 
and black market exchange rate, citizen restrictions on capital transactions with 
foreigners and actual relative to expected size of the trade sector. Each indicator is given 
the value from 0 to 10; therefore, the trade openness index ranges from 0 to 10. If the 
trade openness index is high, the country has a high degree of economic openness. From 
our analytical framework and theoretical analysis, we expect a positive relationship 
between economic openness and growth. This suggests that openness of an economy has 
positive and significant effects on the growth rate of per capita GDP. 
 
Disciplined government and economic growth: We use corruption index as a measure of 
disciplined government (DG) to proxy the quality of governance. Corruption index 
ranges from 0 to 10. An index of 0 indicates a highly corrupt government and an index of 
10 indicates a highly clean government. In other words, the lower the index, the poorer 
the quality of the government in a country is. Similarly, the higher the index, the better 
the quality of the government in a country is. The data on corruption index were taken 
from the Country Data.Com. We expect a positive correlation between disciplined 
government and growth.  
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Inflation and economic growth: One of the most fundamental objectives of 
macroeconomic policies in multi-ethnic developing countries is to sustain high economic 
growth together with low inflation. Several studies have found a negative relationship 
between inflation and economic growth. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) estimate a 
growth equation with cross section data and find that the effect of inflation on the growth 
rate is negative. Grier and Tullock (1989) find that the variability of inflation seems to 
have a significant and negative effect on growth. However, there has been substantial 
debate on the nature of the inflation and growth relationship. But, we anticipate negative 
and significant coefficient on the inflation. Annual inflation rates were computed from 
Consumer Price Indexes (CPI). Inflation is measured by the percentage change in the 
consumer price index. The data come primarily from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database. 
 
Human capital and economic growth: Human capital (HCap) encompasses skills and 
knowledge of workers, often derived from education and training, which contribute to 
productivity (Ehrenberg 1994). Endogenous growth theorists have always stressed the 
importance of human capital for the growth of an economy. To proxy human capital, we 
have taken the adult literacy rate from WDIs (World Bank 2004). Adult literacy is one of 
the common indicators used to capture an important, yet limited, aspect of human capital 
in developing countries. The benefit of this indicator is that it is, in general, readily 
available in most countries and is relatively easy to compare across different countries 
and regions. It is, also a limited indicator in the sense that it fails to capture many 
intricate features implied in worker skills and productivity. Adult literacy is thus 
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considered to be a good indicator to capture some extent of human capital for multi-
ethnic developing countries where a large fraction of the adult population lacks basic 
education. For these countries, alternative indicators such as educational attainment are 
not informative since they tend to be very low in many countries with small variances. 
Human capital has been found to exert the greatest influence on economic growth 
throughout the world and to generate just under two-thirds of the income in developing 
nations (Auty 2001). Therefore, we anticipate positive and significant coefficient on the 
human capital. 
 
Physical capital and economic growth: According to Solow (1956), physical capital 
(PCap) plays an important role in economic growth. To proxy physical capital, we use 
gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP (Schaffer 2004) taken from WDIs 
(World Bank 2004). The higher the capital stock, the more economic growth is expected. 
Therefore, we presume a positive and significant coefficient on physical capital. 
 
Population growth and economic growth: Inclusion of population growth (Popg) is 
derived from the family of simple Solow-Swan growth models, where labor growth is 
one of the most important explanatory variables. While some of the studies (Solow 1956; 
Mankiw et al. 1992) found a negative association between economic growth and 
population growth, endogenous growth models with R&D sectors (Romer 1990), 
emphasized the possibility of a positive relationship between population growth and 
economic growth. The population data are taken from the WDIs (World Bank 2004). 
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Democracy and economic growth: Democracy (Demo) is said to enhance growth. We 
would expect a positive and statistically significant coefficient on democracy. Data on 
this variable were taken from the widely-used Polity IV data by Marshall and Jaggers 
(2002). The Polity IV democracy measure uses a 20-point integer scale constructed from 
two subscales: DEMOC (democracy) and AUTOC (autocracy). DEMOC awards points 
(0 to 10) and AUTOC awards points (0 to 10). Subtracting AUTOC from DEMOC, as 
suggested by Polity IV’s authors (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), generates a summary 
measure that we call ‘Demo’. This varies within the range from -10 (most autocratic) to 
+10 (most democratic). We added 10 to Demo to bring the minimum value to 0, in order 
to avoid complications in the construction of the squared term.  Therefore, the score 
Demo extends from 0 (most autocratic) to 20 (most democratic).  
 
Ethnic-linguistic fractionalization and economic growth: Ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals 
from a given country do not speak the same language. The ELF index ranges from 0 to 1 
with a score of 0, indicating that every person in a country belongs to the same ethno-
linguistic group (totally homogenous country) and a score of 1 indicating that everyone 
belongs to a different ethno-linguistic group(totally fractionalized country). Ethno-
linguistic fractionalization is also closely correlated with GDP per capita growth. Many 
ethnic studies have pointed out that ELF index negatively correlates with GDP per capita 





The dependent variable of the second equation is disciplined government (DG). We use 
corruption index as a measure of disciplined government to proxy the quality of 
governance. Disciplined government has been explained in more detail in the earlier 
section.  
 
The independent variables of this equation are trade openness (Openness), economic 
growth (Growth), Inflation (Inf), democracy (Demo) and population (Pop).  
 
Openness and a disciplined government: In accordance with our analytical discussion, 
countries that are integrated into the world economy tend to display less corruption and 
build better quality of governance. Many studies indicate that economic openness is 
positively related with disciplined government. We expect a similar result from our 
empirical analysis. 
 
Economic growth and a disciplined government: As indicated in the growth equation, 
both variables are interrelated; therefore, we expect a positive relationship between them. 
We use lagged growth rate in the equation to remove simultaneity problem and estimate 
equations individually.  
 
Inflation and a discipline government: Empirical evidence shows that higher inflation 
variability is associated with higher corruption. High and variable inflation is assumed to 
increase uncertainty about prices and therefore to increase the cost of auditing the agent’s 
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behavior, then this can lead to higher corruption. Braun and DiTella (2000) presented 
empirical evidence on the link between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 
75 countries over 14 years. According to panel estimate, they found that a one standard 
deviation increase in inflation variance from the median can lead to an increase in 
corruption of 12-percent of a standard deviation and a decline in growth rates of 0.33 
percentage points. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between inflation and 
discipline government. We used the lagged inflation rate to avoid the endogeneity 
problem. With contemporaneous inflation rate we may have to estimate one more 
equation to explain the inflation rate. 
 
Democracy and a disciplined government: Empirical evidence shows that measures of 
quality of governance are substantially higher in more democratic countries (Rivera-Batiz 
and Francisco 2002). Here too, we expect a positive correlation between democracy and 
disciplined government.  
 
Population and a disciplined government: In countries with large populations there are 
more opportunities for corruption and less chance for good governance. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relationship between these two variables. The minimum and maximum 
values of population data range from 6.82 to 1015.9 Million. We take the logarithmic 
form of this variable. 
 
Equation C:  
The dependent variable of the third equation is ethnic conflict (Ethcon). Ethnic conflict 
encompasses all forms of small and large-scale acts of violence between different ethnic 
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groups (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Sambanis 2001). We use ethnic conflict data from 
State Failure Task Force Report (2004). We use a dichotomous variable for the incidence 
of ethnic conflict that takes the value one if an ethnic conflict took place for each country 
in a given period and zero otherwise. 
 
The independent variables of this equation are trade openness (Openness), disciplined 
government (DG), economic growth (Growth), Inflation (Inf) population (Pop), 
democracy (Demo), and square term of democracy (Demo2), ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF), and square term of ethnic-linguistic fractionalization (ELF2) 
 
Openness and ethnic conflict: According to our analytical framework openness is the 
key variable that will mitigate the chances of ethnic conflicts. Bussmann and Schneider’s 
(2003b) results indicate that long-term openness as expressed through trade to GDP ratio 
seems to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. We expect a negative correlation 
between openness and ethnic conflict. 
 
Disciplined government and ethnic conflict: The second important explanatory variable 
in this equation is disciplined government (DG). It has long been recognized that a 
disciplined government is an important component of political stability in multi-ethnic 
countries. We expect that a disciplined government to have a negative effect on ethnic 
conflict. 
 
Economic growth and ethnic conflict: The third important explanatory variable in this 
equation is economic growth (Growth). Many growth studies have identified economic 
 140
growth as a necessary condition for the successful management of ethnic conflicts. Our 
analytical and theoretical analyses also point out the negative correlation between 
economic growth and ethnic conflict. Therefore, we anticipate a negative relationship 
between these two variables.  As second equation we use lagged growth rate to remove 
simultaneity problem. 
 
Inflation and ethnic conflict: Some have pointed out that high inflation leads to risk of 
conflict. According to Rowlands (2000), suppressing inflation promote violence if it 
relies heavily on demand restraint. In order to explain the relationship between inflation 
and ethnic conflict we included inflation as an independent variable in our ethnic conflict 
equation. We expect a positive relationship between these two variables. As before we 
use lagged inflation rate to avoid the simultaneity problem.  
 
Population and ethnic conflict: Size of the population (Pop) is highly correlated with 
inter-ethnic relation in many multi-ethnic developing countries. In countries with large 
populations there is more space for disagreements. The higher the population, the more 
likely is the occurrence of an ethnic conflict. This means that large countries are more 
prone to conflict than small countries. This is in agreement with the hypothesis that 
populous countries are more heterogeneous and thus have a higher potential for ethnic 
conflicts (Alesina et al 2003). Thus, we expect a positive correlation between population 
and ethnic conflict. We use the logarithms of this variable in the equation. 
 
Democracy, Democracy2 and ethnic conflict: There is strong support that the 
relationship between democracy and ethnic conflict is non-linear, but inversely U-shaped. 
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To account for the non-linear relationship, we use its simple form (Demo) and squared 
term (Demo2) in the ethnic conflict equation. As a result, we expect a positive link 
between a simple form of democracy with ethnic conflict and a negative link between a 
squared term of democracy and ethnic conflict.  
 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization, ELF2 and ethnic conflict:  Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization is one of the most basic elements of ethnic conflict. That is, countries 
must have more than one ethnic group for ethnic conflict to occur within them. The 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization hypothesized to be nonlinearly is related to ethnic 
conflict. Therefore we use its simple form (ELF) as well as its square term (ELF2). The 
rationale behind this is that the probability for an ethnic conflict is lower in a 
homogenous society than in a society where there are two or three dominant ethnic 
groups that continuously fight for power. However, if there is great heterogeneity in a 
country and none of the ethnic groups is dominant, the level of conflict is also supposed 
to be lower (Ellingsen 2000). Like the democracy variable, we expect a positive link 
between a simple form of ELF with ethnic conflict and negative link between a squared 
term of ELF and ethnic conflict.  
 
4.4.2 Estimation Techniques  
In order to quantify the results, we will utilize a pooled time-series cross-section method 
with individual effects for the first two equations (A and B). Given the nature of the data 
(ethnic conflict being a dichotomous variable) we use a pooled time-series cross-section 
Logit model and a linear probability model with individual effects for the third equation.  
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Between the fixed-effect and random-effect panel models the fixed effects estimation is 
the most intuitive way to control for unobservable effects specific to individual countries 
in panel data. The key assumptions of this model are that country-specific effects do not 
vary over time and that they are correlated with the regressors of the model. Compared to 
the fixed effects model, the random effect model achieves more efficient estimation at the 
risk of getting inconsistent estimates. Specifically, the random effects estimation assumes 
that country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors. If this assumption 
is satisfied, researchers can exploit additional orthogonality conditions to obtain more 
efficient estimators without the loss of consistency.  
 
The choice of one model over the other is the trade-off between consistency and 
efficiency. We use the Hausman specification test to determine which of the two models 
is appropriate for our analysis. The Hausman specification test supports random effects 
estimation for equations A and B. For example, the Hausman statistic for the growth 
regression is 2.01 with 0.9456 probability value, failing to reject the maintained 
hypothesis that error term is uncorrelated with the regressors. This implies that by using 
random effects estimation, we can obtain more efficient estimators without sacrificing 
consistency. To avoid difficult theoretical issues involved in estimating a discrete  
choice model in a panel context we estimate a logit model without  
individual effects and a linear probability model with fixed effects. 
 
Appendices 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 summarize the operational definitions of the independent 
variables and the signs that we expect for the corresponding coefficients. Appendices 
4.4A – 4.4L provide some basic descriptive statistics of the potential determinants of 
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dependent variables in each of the 12 countries and 4.4M describes the basic descriptive 
statistics for all countries. 
 
4.4.3 Results 
4.4.3.1 Results of economic growth  
In the first specification, we run the pooled random effects model under two different 
openness measures. The coefficient estimates of the growth rate equation are presented in 
Table 4.4. The results provide strong support to our economic growth and degree of 
economic openness hypothesis. The table indicates that all the variables in the equation 
have a significant relationship with the dependent variable. 
 
The first column of Table 4.4 presents the random effects estimation when we use trade 
dependency ratio to proxy the economic openness. The second column in Table 4.4 











Table 4.4: Dependent variable: Economic growth 
Independent 
 variable 
Trade dependency ratio 



















































































R2  0.5818 0.5985 
Adj.R2  0.5668 0.5765 
DW 1.2113 1.2351 
 Chi. Sq .St = 1.76    Prob. = 0.9534 Chi. Sq. St. = 2.01    Prob. 
= 0.9456 
Note: Asterisks indicate the level of significance (** = p<.05; * = p<.01).                      N = 252 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
In the random effects estimation, the coefficients on openness carry the expected positive 
sign with economic growth and are statistically significant. The coefficients change when 
we use a different proxy to economic openness. As can be seen in Table 4.4, the 
coefficients on openness is 0.6256 when we use trade dependency ratio to proxy the 
economic openness and 0.1563 once we use openness index to proxy the economic 
openness. Overall, the results support our hypothesis that countries that are integrated 
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into the world economy will experience more economic growth. Accompanying this 
result is the fact that the quality of governance variable – disciplined government (DG) – 
is positively related to economic growth and is statistically significant in both cases. But, 
the coefficients on a disciplined government are varied when we use different proxy for 
economic openness.   
 
Inflation in both cases is negatively related to economic growth and highly significant. 
The coefficients on inflation are also varied when we use when we use different proxy for 
economic openness.  As can be seen in Table 4.4, the coefficient on inflation is -0.0112 
when we use trade dependency ratio to proxy the economic openness and -0.0100 once 
we use openness index to proxy the economic openness. 
 
Physical capital in both cases is positively related to economic growth and highly 
significant. The coefficients on physical capital are slightly varied when we use different 
proxy for economic openness. The coefficient on physical capital is 0.0386 when we use 
trade dependency ratio to proxy the economic openness and 0.0350 once we use openness 
index to proxy the economic openness. Human capital in both cases is found to have a 
positive impact on economic growth and is highly significant. Overall, both results are 
totally in line with economic growth theory. In our analysis, population growth is 
positively related to economic growth and highly significant in both cases. While we use 
different proxy for economic openness, the coefficients on population growth changes 
slightly. 
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Table 4.4 indicates that the coefficients on democracy carry the expected positive sign 
with economic growth and are statistically significant. Further, the coefficients on 
democracy are varied while we use a different proxy for economic openness. Our 
findings support previous studies, which used similar proxy for openness. There is a 
negative relationship between the ethnic fractionalization score and growth. In our 
analysis, ELF is negatively related to economic growth and significant in both cases. The 
coefficients on ELF are also varied when we use a different proxy for economic 
openness. 
 
Overall, the coefficients on all explanatory variables carry the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. By using different proxies to economic openness, the results vary. 
However, the above results confirm our main findings that the countries that are 












4.4.3.2 Results of disciplined government 
Table 4.5 displays the random effects estimation of the quality of governance (DG) 
regressions corresponding to equation 2.  
 
Table 4.5: Dependent variable: Disciplined government 
Independent  
variable 
Trade dependence ratio 
























































R2 0.5687 0.5710 
Adj.R2 0.5491 0.5545 
DW 2.1230 2.3109 
 Chi. Sq .St = 1.97, Prob. = 0.8643 Chi. Sq. St. = 1.75, Prob. = 0.8797 
Note: Asterisks indicate the level of significance (* = p<.01).                                      N = 252 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
The first column of Table 4.5 provides the random effects estimation once we use trade 
dependent ratio to proxy the economic openness. The second column presents the random 
effects estimation once we use openness index to proxy economic openness. 
 
The findings show that the coefficient of openness is positively related and highly 
significant to the disciplined government in both cases. As in the growth regression, the 
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coefficient of openness is 0.9921 when we use trade dependency ratio to proxy the 
economic openness and 0.1463 once we use openness index to proxy the economic 
openness. Associated with this result is the fact that economic growth is positively 
related, highly significant and a strong determinant of the quality of governance. The 
result indicates that coefficients vary when we use a different proxy to economic 
openness. Inflation is negatively related and highly significant in both cases. Table 4.5 
shows that the coefficients of inflation vary when we use a different proxy for economic 
openness. 
 
Also, according to the results, the coefficients of democracy are positive related with a 
disciplined government and statistically significant. Using a different proxy to economic 
openness, the results don’t vary much. The value of the population coefficient is negative 
and highly significant. Using a different proxy to economic openness, the results slightly 
vary. In our analysis, population is negatively related to discipline government and highly 
significant in both cases. As we pointed out earlier, when a country has a large 
population, there is more space for disagreement. As a result, the opportunity cost for 
maintaining good governance is very high in the country.  
 
Overall, the findings show a similar pattern of argument that was advanced in the growth 
regression: when we use a different proxy to economic openness, the coefficients differ 





4.4.3.3 Results of ethnic conflict 
Table 4.6 highlights the results of the impact of economic activities (with other political 
and cultural variables) on ethnic conflict.   
 
Table 4.6: Dependent Variable: Ethnic conflict 
Independent 
variable 
Trade dependence ratio 
(Exports + Imports) /GDP  
Openness index 
 Logit model LPM with  
fixed effects 
























































































































































N=252 Log Likelihood  
= -152.96 
 R2  = 0.4378 
Adj.R2   = 0.3948 
DW  = 1.9654 
Chi. Sq. St =0.29,   
Prob. = 0.026 
Log Likelihood 
= -162.43 
R2 = 0.4215 
Adj.R2  = 0.3147 
DW  =1.9076 
Chi. Sq. St = 0.24   
Prob.  = 0.037 
Note: Asterisks indicate the level of significance ((** = p<.05; * = p<.01).   
 Standard errors in parentheses 
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The first column of Table 4.6 provides the logit estimation and the second column 
presents the Lenoir Probability Model (LPM) with fixed effects estimation when we use 
trade dependency ratio to proxy the economic openness. The third column presents the 
logit estimation and the fourth column presents the LPM with fixed effects estimation 
once we use openness index to proxy economic openness. 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.6, the coefficients of all independent variable are expected sine 
and highly significant. Let us first consider the economic variables. Openness is 
negatively related with ethnic conflict and statically significant in all cases. According to 
the result, when we use trade dependency ratio to proxy economic openness, the 
coefficients of openness is -2.1827 and the coefficients of openness varies (-0.0487) once 
we use openness index to proxy economic openness. The results of our regression 
analyses lead to the conclusion that countries that are more open economically seem to be 
more stable. Overall, the results support our hypothesis that countries that are integrated 
into the world economy are likely to experience ethnic peace. However, the peace-
promoting effect of openness depends on a country’s level of income. 
 
Second, we examine the relationship between a disciplined government and ethnic 
conflict. Like openness, the coefficients of a disciplined government (DG) are negatively 
related and highly significant, indicating that a strong determinant of ethnic conflict. In 
this case, the coefficients on a disciplined government are relatively similar when we use 
different proxy for economic openness. But, when we use a different method to run 
regression, the coefficients are varied. The coefficient of DG is -1.3720 when we use 
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logit model to run regression and -1.4546 once we use LPM with fixed effects. Our 
model provides more attention to logit model, because it is more consistent with our data 
compared to LPM with fixed effects.   
 
With respect to the third economic variable – economic growth – we discovered that 
ethnic conflict can be reduced by high economic growth. Economic growth is negatively 
related and highly significant in all cases. Table 4.6 shows that the coefficients of 
economic growth are not highly varied when we use different proxy for economic 
openness. But, the coefficients varied when we used a different method to run regression. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with the evidence that the higher the rate of growth 
the lower the probability of ethnic conflict is. Inflation is positively related and highly 
significant in all cases. Table 4.6 shows that the coefficients of inflation are not highly 
varied when we use different proxy for economic openness. But, the coefficients varied 
largely when we used a different method to run regression. 
 
The coefficients of the size of the population are highly significant and positively 
associated with ethnic conflict. The result suggests that the higher the population is, the 
more likely the incidence of ethnic conflict is. The coefficients are not highly varied 
when we use a different proxy to economic openness. But it is varied when we use a 
different method to run regression.  
 
Let us now consider the political variables. For democracy we find confirmation that the 
relationships have the shape of an inverted U-curve. When we added democracy together 
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with its squared term, the squared term is negative and the simple term positive but both 
are significant in all cases. The results indicate that countries in autocracies and 
democracies the risk of civil war is smaller, whereas in semi-autocratic regimes the risk is 
higher to experience political violence. Two democracy variables are significant at the 
0.01 level when we use different method to run regression and use different proxy to 
economic openness. 
 
We now consider the social variable; ELF and ELF2 have the expected signs and were 
highly significant. From Table 4.6, we can see that the coefficients of ELF and ELF2 are 
high when we use ligit model rather than LPM with fixed effects model. Overall, the 
results show that economic activities are correlated with ethnic conflict.  
 
To sum up our findings, most of the relationships predicted or hypothesized in the 
theoretical part have been supported by the empirics. Further, three main findings emerge 
from our empirical analysis. First, trade openness has a positive impact on economic 
growth. When we use both trade dependency ratio or openness index to proxy economic 
openness, we found a similar relationship between economic openness and economic 
growth. Second, countries with open economic policy tend to have a higher quality of 
governance, as documented by Alberto and Ditella (1999), Gatti (1999) and Treisman 
(2000). Third, economic activities such as economic openness, economic growth, and a 
disciplined government have a negative impact on ethnic conflict. Overall, all the 
relationships predicted or hypothesized in our theoretical part have been supported by 




To sum up, this chapter provided an analytical framework, a theoretical model and 
empirical results to show the link among four key variables: economic openness, 
disciplined government, economic growth, and ethnic conflict. The empirical results 
provide strong support for the hypothesis that economic openness is a strong correlate of 
disciplined government and economic growth. These three variables together constitute 
the key to opening the door for lasting ethnic peace. Adhering to the main focus of the 
thesis, we next examine the specific cases of Sri Lanka and Malaysia to draw further 
























Economic Openness         (OPEN) (Exports + Imports) / GDP  
and Openness index 
+ 
Disciplined Government   (DG) Index of corruption + 
Inflation                             (INF) Consumer Price Index - 
Physical Capital               (PCAP) Gross fixed capital formation /GDP + 
Human Capital                 (HCAP) Adult Literacy rate + 
Labor                                (LABOR) Population growth rate + 
Democracy                       (DEMO) (Autocracy –Democracy)+ 10 + 
Ethnic-Linguistic  






Appendix 4.2: Expected influence of different variables on  
quality of governance 
Independent Variables Operationalization Expected 
influence 
Economic Openness      (OPEN) (Exports + Imports) / GDP  
and Openness index 
+ 
Economic Growth         (GROWTH) Log GDP Per capita + 
Inflation                         (INF) Consumer Price Index - 
Democracy                    (DEMO) (Autocracy –Democracy)  + 10 + 
Population                     (POP) Population in logarithmic form - 
 





Trade openness                 (OPEN) (Exports + Imports) / GDP 
and Openness index 
- 
Quality of governance      (DG) Index of corruption  - 
Economic growth             (GROWTH) Log GDP Per capita  - 
Inflation                            (INF) Consumer Price Index + 
Democracy                       (DEMO) (Autocracy –Democracy)  + 10 + 
Democracy square            (DEMO2) [(Autocracy –Democracy) + 10]2 - 
Ethnic-Linguistic  
Fractionalization               (ELF) 
ELF index + 
Ethnic-Linguistic  
Fractionalization square    (ELF2)   
ELF2 Index - 








Appendix 4.4A: Bangladesh: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.5714 0.5070 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 291.29 38.010 248.54 373.19 
Openness Index 21 1.4628 0.1500 0.51 3.8 
Trade openness 21 0.2091 0.0637 0.14 0.3095 
Disciplined government 21 0.8761 0.9637 0 2 
Physical capital 21 18.05 2.2640 14.44 23.02 
Human capital 21 34.37 3.2487 29.00 39.80 
Democracy 21 10 5.9705 3 16 
Democracy2 21 133 120.40 9 256 
ELF 21 0.0448 0.0004 0.0441 0.0454 
ELF2 21 0.020 0.0000 0.0019 0.0021 
Population 21 109285 13721 86700 131050 
Population growth 
Inflation  

























Appendix 4.4B: Guatemala: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.7142 0.4629 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 1433.5 92.137 1299.2 1597.6 
Openness Index 21 4.5323 1.9714 1.9 7 
Trade openness 21 0.3839 0.0735 0.251 0.5017 
Disciplined government 21 2.4285 0.8106 2 4 
Physical capital 21 14.24 2.8042 9.63 20.35 
Human capital 21 60.92 4.8551 53.01 68.54 
Democracy 21 17 5.7058 0 18 
Democracy2 21 161.62 114.80 0 324 
ELF 21 0.51 0.0001 0.51 0.51 
ELF2 21 0.2624 0.0001 0.2621 0.2628 



























Appendix 4.4C: India: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.8571 0.3585 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 327.05 73.36 228.33 462.94 
Openness Index 21 3.5238 0.7077 2.6 4.8 
Trade openness 21 0.2012 0.0318 0.1717 0.259 
Disciplined government 21 2.8428 0.3585 2 3 
Physical capital 21 21.30 1.5125 18.52 24.36 
Human capital 21 49.23 5.0168 41.03 57.24 
Democracy 21 18 0.4629 18 19 
Democracy2 21 334.57 17.127 324 361 
ELF 21 0.4148 0.0021 0.4114 0.4182 
ELF2 21 0.1721 0.0017 0.1692 0.1749 






























Appendix 4.4D: Indonesia: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 1 0 1 1 
GDP per capita 21 794.38 211.68 503.01 1149.5 
Openness Index 21 5.9571 0.3187 5.1 6.4 
Trade openness 21 0.4784 0.0653 0.396 0.64 
Disciplined government 21 1.6285 1.1619 0 3 
Physical capital 21 25.36 2.5353 20.14 29.6 
Human capital 21 78.86 5.5508 69.04 86.81 
Democracy 21 4 4.2020 3 17 
Democracy2 21 36.428 84.041 9 289 
ELF 21 0.7349 0.0002 0.7346 0.7354 
ELF2 21 0.5402 0.0003 0.5396 0.5408 


























Appendix 4.4E: Kenya: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.1428 0.3585 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 337.61 10.753 317.45 357.99 
Openness Index 21 5.0619 1.4786 3 7.9 
Trade openness 21 0.5697 0.0921 0.4528 0.7054 
Disciplined government 21 2.9285 0.2390 2 3 
Physical capital 21 15.88 1.3663 13.35 18.61 
Human capital 21 70.17 8.1884 56.15 82.42 
Democracy 21 5 1.8835 3 8 
Democracy2 21 24.714 20.674 9 64 
ELF 21 0.8580 0.0005 0.8572 0.8588 
ELF2 21 0.7363 0.0009 0.7348 0.7375 




























Appendix 4.4F: Malaysia: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0 0 0 0 
GDP per capita 21 3385.8 900.51 2287.1 4840.2 
Openness Index 21 7.7476 0.3944 7.1 8.4 
Trade openness 21 1.2957 0.3914 0.8139 1.9423 
Disciplined government 21 4.4714 0.7662 4 6 
Physical capital 21 32.54 6.8334 21.89 43.59 
Human capital 21 80.16 5.1280 71.16 88.7 
Democracy 21 14 0.4629 13 14 
Democracy2 21 188.28 12.4985 169 196 
ELF 21 0.5884 0.0003 0.588 0.5889 
ELF2 21 0.3462 0.0003 0.3457 0.3468 



























Appendix 4.4G: Pakistan: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.7619 0.4364 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 436.45 64.491 318.05 515.8 
Openness Index 21 3.9047 0.8285 2.1 4.9 
Trade openness 21 0.3879 0.0458 0.3171 0.5255 
Disciplined government 21 2.1714 0.3621 2 2.9 
Physical capital 21 16.89 1.2470 13.93 19.24 
Human capital 21 35.41 4.8275 27.82 43.28 
Democracy 21 11 7.0862 3 18 
Democracy2 21 175.19 153.64 9 324 
ELF 21 0.7074 0.0012 0.7055 0.7098 
ELF2 21 0.5006 0.0018 0.4977 0.5033 




























Appendix 4.4H: Philippines: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 1 0 1 1 
GDP per capita 21 1094.6 68.300 974.31 1197.19 
Openness Index 21 6.2761 0.9219 5.1 8.1 
Trade openness 21 0.6162 0.1724 0.3906 0.9694 
Disciplined government 21 1.8142 1.2586 0 3 
Physical capital 21 22.33 3.7776 16.50 29.85 
Human capital 21 91.52 2.0844 87.79 94.65 
Democracy 21 13 7.5052 0 18 
Democracy2 21 218.95 152.28 0 324 
ELF 21 0.2378 0.0004 0.237 0.2385 
ELF2 21 0.0566 0.0002 0.0562 0.0569 



























Appendix 4.4I: Sri Lanka: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.8751 0 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 645.94 136.19 455.07 902.02 
Openness Index 21 4.8476 0.7652 4.1 6.3 
Trade openness 21 0.76 0.110 0.64 1 
Disciplined government 21 3.2190 0.4094 3 4 
Physical capital 21 25.38 2.7235 21.54 31.27 
Human capital 21 88.62 1.9595 85.29 91.63 
Democracy 21 15 0.3007 15 16 
Democracy2 21 227.95 9.3245 225 256 
ELF 21 0.42 0.0030 0.42 0.43 
ELF2 21 0.1778 0.0025 0.1722 0.1807 



























Appendix 4.4J: Thailand: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.5238 0.5117 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 2008.5 686.79 1116.28 3014.8 
Openness Index 21 6.3285 0.5235 5.8 7.3 
Trade openness 21 0.6690 0.1993 0.4076 1.0116 
Disciplined government 21 3.1666 0.3651 3 4 
Physical capital 21 31.79 7.0519 20.83 41.63 
Human capital 21 91.89 2.3422 87.49 95.19 
Democracy 21 15 3.6331 9 19 
Democracy2 21 237.57 110.85 81 361 
ELF 21 0.6432 0.0305 0.6328 0.7351 
ELF2 21 0.4147 0.0417 0.4004 0.5404 



























Appendix 4.4K: Turkey: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.8095 0.4023 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 2518.8 363.16 1955.7 3082.5 
Openness Index 21 4.7 1.2942 2.4 6.5 
Trade openness 21 0.3722 0.1288 0.1848 0.652 
Disciplined government 21 4.2380 0.6445 3.5 5 
Physical capital 21 21.28 4.4651 14.40 26.52 
Human capital 21 77.61 5.2157 68.41 86.5 
Democracy 21 16 4.6357 5 19 
Democracy2 21 273.42 108.07 25 361 
ELF 21 0.3204 0.0002 0.32 0.3209 
ELF2 21 0.1027 0.0001 0.1024 0.1030 






























Appendix 4.4L: Zimbabwe: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.3337 0.4830 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 634.57 29.054 589.5 681.6 
Openness Index 21 4.8047 0.8674 3.5 5.8 
Trade openness 21 0.5996 0.1834 0.4448 0.9617 
Disciplined government 21 3.1 0.5253 1.9 4 
Physical capital 21 17.69 3.2829 12.42 24.58 
Human capital 21 80.11 5.6960 70.10 88.67 
Democracy 21 7 4.3413 4 15 
Democracy2 21 66.285 78.141 16 225 
ELF 21 0.3874 0.0001 0.3871 0.3877 
ELF2 21 0.1501 0.0001 0.1498 0.1503 



























Appendix 4.4M: All Countries: Descriptive statistics 





Ethnic conflict 21 0.6309 0.4835 0 1 
GDP per capita 21 1159.1 1016.6 228.3 4840.2 
Openness Index 21 4.928 1.8390 0.51 8.4 
Trade openness 21 0.55 0.3228 0.14 1.94 
Disciplined government 21 2.740 1.2246 0 6 
Physical capital 21 21.89 6.8093 9.63 43.59 
Human capital 21 69.91 20.199 27.82 95.19 
Democracy 21 12 6.1750 0 19 
Democracy2 21 173.17 131.50 0 361 
ELF 21 0.49 0.2219 0.04 0.86 
ELF2 21 0.2885 0.2136 0.0019 0.7375 








































The impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations in  
Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a three-pronged paradigm comprising the analytical framework, 
theoretical model, and empirical findings were utilized to address the impact of economic 
activities on ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries. It was found that a 
country with a more open economy tends to experience higher rates of economic growth 
and eventually may be able to prevent ethnic conflict. Further, the investigation has 
shown that aggregate measures of economic openness often veil the way that coalitional 
politics drive government intervention to correct ethnically based economic inequality. In 
the absence of a higher level of economic performance coupled with good governance, it 
is difficult to provide reasonable economic benefits with a reasonable degree of equity 
across ethnic groups.   
 
To what extent do economic activities impact on inter-ethnic relations in an economically 
under-developed society? How do economic policies set the parameters for political 
stability as well as the management of social discontent and ethnic grievances? How do 
different policy regimes of economic growth and expansion, and the changing role of 
government in the economy, bring about specific political outcomes? These are some of 
the questions raised in policy debates in many multi-ethnic developing countries 
concerning their post-independence economic development, social transformation and 
 163
political conflict, and particularly in relation to the background of a protracted ethnic 
conflict.  
 
We make an effort to find answers to the above questions by comparing the experience of 
the two interesting cases namely Sri Lanka and Malaysia. It is widely held among 
academics, officials, politicians and journalists that at the time of political independence 
and even about two decades after, Sri Lanka’s economy and level of social development 
were much stronger than Malaysia (Bruton et al.1992; Silva 2001). In this chapter, we 
however, make a comparison with a different objective. We seek to explore how the 
functioning of the economic activities have set the broad parameters to maintain inter-
ethnic relations. Since Malaysia and Sri Lanka are different in terms of economy, politics, 
social policy and conflict management, such a comparison will shed more light on the 
understanding of the relationship between economic activities and inter-ethnic relations.  
 
We begin with the simple hypothesis that governments in multi-ethnic developing 
societies can prevent ethnic conflict through appropriate economic policies. Similarly, 
inappropriate economic policies can fuel ethnic tension and eventually elevate it to the 
proportion of an ethnic conflict. In this paper, the discussion on Malaysia and Sri Lanka 
seeks to illustrate the diverse consequences of economic policy on inter-group relations. 
For convenience of comparative analysis, the chapter provides a critical evaluation of the 
following aspects: 
• economic activities and their outcome; 
• socio-economic status of ethnic communities; and  
• effectiveness and impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations 
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5.2 Economic activities and their outcome in Sri Lanka and Malaysia  
In this section, we critically evaluate economic activities in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. 
These economic activities are interrelated in a complex network of cause and effect; but 
for the purpose of the analysis, they can be placed within five main categories: 
• The degree of economic openness 
• The role of the government 
• The level of macroeconomic stability 
• The rate of economic growth 
• The incidence of poverty and inequality 
 
5.2.1 Degree of economic openness in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
To study the impact of economic openness on inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia, this section first clarifies the degree of economic openness in both countries since 
independence.  
 
In Sri Lanka, the degree of economic openness has been characterized by considerable 
variations and reversals with the changes on the political front and ideological position of 
governing parties. Since independence, there have been two major political parties (The 
United National Party [UNP] and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party [SLFP]) that rotated in 
power at regular general elections. So far, there have been 13 general elections in the 
post-independence political history of Sri Lanka.20 Out of these, nine elections witnessed 
                                                 
20 Though Ceylon (Sri Lanka) received political independence from Britain on February 4, 1948, the first    
general election was held in 1947. 
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major changes in political power and four elections witnessed major changes in policy 
and/or policy regime (see Table 5.1).21  
 
The ideological position of the UNP (a centre-right political party) had always been a 
market-friendly, private sector-led, and favored an integration of the domestic economy 
with the international markets. On the other hand, the SLFP’s (a centre-left party) 
political and economic thinking had been influenced to a great extent by the socialist 
ideology and favored import substitution industrialization in a state-dominated and 
regulated economic environment. Because of the ideological differences between the two 
parties, changes in political power had always produced opposite shifts in development 
policy (Bruton et el. 1992; Abeyratne 2004). The changes in political parties and 
economic policy regimes since independence to 2000 are presented in Table 5.1. Table 
also shows the key economic indicators in Sri Lanka from 1951 to 2000. 
 
Table 5.1: Sri Lanka: Political parties in power and economic policy regimes  
1951-2000 
Growth rate (%)  
Policy period & 
political party 
 











 / GDP  
1951-56  (UNP) B Open market economy 4.3 1.33 10.8 94.67 -2.3 
1956-65  (SLFP) A Closed economy 3.2 0.63 14.4 92.80 -5.2 
1965-70  (UNP) B Partial liberalization 5.2 2.37 16.7 74.11 -6.7 
1970-77  (SLFP) A Closed and  controlled 2.9 1.41 15.7 56.19 -6.8 
1977-94  (UNP) Open economy 5.0 3.25 25.3 69.49 -12.8 
1994-00  (SLFP) Open economy 5.1 3.91 25.6 90.37 -9.0 
Source: Department of Election, Sri Lanka; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, (various annual reports)  
A = More government intervention,   B = More market oriented    
 
                                                 
21 In 1960, there was another policy changed by UNP government for four months.  
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The two main political parties, that succeeded each other pursued opposite political and 
economic policies as well as different degrees of economic openness. The degree of 
economic openness often changed whenever a new political party was elected. As a result 
of the continuous swing of political power between these two major parties, there was 
lack of continuity of economic openness, thus creating uncertainty about the development 
path.  
 
Throughout the post-independence era, Malaysia has maintained a pro-market and open 
economy policy. In its early history, especially during and since the British colonial 
period, Malaysia has always been heavily trade-oriented. The policy option did not stop 
with independence, but continued, accelerating in the postcolonial era, especially since 
the 1970s. Presently, Malaysia has one of the most open economic policies in East Asia. 
The adoption of an outward-looking export-oriented trade strategy, no doubt, has enabled 
Malaysia to achieve higher rates of economic growth that would not have been possible 
under a more restrictive environment. This concurs with the empirical literature (Sachs 
and Warner 1995, 1997) that has shown that there is a positive links between economic 
openness and economic growth. Furthermore, the evidence shows that Malaysia’s open 
economic policy has resulted in disciplined government activities, particularly since 
1970. Table 5.2 indicates Malaysia’s political parties in power and economic policy regimes 
from 1959 to 2000. Table 5.2 also shows the key economic indicators in Malaysia from 




Table 5.2: Malaysia: Political parties in power and economic policy regimes  
1959-2000 
Growth rate (%) Political party and period 





UMNO -1959-64 6.6 4.02 15.1 81.13 -3.6 
UMNO -1964-69 6.3 3.13 15.6 73.51 -4.6 
UMNO -1969-74 8.2 5.46 22.6 73.37 -7.6 
UMNO -1974-78 6.7 4.27 23.5 73.78 -6.0 
UMNO -1978-82 7.4 5.16 30.7 83.93 -5.4 
UMNO -1982-86 3.5 0.31 30.7 91.00 -9.6 
UMNO -1986-90 8.3 5.32 27.4 111.42 -4.4 
UMNO -1990-95 9.4 5.94 38.8 155.08  0.1 
UMNO -1995-00 4.9 2.67 33.2 176.64 -0.5 
Source: Tham Siew-Yean (2003), Brown et al. (2004), World Bank (2004), Ministry of Finance, (various 
economic reports), Malaysia.        IS: Import Substitution; EO: Export Orientation.   
 
 
In comparing the relationship between degree of economic openness with economic 
growth and quality of governance in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, it is visible that consistent 
and high degree of economic openness improved quality of governance and supported 
economic growth in Malaysia, while inconsistent degree of economic openness failed to 
do so in Sri Lanka.   
 
An assessment of the degree of economic openness in different periods of the 
development practice exposed some crucial elements of the link between policy option 
and growth performance in Sri Lanka. Growth performance was higher in the open 
economic periods than in the closed periods in Sri Lanka. Table 5.1 shows that economic 
growth was higher in UNP periods than that of the SLFP periods, except from 1995 to 
2000. As a result of the continuation of an open economy policy, economic growth from 
1995 to 2000 was higher than that in the other periods ruled by the SLFP. 
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As can be seen in Table 5.1, the closed economic periods (1956-1965 and 1971-1977) in 
Sri Lanka experienced a significant slow down in economic growth and worsening 
external and internal balances. The economy experienced constantly growing foreign 
exchange shortage and balance of payments deficits. Obviously, the increasingly 
restrictive policy regime failed in bringing about significant structural changes in the 
classical colonial economy and dragged the economy into a deep and prolonged 
stagnancy (Snodgras 1988). In contrast, the liberalized policy regime produced a 
substantial increase in investment and manufactured export expansion, resulting in higher 
growth performance.  
 
Economic openness to trade and foreign direct investment provided various benefits in 
the economy of Malaysia. These benefits can be summarized as follows: 
• Economic openness creates demand needed to sustain the growth process in 
addition to providing firms with the economies of scale;  
• It reinforces the need to maintain macroeconomic stability and transparency;  
• It allows greater access to foreign technological advances (including both 
technology and management skills), hence facilitating technological catch-up;  
• It promotes efficiency and imposes discipline by subjecting domestic firms to the 
forces of international competition; and 
• It provides a channel for domestic price pressure to diffuse through imports, and 
this has played a vital role in Malaysia’s stable inflation environment. 
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Benefiting from its open economic policy, Malaysia has increased its worldwide 
competitiveness through strategic exposure and promoted economic growth. An annual 
growth rate during 1957-2000 was averaged 6.2 per cent. Although the country has 
maintained a higher level of economic growth, the trend has fluctuated according to the 
country’s trade strategy. The data show that growth performance was higher in an export-
oriented (EO) period than in import substitution (IS) era in Malaysia. During the periods 
of import substitution, 1959-1970 and 1980-85, economic growth was 5.3 and 5.2 per 
cent respectively. In the export-oriented periods of 1970-1980 and 1985-2000, it was 7.9 
per cent and 7.1 per cent respectively. In the period of import substitution, lack of capital 
and new technology led to the failure of the country to provide a high economic growth. 
But the period of export-oriented strategy provided more jobs, stabilized socio-political 
life, and brought in more foreign exchange needed for importing new technologies and 
increasing manufacturing output in Malaysia. As a result, the period experienced high 
economic growth. 
 
Concerning the relationship between the degree of economic openness and the quality of 
governance, evidence shows that there was better governance in the early period of 
independence (1948-1956) in Sri Lanka than in Malaysia (1957-1970). As a result of a 
high degree of economic openness, the first independent government in Sri Lanka was 
successful in ensuring economic welfare and political stability. Therefore, the period of 
1948-1956 can be seen as a solid achievement in state-building and the maintenance of 
inter-ethnic cooperation. In Malaysia, because of the laissez-faire economic system, the 
quality of governance was criticized during the early period. In fact, the laissez-faire 
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system was perceived as having widened economic and income disparities in the society. 
As a result, the simmering tension came to a boil and an ethnic conflict broke out in May 
1969, reflecting the failure of the laissez-faire system.  
 
 But later, the reverse proved to be the case in both countries. Since 1956, as a result of 
the restricted economic policy, the quality of governance has gradually declined in Sri 
Lanka. In particular, the period of 1956 to 1977 was identified with complicated 
bureaucratic bottlenecks, rent-seeking activities, and political patronage. As a result, 
much of the government’s efforts, characterized by a series of economic crises, reflected 
the crisis-management strategies rather than those design to achieve long-term growth 
objectives (Abeyratne and Rodrigo 2002). On the other hand, with the introduction of a 
new economic policy in 1970, quality of governance has gradually improved in 
Malaysia.22 The government of Malaysia strongly accepted that economic and political 
benefits must reach all citizens, including the poor, unemployed, and marginalized 
communities. Good governance has been ensured by the introduction of development 
policies. 
 
From the above inference, we can safely conclude that the findings of the case studies on 
Sri Lanka and Malaysia are consistent with the theoretical model developed in Chapter 4, 
section 4.3 and empirical estimations in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3.1. The lack of continuity 
of economic openness in Sri Lanka has led to the existence of a less disciplined 
government and low economic growth, while the outcome of a continuous open 
                                                 
22 Even though the government implemented a discriminatory policy (Affirmative Action Policy), the 
quality of governance improved compared to what obtained before.    
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economic environment in Malaysia has resulted in a highly disciplined government and 
higher level of economic growth. Therefore, the policy conclusion that we draw from the 
above is that, to maintain a better quality of governance and higher level of economic 
growth, governments must ensure the implementation of a continuous open economic 
policy. In addition to open economic policies the quality and the performance of 
governments in multi-ethnic developing countries are also an equally important 
determinant of inter ethnic relations. The next section examines the role and the quality 
of governments in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.  
 
5.2.2 Role of the government in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
The role of the Sri Lankan government was quite complex, compared with that of the 
Malaysian government. In the early period of independence, as mentioned before, good 
governance was noted in Sri Lanka. However, poor quality of governance has 
commenced in the late 1950s, with the introduction of a restricted economic policy, 
which continued in the 1960s, turning Sri Lanka into a corrupt economy. During this 
period, the popular but economically unfeasible schemes promoted by successive 
governments included restrictions on foreign investment and the nationalization of 
critical industries. In addition, governments actively expanded the public sector and 
broadened domestic welfare programs, including pension plans, medical care, nutrition 
programs, and food and fuel subsidies. Just as import controls were high in the 1970s, the 
regime was marked by an unprecedented expansion of the public sector. The role of the 
government expanded, covering all forms of economic activities, being the major 
‘entrepreneur’, and regulating the economic activities of the private sector (the major 
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‘provider’) (Abeyratne and Rodrigo 2002). State capital and entrepreneurship in industry, 
agriculture, distribution, trade, commerce and other key service sectors became the focus 
of the government. This was a severe blow to the private industries in the country. 
 
The political orientation of the new government in 1956 was rather consistent with the 
nationalist sentiment of the Sri Lankan society. The development strategy was welcomed 
by the Sinhala-Buddhist social groups, who were mostly absent in the modern plantation, 
trade and commercial sectors. Having come to power on the Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist 
platform, the government could not ignore the political pressure exerted by these groups 
and took initiatives to define Sri Lanka as a ‘Sinhala-Buddhist’ country (Wilson 1979). 
The new policies restricted the non-Sinhala control in many areas of the economy and 
provided an opportunity for Sinhala social groups to emerge and integrate with the 
modern economy.  
 
With a multi-ethnic society, Sri Lankan governments were expected to play an important 
role in managing the economy by undertaking relevant policies and programs. But, 
evidence shows the complex story of the role of governments in Sri Lanka. Since 
independence, the governments of Sri Lanka have played a key role in improving the 
socio-economic status of its citizens. Government’s activities were mainly confined to the 
provision of basic social needs and the maintenance of general public administration:  a 
large share of government resources was spent on these programs (see Appendix 5.1). 
This led to a ‘crowding out’ effect in which considerable resources were spent on welfare 
programs as mentioned above, leaving very little for real economic activities. There was 
a decline in economic growth and fewer job opportunities.  
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Furthermore, post-independence governments in Sri Lanka have failed to create sufficient 
employment opportunities for its growing numbers of educated youth (Sivarajah 1996; 
Lakshman 2004) although Sri Lanka has been internationally noted for its very successful 
social development, particularly education and health. The extensive welfare system 
resulted in a rapid growth of the country’s population, especially educated youth. The 
slow economy failed to create adequate employment opportunities for the growing 
numbers of educated youth. Census figures, adjusted to obtain comparability of 
definition, show a steady increase in the unemployment rate from 7.6 per cent in 1963 to 
18.7 per cent in 1971 (see the Appendix 5.2). Many of the, uneducated youth began to 
feel that they were being marginalized by the mainstream development processes. 
Further, there were structural imbalances which could arise when social change was rapid 
but economic change was slow. A symptom of this is the ‘mismatch problem’, which 
arises from a structural imbalance between the educational levels attained and the 
employment opportunities available (Hewavitharna 1997). Solving this mismatch 
problem depended on an adequate expansion of the economic potentials through rapid 
economic growth; but for many decades the governments of Sri Lanka appeared to have 
failed. 
 
In general, the role of governments in Sri Lanka evolved and became more and more 
regulatory because of the important role of state enterprises, subsidies on basic needs 
through the budget, trade controls, and the increasing role of the government as an 
employer. Successive governments were not able to transform the economic structure of 
Sri Lanka in a way that could help combat the two main problems, which were economic 
(unemployment and the balance of payments) and political (ethnic conflict) 
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In the case of Malaysia, the visible hands of the government, through active intervention, 
have no doubt, played a central role in managing the economic development process 
within a politically stable environment. The government of Malaysia subscribes strongly 
to the belief that economic development, if it is to be really meaningful and sustainable, 
must involve and benefit all citizens, including the poor, unemployed, and marginalized 
communities. This philosophy of ‘growth with equity’ has been embodied in all major 
policies since the 1970s, and this has led to a significant reduction in the incidence of 
poverty and a more equitable distribution of income. In particular, since the 1970s, three 
development strategies can be regarded as the most important attempts carried out by the 
Malaysian governments: the New Economic Policy, the National Development Policy 
(NDP), and Vision 2020. 
 
The government of Malaysia attempted to radically restructure the society in two ways 
via NEP. The first way was to eliminate poverty, regardless of race; and the second was 
to eliminate the identification of race with economic and social class. The NEP 
recognized that the distributional objectives that it sought to achieve must be undertaken 
within the context of a rapidly growing economy which offers increasing opportunities 
for all Malaysians. This was considered essential for ensuring that the distribution of 
income, employment and ownership were implemented smoothly, without making any 
particular group feel a sense of loss or deprivation. The principal objective of the policy 
has been to reduce relative deprivation in ethnic communities, leading to improvement in 
the quality of life of the people with continued economic growth. The policy options have 
in fact provided a peaceful and stable environment to enable the government to 
concentrate on the business of developing the nation.  
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The NDP accorded the same importance to the link among national unity, poverty 
reduction, societal restructuring, and economic growth, as did the NEP. The contribution 
of the NDP to national development was to make more explicit and to clarify the nature 
and scope of the balancing requirements. During the NDP period, not only was there 
remarkable economic growth and development of the country, but also improvement of 
ethnic peace between communities. These successes have been made against the 
background of political rhetoric of ethnicity. Vision 2020, like NDP and NEP, focuses on 
the achievement of a suitable balance among competing concerns in development.  
 
The role of the government in Malaysia has been considered as an important factor in 
improving the economic well-being of the people. Since 1970, governments of Malaysia 
have ensured that the benefits of development are equally distributed among all the ethnic 
groups to achieve peaceful inter-ethnic relation. Successive governments continued their 
economic policies under different names, without making any major changes. Because of 
the effective role of governments in the country, poverty and horizontal inequality were 
reduced, leading to increasing improvements in the living standards of all ethnic groups.  
 
In sum, the governments of Sri Lanka have failed to provide better economic 
opportunities for their people to improve their living standards. As a result, the country 
has unsuccessful to achieve higher level of economic growth and fail to overcome the 
problems of poverty, economic imbalances, and relative deprivation. In contrast, the 
governments of Malaysia have succeeded in providing better economic opportunities for 
their people. The country has achieved higher level of economic growth while addressing 
more effectively the problems of poverty, economic imbalances, and relative deprivation. 
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The findings support the predictions of the empirical model in Chapter 4, section 4.4.3.2. 
 
Its very clear that, poor functioning of governments in Sri Lanka, not only dragged the 
economy into a deep and prolonged stagnancy; but also led to more complicated 
bureaucratic bottlenecks, rent-seeking activities, and political patronage which eventually 
led to poor quality of governance. In other words, both economic stagnancy and poor 
quality of governance increase poverty and inequality, creating discontent and a feeling 
of relative deprivation. In contrast, better functioning of the governments in Malaysia has 
achieved higher level of economic growth while focusing more effectively on the 
remedial measures to address the problems of poverty, economic imbalances, and relative 
deprivation. Further, macroeconomic stability deem to be essential in order to open better 
economic opportunities for the people. The next section, thus, examines the macro-
economic stability in Sri Lanka and Malaysia since independence.  
 
5.2.3 The level of macro-economic stability in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
In this section, we do not intend to examine the meaning of macroeconomic stability, 
rather, we focus on the maintenance of macro-economic stability in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia. Maintaining macroeconomic stability is a sine qua non for the better 
functioning of international trade and hence the benefits gained out of it. Therefore, it is 
necessary to first clarify in this section how macro-economic stability can influence on 
other economic activities (such as economic openness, discipline government, economic 
growth and poverty and inequality)  in order to maintain peaceful inter-ethnic relations in 
Sri Lanka and Malaysia.  
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According to Fisher (1993), macroeconomic stability is critical to maintaining sustainable 
growth for several reasons. First, responsible macroeconomic management reduces 
inflation and makes it more predictable, encouraging long-term planning, private 
investment, and financial savings. Second, prudent macroeconomic stability strengthens 
private sector confidence, both domestic and foreign, favoring private investment. 
Finally, macroeconomic stability favors export growth by reducing inflation differentials 
with trading partners and facilitating external competitiveness. Overall, macroeconomic 
stability balances a multiplicity of requirements and objectives: it develops the economy, 
redistributes wealth, reallocates opportunities, and integrates an ethnically divided 
society.  
 
Efforts to maintain macroeconomic stability includes pursuing sound macroeconomic 
management, ensuring prudent fiscal and monetary policies, attracting quality domestic 
and foreign investments, enhancing the development of the growth sectors, and 
maintaining a healthy balance of payments position. Many developing countries have 
paid increasing attention to macroeconomic management in their planning processes in 
the last couple of decades. Sustaining macroeconomic stability has been one of the 
characteristics of Malaysia’s macroeconomic management. Malaysia’s growth rate has 
been achieved in line with the long-term potential of the economy while maintaining 
sound macroeconomic fundamentals, particularly in the form of price stability and a 
surplus in the fiscal and external accounts. On the other hand, Sri Lanka's record in 
macroeconomic stability is weak. Since mid 1950s, macroeconomic stability has been 
one of the most difficult problems in Sri Lanka. In order to examine the macroeconomic 
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stability of both countries, we discuss the fiscal and monetary policies as well as the 
exchange rate.  
 
The effectiveness of fiscal policy was supported by other strategies and policies that 
continued to build on Malaysia’s strong economic fundamentals. Malaysia has been using 
fiscal policy coupled with monetary policy to achieve the desired national objectives such 
as production and distribution of resources through effective allocation of resources in the 
economy. The unsustainable fiscal deficits of Sri Lanka have been indicated by the 
continuing deficit in the primary budget balance and the rising interest cost of the budget. 
Yet another problem associated with large fiscal deficits is the prevalence of relatively 
high inflation. Further, the lack of fiscal discipline in Sri Lanka had an impact on many 
other areas as well. Large domestic borrowings by the government, which crowded out 
resources from the private sector, led to high interest rates and discouraged investment, 
with adverse consequences on the economy (e.g. inadequate infrastructure and inadequate 
development of skills and human resources)(Ahmed and Ranjan 1995). Thus, while the 
high and growing fiscal deficit in Sri Lanka contributed significantly to the rapid growth 
in domestic and international indebtedness as well as inflation, the fiscal deficit in 
Malaysia was significantly smaller, and it’s financing had minimal negative 
macroeconomic consequences. 
 
Turning to the monetary policies in the two countries we see that, since independence, the 
main aim of monetary policy in Malaysia has been to set up a sound financial 
infrastructure and to control inflationary pressure (Mohamed 2000). In Sri Lanka, the 
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monetary transmission mechanism suffered from deficiency, thus hindering the adoption 
of inflation-targeting framework in many periods of post-independence. Further, the 
monetary policy in Sri Lanka varied according to the different political regimes. During 
closed economy regimes, monetary policy was aimed at promoting economic growth; 
economic stabilization was a major concern during the open economic regime 
(Thenuware 2000).  
 
The choice of exchange rate regimes and its impact on economic variables is probably 
one of the most controversial topics in macroeconomic policy. In Malaysia, the ringgit 
exchange rate, except during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98, was kept relatively 
stable. This ultimately created a stable and predictable environment for both investment 
and external trade to thrive (Jomo 2001a). In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, experience 
suggests mixed performance on exchange rate management, with periods of substantial 
overvaluation (Ahmad and Ranjan 1995). More importantly, the overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate created more difficulties in foreign trade and investment opportunities in 
Sri Lanka, particularly during the closed economic period. 
 
Table 5.3 shows that macroeconomic indicators of Malaysia have been more successful 
than that of Sri Lanka. Revenue as percentage of GDP in the case of Malaysia was higher 
than that of Sri Lanka in our period of study. Likewise, expenditure in Sri Lanka has 
always been higher than that of Malaysia; therefore, Sri Lanka witnessed a higher budget 
deficit than Malaysia during this period. The external debt of Sri Lanka rose to a perilous 
level, resulting in higher inflation in Sri Lanka than in Malaysia. Fiscal policies were 
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associated with a stable inflation trade in Malaysia while inflation hovered in the range of 
8-12 per cent in Sri Lanka. 
 
Table 5.3: Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Fiscal operations 1960-2000 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000  
Indicators SL MA SL MA SL MA SL MA SL MA 
Revenue A 20.9 16.9 20.0 19.7 19.6 26.9 21.1 24.8 16.8 18.1 
Expenditure A 27.1 14.1 26.9 23.6 42.7 32.9 31.0 27.6 26.7 23.8 
Fiscal deficit A -6.2 2.8 -6.9 -3.9 -23.1 -6.0 -9.9 -2.8 -9.9 -5.7 
Inflation (CPI)  1.1 -0.1 5.8 1.8 26.1 6.6 21.4 2.6 6.2 1.5 
External debt A 4.4 6.4 18.5 9.8 41.4 14.8 72.1 52.4 53.2 39.8 
GDS A 11.7 25.1 16.7 22.0 18.1 33.2 14.3 29.2 17.3 17.6 
GDI A 14.6 12.6 18.9 20.3 33.8 30.7 22.2 31.3 28.0 26.8 
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various annual reports); Ministry of Finance, (various economic 
reports), Malaysia.   A: as a percentage of GDP 
 
Figure 5.1 below shows that macroeconomic indicators were more stable in Malaysia 
than in Sri Lanka. As can be seen in Figure 5.1, in the 1980s, remarkable changes took 
place in Sri Lanka’s macroeconomic indicators. The onset of ethnic conflict was the main 










Figure 5.1: Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Macro-economic indicators 
 






























Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various annual reports); Ministry of Finance, (various economic 
reports), Malaysia.    
 
In short, a stable macroeconomic environment, low and stable inflation, small budget 
deficits and an undistorted foreign exchange market are crucial to growth and 
development. Compared to Sri Lanka, Malaysia has maintained lower inflation rates, 
higher savings and investment rates, more stable real interest rates, less appreciating and 
more stable real exchange rates, more favorable debt to export ratios, beside, much higher 
per-capita growth rates. Although the theoretical and empirical part of the thesis did not 
focus on the relationship between macroeconomic stability and other economic variable, 
we included inflation as an independent variable in order to verify the relationship 
between (a) inflation and growth, (b) inflation and disciplined government and (c) 
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inflation and ethnic conflict. In our empirical result (Chapter 4, section 4.4.3.3), it was 
found a negative relationship between inflation and economic growth and between 
inflation and disciplined government but a positive relation between inflation and ethnic 
conflict. The empirical studies on Sri Lanka and Malaysia confirm the propositions of the 
above discussion.   
 
5.2.4 Economic growth in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
As we have found in Chapter 4, economic growth facilitates and may even be a necessary 
condition for, the successful management of ethnic conflict. To find out the validity of 
this proposition, it is essential to analyze the trends of economic growth in Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka. The Malaysian economy experienced rapid economic growth during the past 
four decades than that of Sri Lanka; this was achieved through a policy framework, 
which emphasized prudent government planning and investment along with incentives 
for private sector investment, including foreign investment. During the period of 1961-
2000, the annual average growth rate was 6.9 and 4.6 per cent in Malaysia and Sri Lanka 
respectively. 
 
Evidently, the increasingly restrictive policy regime failed in bringing about a significant 
rate of economic growth in Sri Lanka.  In contrast, the liberalized policy regime produced 
a higher growth performance, except during the period of 1986-90.23 Even though the 
policy change could explain the growth trend of GDP, its annual fluctuations could be 
attributed to a series of random events, internally as well as externally. In the early years 
of independence, Sri Lanka continued the colonial economy with its dependence on the 
                                                 
23 The North-East conflict was the major reason for this downward growth trend in 1985-1990.  
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export of three primary commodities (tea, rubber and coconut). As a result of the world 
war price boom, its financial assets accumulated, resulting in some measure of prosperity. 
Consequently, the GDP growth rate was 4.3 per cent in 1951-1955. In the late 1950s, 
however, when declining commodity prices in the world market resulted in deterioration 
in the terms of trade and depletion of assets, there was a decline in the average economic 
growth rate (with 2.9 per cent occurring in 1956-1965). The upward trend in economic 
growth was maintained by policy revisions aimed at gradual and partial liberalization 
during 1966-1970. 
 
Figure 5.2: Sri Lanka and Malaysia: Annual average GDP growth rate 1961-2000 



































    Source: World Bank (2004) 
 
Since 1970s, there has been a major breakthrough in growth trend in the country, for the 
reason that the economy moved to a ‘hard’ phase of import substitution in a highly 
controlled regime. Sri Lanka recorded a -0.4 per cent GDP growth in 1972, the lowest 
since independence to 2000. The lowest rate was attributed to the adverse impact of 
youth insurrection. Further, the global energy, food and exchange rate crises as well as 
bad weather conditions also contributed to this adverse spell. Following policy reforms in 
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1977, there was a reasonable increase in the average growth rates to the level of about 5.3 
percent, from 1978 to 1985. But in the latter half of the 1980s the growth rate slowed 
down. This resulted from the macroeconomic and political instability of the country.24 
The average rate of GDP growth, then came down to 3.4 per cent in the period of 1986-
1990. Since then, the economy has been able to regain its growth momentum to a 
moderate level though ethnic conflict continued in the Northeast Province of the Island.  
 
The Malaysian economy grew by an average of 6.5 per cent yearly during 1961-1970 and 
7.9 per cent during 1971-1980 due to windfall gains from the newfound oil reserves and 
boom in the world prices of tin, rubber and palm oil. Since 1981, however, the nation's 
growth path has shown a declining trend, resulting particularly from the prolonged 
recession of the world economy following the second oil shock in 1979. The adverse 
external environment together with the slow-down in the public sector expenditure led to 
the deterioration in the rate of growth of the economy. In 1985, the economy registered a 
negative rate of growth (-1.1 percent). The economy, however, recovered from 1986 
onwards, resulting mainly from the adjustment efforts undertaken by the government as 
well as a marked improvement in the external environment. The economy returned to a 
high growth path until 1995. Malaysia’s economy rebounded from the 1997-1998 
regional economic and financial crises. Following a 7.4 per cent drop in real GDP in 
1998, the economy registered 6.1 per cent growth for 1999. The recovery picked up 
steam, and the government estimated growth at 8.5 per cent for 2000. 
                                                 
24 The massive increase in public investment followed by a sharp upsurge in military expenditure disrupted 
the macroeconomic stability. Further, a severe blow to the economy came from the political conflicts that 
erupted in the mid 1980s from Sri Lankan Tamil youth in the North and the Sinhala youth in the South.  
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The experience of economic growth in Sri Lanka and Malaysia highlights several 
important differences. In Sri Lanka, a low and unstable rate of economic growth has been 
generated by:  
• political instability and lack of continuity in economic reforms and policies;  
• high level of protection of domestic and foreign trade and investment;  
• unstable macroeconomic conditions;  
• low level of domestic saving and investment; and  
• low level of public investment in the physical and social infrastructure. 
 
In contrast, the process of high and stable economic growth in Malaysia has been 
generated by the following factors: 
• reasonable political stability and continuity in economic reforms and policies;  
• openness of the economy to trade and foreign investment;  
• macro-economic stability; 
• high level of domestic saving and investment; and 
• high level of public investment in building the physical and social infrastructure 
of the country. 
 
The growth process in Malaysia has brought about a much faster and deeper structural 
transformation of the economy and society than in Sri Lanka. Successive governments in 
Malaysia have followed a consistently activist role through appropriate policies to 
maintain high levels of economic growth. But in Sri Lanka, successive governments have 
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followed an inconsistent activist role through inappropriate policies, with the country 
failing to maintain relatively high levels of economic growth.   
 
Our especial results in Chapter 4, section 4.3.3.4 suggests that there is a negative 
relationship between economic growth and ethnic conflict. In the case studies on Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia we have found a strong correlation between the two variables. 
Besides, low level of economic growth and poor quality of governance aggravate poverty 
and inequality which will eventually leads to ethnic conflicts. The next section is devoted 
for an analysis of poverty and inequality in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. 
 
5.2.5 Poverty and Inequality in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
Many countries consider poverty and inequality as the major causes of deprivation and 
discontent. Economic growth is necessary for poverty and inequality reduction, but it is 
no guarantee that poverty and inequality will be reduced.  
 
To alleviate poverty and inequality, government policies and strategies are conducted and 
to achieve growth objective arrangement is enhanced. The Malaysian experience suggests 
that economic growth can be a powerful engine for poverty reduction if the poor and 
marginalized groups are provided opportunities to participate in the growth process. 
Malaysia has been pursuing a number of strategies aimed at widening opportunities for 
the poor to participate in the growth process. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, economy 
grew by some four per cent per annum and much less progress was registered in poverty 
reduction.  
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Sri Lanka is well known for achieving high levels of human development at relatively 
low levels of GDP per capita. However, these human development achievements and 
high levels of public expenditure on social welfare have not eradicated poverty as 
expected. Allailima (1997) argues that actual reductions in poverty, inequality, and under 
nutrition are less than expected, considering the large investments by the state in the 
social welfare sector. The major causes of poverty in the country are discrepancies in 
income flow, low rate of economic growth, rapid population growth, and high cost of 
living, particularly in the rural and conflict areas. Poverty is predominately a rural 
phenomenon in Sri Lanka, with nearly 90 per cent of the poor residing in rural areas. 
Currently, relatively large pockets of poverty persist, however, especially in conflict 
areas, where the quality of life has deteriorated sharply. Two decades of civil conflict 
have left large numbers of families displaced, disabled, and desperate, with much of the 
social and physical infrastructure destroyed. Poverty in the Northeast Province (here after 
NEPR) is far more severe than in other parts of the nation, compounded by massive 
destruction of economic and social infrastructure. Table 5.4 provides the estimates of 
poverty in Sri Lanka as well as regions in selected years.   
 
Table 5.4: Sri Lanka: Incidence of poverty 1969/70 - 1995/96  
Year  Sri Lanka (%) Rural (%) Urban (%) 
1969/70  11.2 12.8 5.0 
1978/79  12.3 12.8 14.3 
1985/86  39.4 45.7 27.6 
1990/91  35.3 30.05 28.4 
1995/96  18.9 20.3 17.3 
Source: Lakshman 1998, Gunawardene 2000, Tudawe 2000. 
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Even though researchers and government departments have measured poverty line in 
different ways, the result shows the increasing pattern of poverty in Sri Lanka from 
1969/70 to 1985/86 and then decreasing trend of poverty until 2000. As can be seen in 
Table 5.4, in 1969/70, nearly 11.2 per cent of the population were under the poverty line 
and it increased to 39.4 per cent in 1985/86, and then decreased to 18.9 per cent in 
1995/96.  
 
The government of Sri Lanka is very much concerned with alleviating poverty and 
helping the vulnerable groups of the population.  Since independence, Sri Lanka has 
made very impressive progress in reducing the incidence of poverty, reflected in 
improvements in human development indicators as well as when poverty is measured in 
consumption terms. Regardless of this progress, Sri Lanka remains a country with 
considerable poverty. Since independence, successive governments of Sri Lanka have 
implemented direct and indirect programs to alleviate poverty. These include food stamp, 
Janasaviya program, Samurdhi program, and various other welfare programs for 
vulnerable groups. The food stamp scheme was introduced in 1979 and has since covered 
more than 50 per cent of the total population. The Janasaviya was the first nationwide 
program launched in 1989 to promote self-employment in the rural areas and, in the 
process, alleviate poverty through the use of the people’s own strength. In 1995, the 
Janasaviya was replaced by the launching of the Samurdhi scheme based on participatory 
approach and a threefold scheme, namely, supplement, social and economic, and credit 
and savings. Through these and a range of other programs, Sri Lanka has reduced poverty 
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and achieved lower levels of income inequality, although it has not reached the standards 
maintained in the 1960s.  
 
With respect to inequality in Sri Lanka, the evidence shows that there was a considerable 
degree of inequality at the time of independence. Income inequalities in rural and urban 
sectors were low and had fallen before 1970, but increased rapidly after the introduction 
of market economic policies in the late 1970s. The economic liberalization policies 
generated a wide range of new economic activities, resulting in accumulation of profits in 
the upper income deciles in the early years of liberalization. Rapid growth in services and 
light industry has benefited urban areas, while investments in agriculture and fisheries 
have benefited large-scale, richer producers. Table 5.5 shows the trend of income 
distribution in Sri Lanka from 1953 to 2000.  
 
Table 5.5: Sri Lanka: Income distribution and gini ratio 1953 - 2000 
Income group 1953 1963 1973 1978/79 1981/82 1986/87 1996/97 2000 
Top 20 % 53.80 52.31 42.95 49.87 51.96 52.30 49.90 42.8 
Middle 40% 31.70 33.03 37.76 34.07 32.79 33.56 34.80 36.7 
Poorest 40% 14.50 14.66 19.29 16.06 15.25 14.14 15.30 20.5 
Gini Ratio 0.46 0.45 0.35 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.48 
Source: Consumer Finance and Socio-economic Surveys (various annual reports) 
 
From Table 5.5, the gini ratio shows inequality narrowing from 0.46 in 1953 to 0.35 in 
1973 and rising gradually up to the present figure in 2000. There was a slight fall in 
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1996/97 (0.45) but this can be due to particular circumstances that year and is not unusual 
by the experience of other countries.25 
 
Like Sri Lanka, poverty and inequality have been main issues in Malaysia since 
independence. Also poverty and inequality in Malaysia are very apparent, especially 
between the ethnic groups (see next section for more detail). While, poverty and income 
inequality in Peninsular Malaysia seemed to have worsened since 1957, there was 
probably an insignificant improvement around 1980 (see Table 5.6). Government 
intervention that begins in the 1970s has significantly reduced poverty in Malaysia. As 
can be see in table, poverty incidence in Malaysia fell from 52.4 per cent in 1970 to 5.5 
per cent in 2000.  
 
Table 5.6: Malaysia: Incidence of poverty 1957/58 - 2000 
Year Malaysia Rural Urban 
1957/58 51.2 59.6 29.7 
1970 52.4 58.5 21.3 
1980 29.0 37.4 12.6 
1984 20.7 27.3 8.5 
1990 16.5 21.8 7.5 
1995 8.7 15.3 3.7 
2000 5.5 10.0 1.9 
Sources: Bronner (2003); Jomo (2001b, 2004); Roslan (2001)  
 
Poverty was one of the major concerns of Malaysian policy makers as it had a delicate 
ethnic and regional dimension. The impressive record of poverty reduction in Malaysia 
can be attributed to two set of factors. 
                                                 
25 World Bank (2003) reports the expenditure Gini for Sri Lanka for 1995 at 0.34, while it was 0.38 for 
India:  0.30 Indonesia:  0.32 Bangladesh: and 0.33 Pakistan. 
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• The first set of factors is an open economy to trade and investment, rapid growth 
with macroeconomic stability, structural transformation, high level of public 
sector investment in building the country’s physical and social infrastructure and 
proactive policy to provide increasing opportunities for education, employment, 
and enterprise for the poor and marginalized people.   
• The second factor is the government poverty reduction program that began in the 
1970s and targeted specific groups in both rural and urban areas. It involved 
distribution of assets, access to credit, subsidies for education and health, and 
safety nets for the poor. 
 
It should be pointed out that successive governments in Malaysia generally followed 
appropriate policies to promote stable and high growth rates as well as to reduce inter-
ethnic and intra-ethnic inequalities, thus reducing poverty across ethnic groups in both 
urban and rural areas (Drabble 2000). In order to alleviate poverty, successive 
governments used several targeted programs since 1970s. In the rural areas, programs 
included land distribution, land settlement, replanting of low-yielding rubber trees on 
small plantations, and integrated agricultural development projects in each state focusing 
on a package of modern inputs, technologies, infrastructure, and support services to assist 
traditional peasants to increase productivity and income. Further, these programs 
provided incentives for the expansion of small-scale rural industries and investment in the 




Historically, inequality in Malaysia was inherited from the colonial period, especially 
under British colonial rule. At the time of attaining independence, 52.2 per cent of 
households were under the poverty line (RM 120 per month). More than half of these 
households were Bumiputera, and more than two-thirds were rural (Snodgrass 1980). 
Table 5.7 shows the income distribution in Malaysia, especially Peninsular Malaysia, 
since independence. 
 
Table 5.7: Malaysia: Income distribution and Gini ratio 1957/58 - 2000 
Income group 1957/58 1967/68 1970 1973 1979 1987 1990 1995 2000 
Top  20% 48.6 51.3 55.9 53.7 54.7 51.2 50.0 50.3 54.3 
Middle  40% 35.5 34.4 32.5 34.0 34.4 35.0 35.5 35.2 33.1 
Bottom 40% 15.9 14.3 11.6 12.3 10.9 13.8 14.5 14.5 12.6 
Gini Ratio 0.412 0.444 0.513 0.515 0.502 0.450 0.445 0.446 0.492 
Sources: Bronner (2003); Jomo (2001b, 2004); Roslan (2001) 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.6, between 1957 and 1973 income inequality apparently grew, 
with the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer. From the mid-1970s until 1999 
income inequality declined overall (although it has been on the rise again since 1995). 
Further, Table 5.6 shows that at the time of independence almost 49 per cent of the 
national income went to the top 20 per cent of households, and around 16 per cent of 
national income went to the bottom 40 per cent of households. However, in 1970 the 
income share of the top 20 per cent increased  by 56 per cent while the share of the 
bottom 40 per cent income recipient group decreased by 12 percent. But in 1990, the 
income share of the top 20 per cent decreased slightly while the share of the bottom 40 
per cent income recipient group increased slightly.  
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In comparing poverty and inequality in Sri Lanka and Malaysia, we observed the problem 
of poverty was common for all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka but in Malaysia the problem 
was more serious for the Malay community than other ethnic groups. In the early period 
of independence, poverty and inequality were more severe problems for Malaysia than 
for Sri Lanka. At the time of independence in 1957, more then half of the population 
were under the poverty line in Malaysia. Only 11.2 per cent of Sri Lanka’s population 
was under the poverty line in 1969/70. But later in Malaysia, rapid expansion of the 
economy significantly reduced poverty by creating employment opportunities for all 
ethnic groups. However, rapid growth alone would not have been able to reduce poverty 
without strong government emphasis on distributing the gains of development across all 
the sectors of the economy. But in Sri Lanka, low economic growth and poor government 
intervention led to an increase in poverty. In the case of inequality, the available data 
show that in the early period of independence inequality was high in Sri Lanka compared 
with Malaysia; later, inequality was reduced gradually in Sri Lanka and increased in 
Malaysia. It is worth noting that horizontal inequality (inequality between ethnic groups) 
was the main reason for the outbreak of ethnic crisis in Malaysia in the early period of 
independence. Since 1980s the trend has changed; inequality increased once again in Sri 
Lanka and decreased in Malaysia. In the year of 2000, inequality was almost similar in 
both countries.   
 
Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 concludes that high incidence of poverty and inequality among 
ethnic groups fuel conflict as marginalized and poor segments of the society are unhappy 
with their economic status. As a result it is extremely difficult to reach peaceful inter 
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ethnic relations among various groups with different levels of incomes. The results of our 
case study confirm that there is a strong correlation between poverty & inequality and 
ethnic conflict. Poverty and inequality were more severe problems in Malaysia in the 
early period of independence. As a result, the poor and deprived groups were confronted 
with groups that were relatively better off. But in the periods thereafter, rapid expansion 
of the economy significantly reduced poverty and inequality; eventually country has been 
maintained peaceful ethnic relations between societies. In case of Sri Lanka, since 1980s, 
while the level of poverty and inequality gradually increased, the poor and deprived 
groups are confronted with groups that are relatively better off.    
 
From the above discussion we can draw several conclusion that, despite their largely 
shared economic, social, cultural and colonial institutional legacy, post-independence 
governments in Sri Lanka and Malaysia have followed radically different economic 
policies of several dimensions – most notably, in degree of economic openness and the 
role of government in the economy. At the time of independence, economic activities 
(including government intervention) were more conducive for enhancing economic 
growth and improving ethnic relations in Sri Lanka than in Malaysia. However, in the 
later period of independence,26 economic activities were more supportive in improving 
economic growth in Malaysia than in Sri Lanka. In brief, these findings are consistent 
with our theoretical and empirical result which concludes that economic happiness is the 
most important factor that can reduce ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries. 
                                                 
26 As an outcome of ethnic relations in both countries, the post-independence period can be divided into 
two different sub periods: early period of independence (Sri Lanka, from 1948 to 1955; and Malaysia, from 
1957 to 1970) and later period of independence (Sri Lanka, from 1956 to 2000; and Malaysia, from 1970-
2000).   
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The next section provides a critical assessment of the socio-economic status of the 
various ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. The socio-economic status should be 
assessed against the background of the above economic setting of the country in the post-
independence period.  
 
5.3 Socio-economic status of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic 
relations in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. However, the past experience shows that the 
economic activities have an influence on inter-ethnic relation by changing the socio-
economic status of ethnic groups. Therefore, it is necessary here to analyze the socio-
economic status of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.  
 
Socio-economic status refers to social and economic circumstances used to denote the 
ranking of individuals or groups in society. It is characterized by the economic, social, 
and physical environments in which individuals live and work, as well as demographic 
and genetic factors. Indicators such as the structure of poverty and income distribution, 
monthly mean income levels, standards of living, incidence of unemployment, 
educational attainment, land alienation, and other welfare services could help to measure 
the socio-economic attainments of the different groups. Socio-economic status, however, 
is a broad marker variable that captures a wide variety of developmental influences. 
 
In Sri Lanka and Malaysia, colonial power is one of the most important factors which 
have influence on the different levels of socio-economic status among ethnic groups. 
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Since independence, there have been wide disparities in the socio-economic status of the 
various ethnic groups in both countries. Political leaders as well as the elites of both the 
majority and minority ethnic groups have made statements regarding the socio-economic 
achievements of other ethnic groups. Such statements which form an important part of 
their perception of each other have often been challenged. The majority community in 
both countries, for instance, claim that minority ethnic groups are privileged, having a 
disproportionate quota of places in public sector employment, university admission, and 
economic as well as commercial places. The minority ethnic groups also claim that they 
have been discriminated by the majority government in similar respects.  
 
In general, there are two possible ways of looking at the socio-economic status of the 
various ethnic groups. The first one is by taking the population figures of each ethnic 
group and measuring them against their share of social and economic attainment. The 
second one is by considering the geographical areas where particular ethnic communities 
are concentrated and to compare their levels of social and economic attainment.  
 
5.3.1 Ethnic composition and socio-economic attainment 
This section examines the population figures of each ethnic group and measures them 
against their share of social and economic attainment. In particular, we examine the 
following socio-economic indicators in terms of the majority and minority communities 
in both countries: 
• Educational achievement  
• Employment pattern 
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• Ownership of capital assets and  
• Mean monthly income 
 
5.3.1.1 Education achievement by ethnicity 
Socio-economic status is strongly related to the educational achievement of people. 
Educational achievement is one of the important areas which have provided more 
opportunities for people to attain better standard of living in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. 
Consequently, the issue of university entrance by ethnic group is of utmost concern. 
 
Educational achievement in Sri Lanka has been for many decades a crucial issue in public 
debate. Under British colonial rule, English was made the language of government and 
Christian missionary organization started English-medium schools in the country. The 
Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamic leaders resisted the expansion of missionary activities in the 
Southern part of Sri Lanka. However, the missionaries set up many English-medium 
schools in the North, particularly Jaffna. As a result, the Sri Lankan Tamils had for years 
enjoyed a predominant position in the faculties of science, engineering, and medicine of 
the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya and Colombo. This was partly due to their higher 
rate of literacy in English and the excellent facilities for education in science in the 
schools of the Jaffna district from which many of them entered the universities (Silva 
1997). 
 
Until 1969, admissions to universities were based on the results of the final examination 
at the high school level. Since 1970s, the government of Sri Lanka brought about some 
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far reaching changes in the access to university education. These changes gradually 
reduced the number of Tamil students entering university.  Admission into universities 
has been controversial since 1974, when the new system of standardization was 
introduced by the government of Sri Lanka. The government introduced a lower 
qualifying mark for students who took the examinations in Sinhalese in order that a 
politically acceptable ratio of Tamil to Sinhalese students could be admitted to the 
science, engineering and medical faculties of the University of Ceylon (Silva 1997). 
Under this new system, therefore, Tamil students were required to obtain a higher 
aggregate of marks than their Sinhalese counterparts in order to gain admission to the 
science, engineering and medical faculties of the university. This new university 
admission made access to scientific and technical education more difficult for the Tamils 
than it had been before.  
 
Interestingly the changes also positively impacted on the Tamils students outside the 
peninsular Jaffna. Under the new scheme, students from areas such as Trincomalee, 
Mannar, Mullaithivu, Kilinochchi and the Tamils from the plantations and areas such as 
Matale were able to enter the coveted streams such as medicine and engineering which 
inspired a whole new generation of students. Thus, students from such deprived areas 
were motivated to seriously compete for tertiary education. But, overall, the percentage 
of Tamil students that qualified for admission to university decreased from 17.7 per cent 
in 1969 to 14.6 per cent in 1977. In contrast, the percentage of Sinhalese students who 
qualified for admission to university increased from 80.6 per cent in 1969 to 81.1 per cent 
in 1977 (Sivarajah 1996). Following the removal of the scheme of standardization in 
1978, the percentage of Tamil students who qualified for admission to university 
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increased gradually from 14.6 per cent in 1977 to 17.6 per cent in 1980 and 19.3 per cent 
in 1983 (Sivarajah 1996). 
 
As a result of their higher rate of literacy in English and the excellent facilities for 
education, Sri Lankan Tamils were able to secure employment in the public sector. 
Consequently, at the time of independence, the socio-economic status of Sri Lankan 
Tamils was relatively higher than that of the Sinhalese. Later, Sinhalese politicians 
demanded a larger share of the university admission for their community in order that the 
consequences of inequalities between the two communities might be redressed. Because 
of limited university admissions, the competition for higher education increased and the 
percentage of Tamil students who qualified for admission to university dropped 
drastically. As a result, their socioeconomic status also declined gradually: educational 
failure became an important factor in the deterioration of socioeconomic status of Sri 
Lankan Tamils. 
 
In Malaysia, the socioeconomic status of minority ethnic groups – especially the Chinese 
– did not depend highly on educational achievement. Despite their educational 
background, the Chinese had many resources – such as tin industry – to maintain their 
socioeconomic status. But in the case of the Malays, educational achievement was one of 
the major factors for maintaining their socioeconomic status. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
during the early period of independence, the Chinese enjoyed a predominant position 
with respect to university admissions. As a result, they were overrepresented in public 
sector employment compared with the Malays. In other words, there was a high disparity 
between majority and minority ethnic groups in terms of socio-economic status. Since 
 200
independence, the government has provided special rights to Malays in education by 
offering them generous scholarships, expanding their admission quotas, lowering their 
admission requirements, and creating institutions for their professional training. This has 
led to a steady increase of Malay representation in education.  
 
Further, the ethnic representation in education can be explained by admission to 
universities. For example, in terms of ethnic composition of students in university 
admission, Malay representation increased from 49.7 per cent in 1970 to 65.1 per cent in 
1975. At the same time, Chinese and Indian representations reduced from 42.7 per cent to 
31.1 per cent and from 5.1 per cent to 3.3 per cent respectively (Abdullah 1997). This 
significant increase in the percentage of Malay students is related to the state policy of 
setting intake quotas for various ethnic groups. 
 
Clearly, at the time of independence, the minority ethnic group had more educational 
achievement than the minority group, but with the introduction of EPPs, the majority 
ethnic group had better educational achievement. As we mentioned earlier, the 
educational achievement provided more opportunities to improve the socio-economic 
status of the majority ethnic group in Malaysia.  
 
5.3.1.2 Employment and unemployment pattern by ethnicity 
Competition for employment and distribution of employment opportunities also affects 
the socio-economic status of the majority and the minority communities in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia. In both countries, while minority communities claimed that there had been 
serious discrimination against them in employment opportunities, the majority 
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communities repeatedly argued that the minority enjoyed a disproportionate share of 
employment available in the public sector and the opportunities in a variety of 
professional fields.  
 
Table 5.8: Sri Lanka: Employment and unemployment rate 1959/60-2000 
Year  Employment (‘000) Unemployed (’000) Unemployment rate 
1959/60 2974 349 10.5 
1963  3087 264 7.6 
1969/70 3116 550 15.0 
1973  3166 1000 24.0 
1978/79  5031 874 14.8 
1981  4114 897 17.9 
1985/86  5117 840 14.1 
1990  5046 954 15.9 
1995  5340 749 12.3 
1997 5617 645 10.3 
1999  5983 591 8.9 
2000  6217 517 7.6 
Source: Lakshman (2004) 
 
In Sri Lanka, the slow economic growth and rapid population growth adversely affected 
employment opportunities and aggravated the unemployment problem. Table 5.8 
provides the employment and unemployment trend in Sri Lanka since 1960s.  
 
Table 5.8 indicates that the total employment grew from 2.9 million in 1959/60 to 3.1 
million in 1973 and 6.2 million in 2000. Unemployment rate also increased from 10.5 per 
cent in 1959/60 to 24 per cent in 1973. Since then, it has declined gradually. 
Unemployment rate reduced gradually to 15.9 per cent in 1990 and 7.6 per cent in 2000.  
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Unemployment as well as under-employment has accentuated the already strained 
relationship between the various ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. And like educational 
achievement, public sector employment is also one of the key factors to improving the 
socio-economic status of the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. At the time of independence, the 
Tamils in terms of their population size were overrepresented in government service, 
compared to other ethnic communities. In 1948/49, 25 per cent and 41 per cent of those 
who occupied the administrative and general clerical positions respectively were Tamils, 
representing 22.7 per cent of the population. They also occupied 46 per cent of the 
general accountant posts. On the other hand, the Sinhalese only occupied 54 per cent of 
both administrative and general clerical positions in 1948/49, with 70.0 per cent of the 
population; in the general accounting service, their share was only 40.5 per cent in 1948. 
This initial advantage Sri Lankan Tamils had enjoyed in employment was an outcome, 
partly, of the early development of facilities for education in English in Jaffna peninsula, 
and their greater need and superior capacity to benefit from access to such facilities. The 
scarcity of physical resources in the northern parts of the country provided the main 
impulse for their focus on education. Unlike other communities, education was the main 
avenue that provided a little scope for socio-economic advancement for Sri Lankan 
Tamils.  Therefore, they looked upon their proportionately larger share of white-collar 
and professional employment as a due right which they must continue to safeguard.   
 
But later, the share of Tamils recruited into the public sector declined. For example, in 
the General Clerical Service the number of Tamils recruited in 1949 was 40.7 percent, 
but in 1980 it declined to 5.4 percent. During the same period the percentage of the 
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Sinhalese recruited for the same service increased from 53.7 per cent in 1949 to 93.6 per 
cent in 1980. It is evident from the above that there are exaggerations and distortions in 
the way the respective communities present their grievances. 
 
According to the Census of Public and Corporation Sector Employment conducted in 
1981/83, the share of Tamils27 in the public sector including both government and State 
Corporation is 11.1 percent. But their share in the population was 18.2 per cent (see Table 
5.9). This shows that Tamils were considerably under represented in the public sector. 
The share of the Sinhalese was 85.0 percent, which is well above their share in the 
population (74 percent). But the share of others in public service was only 3.9 percent, 
which was very much lower than their population (7.8 percent).  
 
Table 5.9: Sri Lanka: Employment by ethnic group and occupation 1981/83 
Sinhalese (74.0 %) Tamils (18.2 %) Others (7.8 %)  
Occupational Groups Gvt S. Cor Gvt S. Cor Gvt S. Cor 
Total 84.3 85.7 11.4 10.7 4.3 3.6 
Professional and  Technical 82.4 75.5 12.1 21.3 5.5 3.2 
Administrative and  Managerial 81.3 83.3 15.5 12.5 3.2 4.2 
Clerical and related work 83.7 86.5 13.2 9.9 3.1 3.6 
Agriculture and fisheries  72.2 60.9 21.1 35.8 6.7 3.3 
Production and related work 85.5 88.0 11.0 8.9 3.5 3.1 
Not classified occupation 93.8 67.9 3.3 26.3 2.9 5.8 
Sources: Marga publication (1995), “Inter racial equity and national unity in Sri Lanka”  
 Gvt: Government; S. Cor: State Corporation 
 
                                                 
27 In most cases the government has classified both Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils as Tamils in 
general. Similarly, Low country Sinhalese and Kandyan Sinhalese have been categorised as Sinhalese. It 
must also be understood that during a time of communal disturbance these distinction are usually not 
relevant with regard to victims of violence. Misperceptions about an ethnic community as a whole whether 
they be Sri Lankan Tamils or Indian Tamils, Kandyan Sinhalese or Low country Sinhalese, rich or poor 
exist. 
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As can be seen in Table 5.9, Tamils received well above their share in the population 
only in agriculture and fisheries (28.4 percent). Table 5.9 further shows that while 85 per 
cent of the Sinhalese received employment opportunities from clerical and related works, 
only 11.5 per cent of job placements were provided for Tamils and 3.3 per cent for 
others. Overall, Table 5.9 clearly indicates that the minority ethnic groups lost their 
public sector employment share when viewed in terms of their population size.   
 
Similarly, unemployment affects inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. This is becoming a 
serious concern among Tamils, especially the educated youth. Although unemployment 
has been a problem for all communities, the rate of unemployment among some 
communities is higher than that of others. According to surveys of Consumer Finance 
conducted by the Central Bank of Ceylon since 1963 the rate of unemployment has been 
high among Burghers and Malays – 10.2 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively in 
1981/82. Unemployment as a percentage of population and as a percentage of workforce 
is higher among the Sinhalese than Tamils. For example, the rate of unemployment as a 
percentage of labor force was 16.2 per cent in Sinhalese, 10.9 per cent for Sri Lankan 
Tamils and 5.6 per cent for Indian Tamils in 1979 (Consumer Finance and Socio-
economic Survey 1978/79). Similarly, in 1979, the rate of unemployment as a percentage 
of population was higher in Sinhalese than Tamils.  
 
From the above data, it can be noted that Tamils are under-represented in public sector 
employment and their unemployment rate is lower. This would indicate that Tamils have 
moved away from employment in the public sector and have had more success in finding 
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employment in the private sector, particularly self-employment. Table 5.10 provides the 
employment pattern among various ethnic groups in 1977/78.  According to Table 5.10, a 
high percentage of Sri Lankan Tamils were self employed compared with other ethnic 
groups.  
  
Table: 5.10: Sri Lanka: Employment by ethnic groups 1977/78 
As a % of labor force Sinhalese Sri Lankan Tamils Indian Tamils Moors 
Self employed  21.71 27.52 1.80 25.16 
Employer 1.32 0.95 0.17 2.58 
Employee 46.14 51.78 91.54 50.58 
Unpaid Family worker 14.65 8.96 0.87 7.87 
Total employed 83.22 89.21 94.38 86.19 
As a % of total population Sinhalese Sri Lankan Tamils Indian Tamils Moors 
Self employed  8.39 8.63 0.93 6.79 
Employer 0.51 0.30 0.08 0.70 
Employee 17.74 16.23 47.50 13.64 
Unpaid Family worker 5.72 2.81 0.45 2.12 
Total employed 32.28 27.97 48.96 23.25 
Source: Consumer finance and Socio-economic survey: 1978/79. 
 
For example, in 1977/78, about 27.52 per cent of Sri Lankan Tamils were self-employed 
as a percentage of labor force and 8.63 per cent as a percentage of total population. In the 
same period, the Sinhalese contributed 21.71 per cent self-employed out of the total labor 
force and 8.39 per cent as a percentage of population (see Table 5.10). Though the Tamils 
have a low unemployment on average, the socio-economic survey published by the 
Ministry of Plan and Implementation and the Department of Census and Statistics 1983 
shows that the unemployment rate among young Tamils who have passed the General 
Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) Examinations is 41 percent, while their 
Sinhalese counterparts suffer an unemployment rate of 29 percent. This may help us to 
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understand the phenomenon of the militant movement in the North (Committee for 
Rational Development 1984).  Thus, at the time of independence in Sri Lanka, though the 
public sector employment provided better socio-economic status for the minority ethnic 
group, the introduction of EPPs led to a decrease in their socio-economic status because 
they lost their share of public sector employment.  
 
The case of Malaysia with respect to employment and unemployment is similarly 
interesting and illuminating. Before analysing the distribution of employment and 
unemployment rate among ethnic groups, it is necessary to provide some basic 
information about employment and unemployment pattern in Malaysia. Since 
independence, reflecting the rapid growth in the economy, total employment has been 
increasing steadily in Malaysia. Table 5.11 shows the employment and unemployment 
pattern of Malaysia.  
 
Table 5.11: Malaysia: Employment and unemployment rate 1957-2000 
Year Employment (‘000) Unemployed (‘000) Unemployment rate (%) 
1957A 2126 135 6.0 
1965 3047 199 6.1 
1970 3396 286 7.8 
1975 4247 320 7.0 
1980 4817 305 5.6 
1985 5625 414 6.9 
1990 6682 360 5.1 
1995 7834 226 2.8 
2000 9585 307 3.1 
Source:  Government of Malaysia (1996), Athukorale (2001). 
Notes: A Peninsular Malaysia only 
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Table 5.11 indicates that the total employment grew from 2.1 million in 1957 to 3.4 
million in 1970 and 9.6 million in 2000. Unemployment rate also increased from 6.0 per 
cent in 1957 to 7.8 per cent in 1970. Since then, it has declined gradually. However, the 
recession in 1985 quickly drove the unemployment rate up to a peak of 8.3 per cent in 
1986. In the period of 1986-1988,28 unemployment rate was very high in Malaysia. With 
the rapid recovery of the economy, unemployment rate reduced gradually to 5.1 per cent 
in 1990 and 3.1 per cent in 2000. During 1995-1999, the economy was at virtual full 
employment, with unemployment below 3 percent. Most of the new employment 
opportunities came from the rapidly expanding manufacturing sector. 
 
The growth of labor intensive export-oriented industrialization, the construction boom of 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the public sector expansion under the NEP, the drive for 
FDI and the growth of other sectors, however, quickly brought the unemployment rate 
down to the full employment benchmark of about 4 per cent, despite the rise in labor 
force growth. This again reflects the success of government policies in generating 
adequate job opportunities in the face of the increase in the working age population, 
hence avoiding potentially troublesome social problems. 
 
As in Sri Lanka, distribution of employment and unemployment affects inter-ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. There also existed inter-ethnic inequality in terms of employment 
and occupation, which reflected the differences in skills, education and experiences of 
each ethnic group. In the early years of independence, the majority of Malays were 
engaged in low productive subsistence agriculture and fishing, while non-Malays, 
                                                 
28 In 1987 and 1988 unemployment rate was 8.2 and 8.1 respectively. 
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particularly the Chinese, had moved out of the lower paid occupations in the agricultural 
and low skill service industries into highly paid occupations in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors. As a result, during the early period of independence, non-Malays enjoyed greater 
socio-economic strength and dominated most modern sector activities. By 1957, about 61 
per cent of those employed in the primary sector were Malays, while about 78 per cent of 
non-Malays were employed in the secondary sector (Snodgrass 1980). In 1970, 68 per 
cent of those employed in agriculture were Malays, while 69 per cent employed in the 
secondary sector and 62 per cent employed in the tertiary sector were non-Malays 
(Malaysia 1991a). Table 5.12 explains the pattern of employment share by ethnic group.  
 
Table 5.12: Malaysia: Employment by ethnic group and Sector 1970-2000 
(Percentage employed as a proportion of ethnic group) 
Malays Chinese Indians  
Sector 1970 1990 2000 1970 1990 2000 1970 1990 2000 
Primary 61.0 36.7 18.8 25.4 13.5 6.2 51.2 21.8 11.0 
Secondary 14.6 26.3 39.4 37.7 36.5 39.4 18.9 39.8 53.5 
Tertiary 24.4 36.9 41.8 36.8 49.9 49.3 29.9 38.3 35.5 
Source: Drabble (2000), Hassan and Hashim (2001)  
 
As can be seen in Table 5.12, the employment share of Malays in the secondary and 
tertiary sectors rose from 14.6 per cent and 24.4 per cent in 1970 to 26.3 per cent and 
36.9 per cent respectively in 1990. This further increased to 39.4 per cent and 41.8 per 
cent in 2000. At the same time, employment in the primary sector fell from 61 per cent in 
1970 to 36.7 per cent in1990 and 18.8 per cent in 2000. There was no much change in 
employment share of Chinese in the secondary sector but their employment share in 
tertiary sector increased from 36.8 per cent in 1970 to 49.9 per cent in 1990, while that of 
the primary sector decreased gradually over the period. In the case of Indians, while the 
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share of primary sector decreased sharply from 51.2 per cent in 1970 to 11 per cent in 
2000, the share of secondary and territory sectors increased same period.  
 
Besides the difference in the pattern of employment, there were also significant 
differences in terms of occupation across the three ethnic groups. The professional, 
technical, sales and managerial jobs were predominantly held by the Chinese, while about 
three-quarter of the Malays were agricultural workers, mostly involved in small, 
subsistence farming and fishing activities. Table 5.13 shows the pattern of employment 
by ethnic group in terms of occupations. According to Table 5.13, the percentage of 
Malays in all other occupations, except for agriculture, increased. The percentage of 
Malays in professional and technical categories increased from 35.1 per cent in 1957 to 
63.3 per cent in 2000; and the percentage in administrative and managerial categories 
increased from 17.5 per cent to 36.5 per cent in the same period. 
 
Table 5.13: Malaysia: Employment by ethnic group and occupation 1957-2000 
Malays Chinese Indians  Occupation 
1957 1970 1990 2000 1957 1970 1990 2000 1957 1970 1990 2000 
Ethnic proportion 50.0 52.7 57.4 61.1 37.0 35.8 29.4 24.5 11.0 10.7 9.5 7.2 
Professional and 
Technical 
35.1 47.2 54.4 63.6 41.9 
 
39.5 32.4 25.9 12.1 
 
10.8 11.1 8.6 
Administrative  
and managerial 
17.5 24.1 28.2 36.5 62.3 62.9 66.0 53.0 12.3 7.8 5.0 6.5 
Clerical 27.1 35.4 54.0 56.1 46.2 45.9 36.8 32.7 19.9 17.2 8.7 9.4 
Sales 15.9 26.7 37.9 37.5 66.1 61.7 56.8 50.4 16.8 11.1 5.2 6.4 
Services 39.7 44.3 57.9 57.5 33.3 39.6 31.2 21.3 12.8 14.6 9.7 8.7 
Agricultural 62.1 72.0 73.5 60.3 24.3 18.3 17.2 10.9 12.8 9.7 8.3 6.9 
Production 26.5 34.2 45.5 44.1 53.5 55.9 43.1 33.7 18.9 9.6 10.9 10.5 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971, 1981. 2001a. 
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Further, the percentage of Malays in clerical, sales and services fields increased from 
27.1, 15.9 and 39.7 per cent to 56.1, 37.5 and 57.5 per cent respectively in the same 
period. On the other hand, the percentage of Chinese in all occupations decreased. The 
percentage of Chinese in professional and technical fields decreased from 37.0 per cent in 
1957 to 24.5 per cent in 2000; similarly in administrative and managerial fields there was 
decrease from 41.9 per cent to 25.9 per cent in same period. Similar changes occurred in 
other occupational fields. Table 5.13 also indicates that, like Chinese contribution, the 
percentage of Indians in all occupations has decreased gradually from 1957 to 2000.  
 
Without doubt, similar to Sri Lanka, there have been significant changes in the 
employment composition of ethnic groups in Malaysia. At the time of independence, the 
Chinese had more access to public sector employment opportunities than the Malays but 
later, the share of Malays increased. According to the change of employment 
opportunities, the socio-economic status varied among ethnic groups since independence. 
In the early period of independence, the majority of Malays received employment 
opportunities from agriculture. As a result their socio-economic status was not 
comparable with other ethnic groups. With the introduction of EPPs, they received high 
employment opportunities from other sectors as well, leading to the improvement of their 
socio-economic status.   
 
5.3.1.3 Ownership of capital assets by ethnicity 
With regarding to ownership of capital assets, there is scarcity of reliable data on the 
various ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. But it can be said that the Tamil community never 
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held large ownership of capital assets like the Sinhalese community. The most lucrative 
export sector of tea, coconut, and rubber even before nationalization was never 
dominated by Tamils. It has been observed that in many societies those who do not hold 
ownership of capital assets tend to go into professions and businesses. The Tamils as an 
ethnic group followed this path (Committee for Rational Development 1984). As far as I 
am aware, none of the ethnic studies on Sri Lanka has indicated ownership of capital 
assets as one of the main causes of ethnic conflict.  
 
Contrary to the situation in Sri Lanka, in Malaysia, ownership of capital assets is one of 
the important issues which affect the socio-economic status of the majority and the 
minority ethnic communities. Since independence, there has been a high disparity 
between the main ethnic groups in terms of ownership of capital assets. Various programs 
such as training, provision of technical advice and hands-on experience as well as 
providing opportunities for capable Bumiputera to actively participate in the corporate 
sector were implemented. Bumiputera institutions and trust agencies played an important 
role in mobilizing Bumiputera resources and in the acquisition of effective equity 
ownership. As a result, the Bumiputera share of corporate equity ownership increased 
gradually from 1970. Table 5.14 reflects the distribution of ownership of the corporate 
sector by ethnicity between 1969 and 2002. According to Table 5.14, in 1969 the 
ownership of 62.1 per cent of capital assets was in the hands of foreigners, while the 
other Malaysians owned 36.4 per cent (the Chinese owned 22.8 percent) and a mere 1.5 
per cent was owned by the Bumiputera. 
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Table 5.14: Malaysia: Ownership of share capital 1970-2002  
Ethnic Group 1969 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1999 2002 
Bumiputera  1.5 2.4 9.2 12.5 19.1  19.3  19.1 18.7 
Other Malaysians A 36.4 34.3 37.5 44.6 54.9 55.3  48.2 52.4 
Foreigners  62.1 63.4 53.3 42.9 26.0 25.4 32.7 28.9 
Source: Government of Malaysia 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1996, and 2001b; Jomo (2004) 




The Bumiputera share of corporate equity ownership rose sharply during the 1970s and 
1980s from 2.4 per cent in 1970 to 12.5 per cent in 1980 and 19.3 per cent in 1990. 
Meanwhile, the ownership of share capital by foreign residents fell from 63.4 per cent in 
1970 to 42.9 per cent in 1980, 26.0 per cent in 1985, and 25.4 per cent in 1990. At the 
same time, the Chinese share increased from 27.2 per cent in 1970 to 45.5 per cent in 
1990. However, the Bumiputera proportion of corporate equity ownership decreased 
marginally from 19.1 per cent in 1999 to 18.7 per cent in 2002. Foreign ownership 
increased significantly to 32.7 per cent in 1999 and then declined to 28.9 per cent in 
2002.  Meanwhile, the Chinese share of capital ownership declined to 37.9 per cent in 
1999 and again increased to 40.9 per cent in 2002. These figures demonstrate that 
compared to the growth rate of Chinese ownership of share capital, Malay ownership 
expanded at a much faster rate during 1970-1985, but it was very marginal during 1985-
1990. 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that ownership of share capital is one of the major 
factors that have contributed to the economic well-being of the ethnic groups at different 
periods in Malaysia. While during the early period of independence, the major ethnic 
groups such as Malays and Chinese owned less than 40 per cent of share capital, in later 
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years, more than 70 per cent of share capital was owned by the Chinese and Malays. The 
result was that the benefits from share capital were shared by local ethnic groups. These 
changes in turn also improved economic contentment of the local ethnic groups. 
 
5.3.1.4 Monthly mean income by ethnicity 
An unequal household income between ethnic groups is one of the important factors 
which affect inter-ethnic relations in many developing countries. But in Sri Lanka, the 
evidence shows that there has been no significant disparity in levels of income between 
ethnic groups, except the Indian Tamils. On the other hand, the data shows that there has 
been a high disparity in levels of income among ethnic groups in Malaysia. 
 
There appears that there has been no rigorous analysis of the ethnic dimension of income 
inequality in Sri Lanka. However, certain data are available for the purpose of analyzing 
the ethnic dimension of income inequality. Table 5.15 highlights the monthly mean 
income recipients by ethnic groups in selected years.  
 
Table 5.15: Sri Lanka: Monthly mean household income by ethnicity   
1963 – 1981/82 (SLR) 
Ethnic Group 1963 1973 1981/82 
Sinhalese 255 472 1148 
Sri Lankan Tamils 327 470 1189 
Indian Tamils 148 225 519 
Moors and Malays 414 670 1418 
Others 819 982 2362 
Source: Consumer Finance and Socio-economics Surveys: 1963, 1973, 1981/82. 
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According to the surveys of Consumer Finances conducted by the Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka, in 1963 data the highest two months’ mean household income Sri Lanka Rupees 
(SLR) 414 was received by Moors and Malays. Table 5.15 further shows that next to 
Moors and Malays the Sri Lankan Tamils received SLR 327. Third was the Sinhalese 
with SLR 255 and then Indian Tamils with SLR 148. However, by 1973, the situation has 
changed. Next to the Muslims and the Malays (SLR 670), the Sinhalese received SLR 
472 and the Sri Lankan Tamils SLR 470 slightly less than the Sinhalese. Even in 1973 
the Indian Tamils had the least income, SLR 225. According to the 1981/82 data, the 
Moors and Malays ranked first with SLR 1418 and the Sri Lankan Tamils ranked second 
with SLR 1189. The mean monthly income for Indian Tamils still remained the lowest 
(SLR 519). As reported in the table, there were no substantial disparities in monthly mean 
income between the ethnic groups, except in the case of the Indian Tamils until 1981/82.  
 
Income inequality has, historically been a central development issue in Malaysia. Of 
special interest is the extent of income inequality between the Malays and non-Malays. 
Racial or ethnic economic imbalances have been the framework for assessing inequality 
in Malaysia. It was found that in 1957 there were serious inequalities among the three 
major ethnic groups in terms of their average levels of income: M$ 144 for Malays, M$ 
272 for the Chinese, and M$ 217 for Indians. This scenario hardly changed, even in 1970, 
when the mean household income per month was M$172 for Malays, M$394 for the 
Chinese, and M$ 304 for Indians. One reason for the wide difference in income levels 
could be the distribution of employment. For example, Malays were mainly concentrated 
in the low-paying agricultural sector while others were employed in more lucrative 
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sectors. Another contributory factor was the wide inequality in the ownership and control 
of the existing stock of assets. In this period, the Malays moved from the least unequal to 
the most unequal, measured in the Gini-coefficient of income distribution, among the 
three ethnic groups. The Gini ratio for income data from official sources rose from 0.412 
in 1857/58 to 0.444 in 1967/68, and 0.50 in 1970, which was one of the highest rates 
among Asian countries (Snodgrass 1975). Table 5.16 indicates the pattern of monthly 
mean household income by ethnicity and disparity ratio from 1957 to 2002.   
 
Table 5.16: Malaysia: Monthly mean household income by ethnicity 1957-2002 
Ethnic groups 1957 1967 1970 1984 1990 1995 1999 2002 
All 199 217 264 1095 1167 2007 2742 3011 
Malays 144 130 172 852 940 1600 1984 2376 
Chinese 272 321 394 1502 1631 2895 3456 4289 
Indians 217 253 304 1094 1209 2153 2702 3044 
Disparity Ratio (Chinese/Malay) 1.89 2.47 2.29 1.76 1.70 1.80 1.74 1.80 
Disparity Ratio (Indian/Malay) 1.51 1.95 1.75 1.28 1.28 1.35 1.36 1.28 
    Source: Roslan (2001); Jomo (2004)  
 
During the period 1957 -1967, although income levels increased for all ethnic groups, the 
income gap among these groups widened rather than diminished. But from 1970 to 1990, 
while the income level increased for all ethnic groups, the income gap among these 
groups diminished. The Table 5.16 shows that from 1957 to 1970, the disparity ratio 
between Malays and Non-Malays had become disproportionately high. In 1957 the mean 
income disparity ratio between Malays and Chinese was 1: 1.89 and in 1970 the ratio 
increased to 1:2.29. Over the past 30 years the disparity ratio has narrowed, but in recent 
years the trend seems to have been reversed. In 1984 the mean income disparity ratio 
between the Malays and Chinese was 1:1.76. By 1995 it had narrowed to 1:1.80 and 
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declined to 1:1.74 in 1999. But with a faster growth in the mean of Chinese income, the 
disparity ratio increased to 1:1.80 in 2002, back to the level it was in 1995. The disparity 
ratio between Malays and Indian declined from 1970 to 1995, rose in 1995, and declined 
in 2002 to 1:1.28. 
 
In general, educational attainment, employment pattern, ownership of capital assets and 
the mean monthly income have led to the change in the socio-economic status of the 
majority and minority ethnic groups at different periods. We now turn our attention to the 
next key issue: the relationship between geographical area/region and the socio-economic 
performance of ethnic groups.  
 
5.3.2 Geographical area and socio-economic performance of ethnic groups 
This section examines how different geographical areas, where particular ethnic 
communities are concentrated, can influence the levels of social-economic status of 
ethnic groups. In the present study, the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are differentiated on 
territorial basis but in Malaysia ethnic groups are distinguished on rural-urban basis.  
 
5.3.2.1 Geographical area and socio-economic performance of ethnic groups in  
Sri Lanka  
As we mentioned before, the ethnic groups of Sri Lanka are segregated in terms of 
geographical areas. While the Sinhalese are concentrated in the South and West, the 
majority of Sri Lankan Tamils live in the Northeast Province of the island. In order to 
compare the socio-economic statuses of the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils, it is 
necessary to examine the economic performance of NEPR with other parts of the country.   
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Though Sri Lanka is administratively divided into 9 provinces (see Appendix 5.3) and 25 
districts, the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged in 1987. The NEPR is divided 
into 8 districts – Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu and Vavuniya districts in the 
North and Ampara, Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts in the East. The NEPR 
constitutes 29 per cent of Sri Lanka’s area and is estimated to have had a population of 
1.9 million in 2001 (about 11 per cent of the national total). The population is largely 
rural, with an estimated 88 per cent living outside the principal towns. The Tamil 
community accounted for 73 per cent of the total population of the NEPR in the census 
undertaken in 1981, while the Muslim community comprised 16 per cent and the 
Sinhalese community 10 percent.  
 
Due to climatic and historical reasons, the island’s export agriculture sector in tea, rubber 
and coconuts are concentrated largely in the south, while the NEPR focuses on traditional 
agricultural sector including minor food crops such as bananas, onions, chillies for 
domestic consumption. Prior to the conflict, the NEPR was dominated by its agricultural, 
livestock, and fisheries sectors. These were, relatively, twice as important to its economy 
as in the rest of the island, and 80 per cent of its population depended directly or 
indirectly on such activities. Although the industrial sector in the region is relatively 
small, it comprised a number of important state industrial enterprises – cement, paper, 





Table 5.17: Sri Lanka: The comparison of Northeast Province  
with other Provinces in 1981 
Socio-economic indicators WES CEN SOU NEPR NWES NCEN UVA SUB 
Total population (Mill.) 3.92 2.01 1.88 2.08 1.70 0.85 0.91 1.48 
Population As a % total 26.4 13.5 12.7 14.0 115 5.7 6.1 10.0 
Land area as a % of total land 5.7 8.9 8.6 28.1 12.0 15.5 13.3 7.8 
Employment as % of population 27.1 31.2 23.3 24.8 28.6 31.6 32.5 28.5 
Labor force participation rate 56.3 60.0 53.3 48.7 55.5 59.5 61.5 56.9 
Unemployment rate 23.8 14.4 25.1 11.45 13.8 10.5 10.3 18.9 
Government employees (per 1000) 41 29 26 24 24 25 24 22 
Employment by sector total 
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                                   Industry 

































Per Capita gross regional product 
(1981 Rupees) 
6711 5084 4424 4520 5017 5123 4965 5142 
Source: Ernst and Samaranayake (1988). 
WES: Western Province; CEN: Central Province; SOU: Southern Province; NEPR: Northeast Province; 
NWES: North Western Province; NCEN: North Central Province; UVA: Uva Province;  
SUB: Sabragamuwa Province 
 
 
But compared to other parts of the country, the available data show that the NEPR 
economically lagged behind in terms of some economic activities in early 1980s. Table 
5.17 shows the comparison of NEPR with other provinces in 1981.  
 
Table 5.17 indicates some variations between provinces in terms of socio-economic 
indicators. According to the above table, the Western province made the highest 
contribution to the country in terms of socio-economic indicators. The Western province 
had the highest population density, five times more than the average for the entire 
country. Total employment as a percentage of the total population varies from 23 per cent 
in the Southern province to 32 per cent in the Uva region. Higher unemployment rates 
were found in the Western Province. The overall employment rates for the Northeast and 
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Southern provinces appeared to have different causes – lower labor force participation in 
the Northeast and higher unemployment among the economically active population in the 
South. As can be seen in Table 5.17, with the exception of the Western region, 
government employment ratio varied from 22 to 29 per thousand inhabitants. Further, 
Table 5.17 provides a summary view of employment according to the major sectors of 
each of the provinces. Finally, the table shows the estimates of per capita regional 
product by provinces. Available data indicate that the Southern and Northeast provinces 
made the least contribution in terms of growth.   
 
Compared to other parts of the country, NEPR received less percentage of employment 
opportunities from the public sector. In addition, the Table 5.17 shows that the level of 
employment as a percentage of population and per capita gross regional product were less 
in NEPR compared to other provinces, except the Southern province. Overall, these data 
indicate that prior to the ethnic conflict; there were some differences in terms of 
economic activities between NEPR and other provinces. 
 
But as a result of ethnic conflict, the economic performance of NEPR changed 
dramatically. NEPR has been engulfed in severe ethnic conflict since 1983 and this has 
taken its toll on the economy as a result of internal and external displacement of large 
number of people. Further, as a result of the ethnic conflict, NEPR has been subjected to 
economic embargo since 1990: some goods were totally prohibited and others had been 
subjected to quantitative restrictions. Due to quantitative restrictions on the transport of 
fuel and fertilizer to NEPR and lack of power supply in the Northern Province, all 
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productive activities were severely affected in the province. In addition, the closure of 
major highways linking NEPR and the rest of the country and the destruction of railway 
lines connecting NEPR and the rest of the country also contributed to the economic 
decline of the NEPR. These factors cumulatively contributed to the steady decline of the 
economy of NEPR during the past two decades. 
 
To obtain an estimate of the decline in economy, first we consider the performance of the 
agriculture sector. Historically, the agriculture sector has been the mainstay of NEPR 
economy. In pre-conflict times, NEPR was a significant supplier of agricultural produce 
to the rest of the country. But during the conflict, due to interruption of transportation 
difficulties and prohibition on movement of goods from rebel-held areas to government-
held areas, the commercial agriculture of NEPR transformed into subsistence agriculture. 
During pre-conflict period, NEPR produced approximately one-third of the total paddy 
production, around 40 per cent of the total red onions production, one-forth of the total 
chillies production, 13 per cent of the total potatoes production and nearly 53 per cent of 
the total marine fish production in the country. However, the share of NEPR in the total 
production of agriculture declined dramatically in 1990 and 2000 (Department of Census 
and Statistics 2003). The Northern Province contributed 12 per cent of the total paddy 
output in 1980, which dramatically dropped to 5 per cent in 1990 and 3 per cent in 2000.  
Further, the share of NEPR in total production of red onions in the country declined from 
nearly 40 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent in 1990 and to nearly 30 per cent in 2000. The 
share of NEPR in total chillies production in the country dropped from about 25 per cent 
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in 1980 to 8 per cent in 2000. The Northern Province contributed about 13 per cent of the 
total output of potatoes in the country in 1980, declining to less than 1 per cent in 2000.  
 
Next, let us consider livestock and fishing. Livestock has also been negatively affected by 
the ethnic conflict as a result of displacement of people and cattle throughout the NEPR 
(Department of Census and Statistics 2003). The share of NEPR in the total stock of 
goats in the country declined from 47 per cent in 1980 to 28 per cent in 2000. Further, the 
share of NEPR in the total stock of sheep in the country declined from 76 per cent in 
1980 to 61 per cent in 2000. Historically, fishing has been a major economic activity in 
NEPR, because it is a coastal province; especially, Jaffna is a major fishing district as it is 
a peninsula. In 1980, about 56 per cent of the total fish catch in the country was from 
NEPR. However, this scenario has dramatically changed in the past two decades, 
particularly in the North, due to severe restrictions on fishing as a result of the ethnic 
conflict (Department of Census and Statistics 2003). The share of NEPR contribution 
dropped to 33 per cent in 1990 and further to just 16 per cent in 2000. Overall there was 
an 88 per cent drop in output between 1980 and 2000 in the North.  
 
In the pre-conflict period, there were three major state-owned industries in NEPR: a 
cement factory in Kankesanthurai (Jaffna district), a chemical factory in Paranthan 
(Kilinochchi district) and a paper factory in Valachenai (Batticaloa district). It is claimed 
that NEPR used to produce 500,000 Mt. of cement, 1,700 Mt. of caustic soda, 1,200 Mt. 
of chlorine and 1,000 Mt. of hydrochloric acid in the mid 1980s. As a result of the ethnic 
conflict, the cement and chemical factories have ceased production and the paper factory 
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is in partial operation. Many other small and medium industries such as soap factories, 
rice milling plants, ice plants and oil mills remained closed. As a result of the war, the 
production of cement, caustic soda, chlorine, and hydrochloric ceased by early 1990s 
(Council of NGOs Jaffna district 1999). The output of mineral sands has also declined 
steeply. Sufficient data are not available to make a reliable estimate of the drop in 
industrial production in the region. It is however, safe to conclude, that industrial output 
has been reduced by more than half as a result of the war. After liberalization and the 
economic reforms of 1977, one of the sectors that have grown faster has been the 
manufacturing sector. NEPR has not been able to benefit from these new opportunities. 
While trade liberalisation benefited the export sector in the south, it resulted in a sharp 
decline of prices of domestic food crops in the north. Along with the reduction in 
industrial output, the growth rate of GDP in NEPR resulted in an average annual loss in 
late 1980s and 1990s. The provincial shares of the national GDP are important yardsticks 
to measure the level and size of the economy in a particular province. Table 5.18 presents 
the GDP shares for the provinces of Sri Lanka. The contribution to GDP differs from 
province to province.  
 
The data clearly indicate an uneven distribution of GDP among provinces. Having 
dominated throughout, the Western Province (where the capital Colombo is located, and 
where industry and commerce are concentrated) was responsible for the year 1981 and 
the periods of 1990-1995 and 1996-2000. The share of the Western Province increased 
continuously from 33 per cent in 1981 to 42 per cent in first period (1990-1995) and 46 
per cent in the second period (1996-2000). The main reason for this substantial 
 223
contribution was the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector is highly 
concentrated in the Western Province, which accounts for 72 per cent of the total value 
manufacturing output in the country.  
 
Table 5.18: Sri Lanka: GDP share by provinces 1981-2000 
Province 1981 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
WES 33.16 41.37 41.06 42.09 42.07 42.68 43.35 43.5 43.9 45.0 48.6 49.4 
NWE 10.77 10.88 10.60 10.68 10.38 10.46 10.29 11.3 12.0 12.0 10.3 10.4 
CEN 12.87 11.33 11.82 11.43 11.36 11.26 11.11 10.6 11.1 10.3 9.7 9.9 
SOU 10.49 9.45 11.17 9.98 10.33 9.80 9.73 8.9 8.7 9.2 9.4 9.3 
SAB 9.60 7.69 7.28 7.15 7.40 7.58 7.62 9.1 7.7 6.7 6.5 6.7 
UVA 5.72 5.60 5.28 5.21 5.43 5.17 5.11 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.0 4.0 
NCE 5.48 5.21 6.26 6.30 6.38 6.48 6.39 4.5 3.9 3.6 4.1 3.8 
NOR 6.33 4.41 3.35 3.13 2.81 2.71 2.45 2.4 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.1 
EAS 5.55 4.02 4.18 4.03 4.11 3.84 3.93 4.8 4.9 5.5 5.0 4.5 
NEPR 11.88 8.43 7.53 7.16 6.92 6.55 6.38 7.2 7.6 8.3 7.5 6.7 
Source: National Human Development Report (1998), Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various annual reports) 
 
The Table 5.18 also provides a frame of reference for checking the reliability of these 
estimates of GDP losses for NEPR. The share of the overall economy of NEPR was 
11.88 per cent in 1981. Due to the ethnic conflict, the GDP share shrank from 8.43 per 
cent in 1990 to 6.7 per cent in 2000. This represented a negative annual average growth 
of 1.95 per cent per year (See Appendix 5.3 for a comparison of the average provincial 
contribution to the national GDP in three different periods: 1981, 1990-1995 and 1996-
2000). To compare the Northern and Eastern provinces, we can draw three broad 
conclusions from the data presented in table. Firstly, the contribution of the Eastern 
provincial economy to the national economy has been marginally rising while the 
contribution of the Northern provincial economy to the national economy has been 
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steadily declining during the 1990s. Secondly, the economic slump in the Northern 
Province has been much more severe than in the Eastern Province during conflict. 
Thirdly, the combined NEPR has been economically the most deprived province in Sri 
Lanka throughout the 1990s. 
 
The estimate of loss of economic growth in the Northern and Eastern provinces in 2000 
indicates that household incomes dropped to a level half that of 1981. There are severe 
shortages of a large range of essential goods such as fuel, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer and 
pesticides.  
 
Social structures too have been destroyed. The war has devastated the economic 
infrastructure of the Northern Province and extensively damaged it in the east. In 1987 
the national task force on the damage to public and private property during the period 
1983-1987 reported that 56,000 houses were completely destroyed and another 34,000 
damaged. The damage to commercial and government property, roads and bridges, 
irrigation systems, plant and machinery and movable property of private individuals, 
firms and government agencies was extensive. For other losses, such as the decline in 
trade with NEPR and the slowing down of business and investment resulting from 
unstable conditions, no firm data are available. In industry and tourism the economic 
opportunities which became available to NEPR with liberalization were lost due to the 
war. With the war and the continuing hostilities, tourists have ceased to travel to the 
Eastern Province despite its attractions and the development of tourism in the province 
was completely halted.  
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NEPR is also deprived in terms of access to economic infrastructure such as roads, 
railways, ports, power, safe water, and telecommunication facilities compared to the rest 
of the country. Roads and railways are in much depleted state in NEPR. Rail lines 
throughout the Northern Province are completely destroyed and in the Eastern Province 
severely run down. Though the major Trincomalee port is reasonably maintained the 
smaller ports of Kankesanthurai, Point Pedro and Talaimannar are over-stretched and 
hence depleted (United Nations 2003). For every 100 people there are 10 telephones in 
Sri Lanka. However, in Eastern province there is one telephone for every 25 people and 
in the Northern Province there is one telephone for every 33 people. Further, about 56 per 
cent of the total homes in Sri Lanka have power supply whereas in the Eastern Province 
only 40 per cent of homes and in the Northern Province only 22 per cent of homes have 
power. Moreover, while 45 per cent of the total households in the country have access to 
safe drinking water only 20 per cent of households in NEPR has access to safe drinking 
water (United Nations 2003).  
 
Health and education have been badly affected by the ethnic conflict in the NEPR. A 
major casualty of the protracted ethnic conflict in NEPR is the dramatic decline in the 
health standards of its population. Most of the health indicators in NEPR are less than the 
national average. Seventeen per cent of the children in Sri Lanka were born underweight 
in 2001 whereas in NEPR it was 26 percent. Crude birth rate in Sri Lanka was little more 
then 17 in 2000 while it was high in many of the NEPR districts (Batticaloa (23), 
Kilinochchi (25), Mullaitivu (35) and Trincomalee (24)). Crude death rate in Sri Lanka 
was almost 6 in 2000 while it was high in many of the NEPR districts (Kilinochchi (9), 
 226
Mullaitivu (11) and Vavuniya (10)). The national infant mortality rate was little more 
than 15 whereas in NEPR it was it was high in many of the NEPR districts (Jaffna (22), 
Kilinochchi (28), Mannar (22), and Mullaitivu (20)) in 2000. The education standards of 
NEPR also significantly deteriorated during the two decades of ethnic conflict. Due to 
massive displacement of the population, children’s education got severely disrupted. 
Further, destruction and occupation of school by armed forces throughout NEPR also 
severely hampered education standards in NEPR (United Nations 2003). The school drop 
out rate is only 4 per cent nationally. But in NEPR it is 15 per cent (United Nations 2003) 
 
The broad comparisons in this section indicate that NEPR differs from other parts of the 
country in terms of socio-economic characteristics. In this way, it could have fed into the 
long-standing Tamil grievances regarding regional development inequalities in the North, 
relating to the unequal distribution of public sector projects and the acceleration of 
demographically sensitive irrigation and resettlement schemes.
  
 
5.3.2.2 Geographical area and socio-economic performance of ethnic groups in  
Malaysia  
As we have already stated, since early history, ethnic groups of Malaysia have been 
distinguished in terms of rural-urban dichotomy. In the early period of independence, the 
majority of Malays were found in the North and in the Eastern states of Peninsular 
Malaysia, which are relatively less developed and poorer. On the other hand, the non-
Malays – Chinese and Indians – were concentrated in the Western states of Peninsular 
Malaysia, which are comparatively more developed and wealthy. Therefore, while the 
majority of Malays formed a much higher proportion of the population in rural areas, the 
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majority of non-Malays were in the urban areas. Table 5.19 indicates how ethnic groups 
of Malaysia were isolated in terms of rural-urban dichotomy in 1957 and 1970. 
 
Table 5.19: Malaysia: Population by ethnic groups and degree of urbanization at 
1957 and 1970 (Peninsular Malaysia) 
1957 1970 Ethnic 
group Urban Area (%) Rural Area (%) Urban Area (%) Rural Area (%) 
Malays 11.2 88.8 14.9 85.1 
Chinese 44.7 55.3 47.4 52.6 
Indians 30.6 69.4 34.7 65.3 
Others 49.3 50.7 40.8 59.2 
Total 26.5 73.5 28.7 71.3 
   Source: Rosen (2001) 
 
The table above shows that in 1957 almost 90 per cent of Malays lived in the rural area, 
compared to about 55 per cent of the Chinese and 70 per cent of the Indians. This 
condition continued until early 1970s. As a result, compared to non-Malays, the majority 
of the Malays formed a higher proportion of the workforce in traditional agriculture and a 
lower proportion in modern industry and commerce. In addition, the majority of them had 
a significant lower share of ownership of industrial and commercial capital. Therefore, 
the majority of the Malays had a lower socio-economic status than the average non-
Malays. Later, with the introduction of a new economic policy, the rural-urban gap was 

















































   Source: Roslan (2001), Anoma (2003), Jomo (2004) 
 
From the figures (5.3A and 5.3B), we can see that in the early period of independence, 
the mean monthly income was far less for Malays than non-Malays; therefore, the 
incidence of poverty among Malays was high compared to other ethnic groups. Through 
government intervention, the incidence of poverty was reduced while the mean monthly 
income improved. This situation depended partly on the geographical area where the 
particular ethnic groups concentrated and available resources.  
 
The above analysis reveals that both the minority and majority ethnic groups in Sri Lanka 
equally enjoyed socio-economic performance in the early period of independence than 
later. But in Malaysia, during the early period of independence there was high inequality 
between majority and minority communities in terms of socio-economic performance 
compared to later period of independence. The next section will attempt to examine the 
economic aspects of inter ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and Malaysia.  
Figure 5.3A: 
Malaysia: Mean monthly household 
income by ethnicity 
Figure 5.3B: 
Malaysia: Incidence of poverty  
by ethnicity 
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5.4 Economic aspects of inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and Malaysia 
The records on inter-ethnic relation in Sri Lanka and Malaysia take into account two 
different periods:  
• Early period of independence:   
A. Sri Lanka - From 1948 to 1955  
B. Malaysia - From 1957 to 1970 
• Later period of independence:  
A. Sri Lanka – From 1956 to 2000  
B. Malaysia – From 1970 to 2000 
 
5.4.1 Inter-ethnic relation in Sri Lanka  
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia and Sri 
Lanka evolved during the post-colonial period in close relation to the changing nature of 
their economy and their linkages to the global economy. In the early period of 
independence, in Sri Lanka, what we shall show is that the open market policy and 
related benefits were more supportive in improving the economic development in the 
country and socio-economic status of the people. As a result of high economic 
contentment among ethnic groups, the country became deceptively calm and there was 
cordial relation between the majority Sinhalese community and the minority community 
of Sri Lankan Tamils. But the transition from an open economy to a close economic 
model of development was less supportive of the economic development in the country 
as well as socio-economic status of the people. There was growing discontent and 
deprivation among the various ethnic groups; this led to inter-ethnic tension and 
eventually ethnic conflict.  
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Early period of independence: At the time of independence, Sri Lanka was a classic 
example of a small open economy with an exceptionally high standard of living relative 
to other countries in Asia (Snodgrass 1988; Bruton et al. 1992; Ganeshamoorthy 2002). 
Further, the first post-independence government inherited an efficient administrative 
system, a dynamic judiciary, and a well-established social welfare system and policy 
(Silva 2001). In addition, Sri Lanka received much policy advice from foreign experts 
and from international agencies (Ganeshamoorthy 2002). Sri Lanka’s balance of 
payments and the terms of trade were appreciable. Foreign exchange reserves were 
adequate for nine months’ imports and foreign debt was less than 5 per cent of exports. 
There was virtually no inflationary pressure because government deficit was negligible 
and money supply growth was well under control (Bruton et al. 1992). During this 
period, unemployment was not a major problem as the number of unemployed persons 
was relatively small (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 1998) and there were no reports 
regarding the Sinhalese colonization of traditional Tamil areas.29   
 
Further, Sri Lanka’s economy was seemingly capable of sustained rapid economic 
growth in this period with 4.3 per cent (1951-1955). In the 1950s, Sri Lanka’s real per 
capita GDP expressed in international prices was twice as large as that of India, and 80 
per cent of that of Japan (Summers and Heston 1984). The per capita nominal income in 
1948 was estimated at USD 120 or SLR 397. Accordingly, the monthly income per 
person was USD 10 or SLR 33 in 1948 (Central Bank of Sri Lanka 1998). Sri Lanka’s 
experience of a high growth rate favored by buoyant prices for its major export 
                                                 
29 Later, both employment and colonization became major problems for the country, and this led to tension 
between communities. 
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commodities. As a result, Sri Lanka’s development indicators compared favorably with 
those of other South Asian countries and most of the East and South-East Asian countries 
(Snodgrass 1988). 
 
Despite these favorable economic performances, government intervention regarding 
minority ethnic groups was well maintained during the early period of independence. As 
a result, during the early period of independence, the minority Sri Lankan Tamils was 
economically well-off and their socio-economic status was comparable with other ethnic 
groups; therefore, they did not challenge the Sinhalese. In fact, the minority Sri Lankan 
ethnic groups were overrepresented in the public service and professions relative to the 
size of their population. Because there was no substantial inequality between the ethnic 
groups in terms of economic contentment, the majority Sinhalese ethnic groups also did 
not challenge the minority Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus, the country was deceptively calm, as 
there was cordial relation between the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan Tamils. But 
structural imbalances in terms of educational and employment opportunities created 
tension between the ethnic groups. The main causes for the inter-ethnic conflict in Sri 
Lanka are investigated in the next section.  
 
Later period of independence: In Chapter 4, we identified the degree of economic 
satisfaction among ethnic groups as an important factor for conflict in multi-ethnic 
developing countries. Particularly, if a minority ethnic group is economically well-off 
their motivation to challenge the majority ethnic group is weakened. This was the case in 
the early period of independence. But as a result of inappropriate economic policies in the 
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country and the lack of economic opportunities for the minority ethnic group, there was 
ethnic violence.  
 
We now use a diagram to explain how peaceful inter-ethnic relations can be damaged by 
an inappropriate economic policy option. The Diagram 5.1 below describes how Sri 
Lanka’s closed economy and related economic activities led to ethnic conflict with the 
implementation of discriminatory policies.  
 
As can be seen from the diagram, closed economy leads to poor economic growth as well 
as poor quality of governance resulting in increased poverty and inequality. In such a 
situation, discriminatory policies improve nothing but increase discontent and feeling of 
relative deprivation among people. Eventually, the situation creates ethnic tension and 
ethnic conflict. Ethnic tension or conflict then becomes a cause of poor economic growth 
and results in discontent and feeling of relative deprivation. This situation actually 
happened in Sri Lanka from 1956 to 1977. Because of the closed and restricted economy, 
the government was unsuccessful in bringing about considerable structural changes in the 
classical colonial economy, thus dragging the economy into deep and prolonged 
stagnancy. Further, the periods experienced a significant slow down in economic growth 
and worsening internal and external balances. The economy experienced constant foreign 































Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
The available data further show that in the later period of independence there were 
substantial disparities between ethnic groups in terms of educational attainment, 
employment opportunities and other socio-economic achievements relative to the 
proportional size of their population.  Therefore, the transition from an open economy to 
a closed economy in the late 1950s gave birth to the contemporary deprivation among 
ethnic groups in Sri Lanka.  
Also, the present research confirms the following two issues as the basic reasons for the 
military action taken by the South (JVP) and North (LTTE and other Tamils groups) 
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• The government failed to bring appropriate economic policies to fulfill the aspirations 
of all ethnic groups; 
• There was lack of government support for industrial development in the country as 
a whole and for the poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged people in particular.  
 
As we pointed out earlier, inappropriate economic policies and the complex nature of 
government’s role in the economy have failed to fulfill the aspirations of educated youths 
and to bring industrial development to the poor. While the government actively expanded 
the public sector and broadened domestic welfare programs, it failed to create sufficient 
employment opportunities for the growing numbers of educated youth. Many of the 
uneducated youth began to feel that they were being marginalized by the mainstream 
development processes. 
 
Economic prosperity of people is considered to be largely dependent upon what 
comparative advantage the regions reveal in terms of the availability of resources. Since 
independence, there has been lack of suitable industrial development in rural areas and 
NEPR. Agricultural development was also restricted in NEPR due to not only the lack of 
land but also the shortage of water. Further, an outstanding expansion of the government 
control of the private sector damaged private sector employment opportunities in the 
country. The inadequate expansion of the economy to provide employment opportunities 
for the educated youth eventually led to the gradual exclusion of individuals, ethnic 
groups, and some regions from the mainstream development process. In other words, all 
these developments ultimately led to socio-economic disparities within and between 
ethnic groups.  
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The educated youth became persuaded that their salvation depended on the radical 
transformation of the socio-economic and political system of Sri Lanka. Eventually, a 
group of lower-middle class from the Sinhalese community formed a Marxist party called 
JVP (Janatha Vimukthy Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front)) and attempted to capture 
power through armed struggles in 1971 and 1989/90. These attempts were carried out by 
the Sinhalese youths and none of the Sri Lankan Tamil youths took part in these initial 
armed struggles. However, they also took to arms a few years later. In order to fulfil their 
aspirations, the Tamil students formed a student organization in 1972 known as Manavar 
Peravai (Student Federation) and conducted several unsuccessful campaigns to press the 
government to provide the minority community opportunities such as education and 
employment. Instead of redressing the grievances of the Tamil students, the government 
suppressed the organization. The frustrated Tamil youth then responded in violent ways.  
 
It is worth noting that Sri Lanka's descent to ethnic conflict came in three stages, 
beginning with the period mid-1955 to 1961, when two sets of communal riots broke out 
against the background of a unilateral change in language policy. The passage of the 
Official Language Act precipitated a current of antagonism between the Tamils and 
Sinhalese. The Sri Lankan Tamils, represented by the Federal Party, launched a 
satyagraha (nonviolent protest) that resulted in a pact between the Prime Minister, 
S.V.R.D. Bandaranaike, and the leader of Federal Party, S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, 
commonly referred to as the “Banda Chelva Pact”. The agreement provided a wide 
measure of Tamil autonomy in Northern and Eastern provinces. It also provided for the 
use of the Tamil language in administrative matters. But the pact was not carried out 
because of a peaceful protest by Buddhist clergy, who, with the support from the UNP, 
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denounced the pact as a "betrayal of Sinhalese-Buddhist people." In May 1958, a report 
that a Tamil had killed a Sinhalese sparked off nationwide communal riots. Hundreds of 
people, mostly Tamils, died. This disturbance was the first major episode of communal 
violence on the island since independence. The riots left a deep psychological scar 
between the two major ethnic groups. The government declared a state of emergency and 
forcibly relocated more than 25,000 Tamil refugees from Sinhalese areas to Tamil areas 
in the North.  
 
After a period of lull in the 1960s there was a second phase of confrontation and 
violence, culminating in the riots of 1977. During the 1977 elections, many Tamil youths 
began to engage in extra parliamentary and sometimes violent measures in their bid for a 
mandate for a separate state. These measures precipitated a Sinhalese reaction. An 
apparently false rumor that Sinhalese policemen had died at the hands of Tamil terrorists, 
combined with other rumors of alleged anti-Sinhalese statements made by Tamil 
politicians, sparked brutal communal rioting that engulfed the island within two weeks of 
the new government's inauguration. The rioting marked the first major outbreak of 
communal violence in the nineteen years since the riots of 1958. Casualties were many, 
especially among the Sri Lankan Tamils of Jaffna and the Indian Tamil plantation 
workers. The Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation Organization estimated the death toll at 300.  
 
Six years of relative calm followed until the outbreak of a major anti-Tamil riots in 1983. 
In July 1983, the most savage communal riots in Sri Lanka's history erupted. The riots 
began in retaliation for an ambush of an army patrol in the north that left thirteen 
Sinhalese soldiers dead. The army was reputed to have killed sixty Tamil civilians in 
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Jaffna, but most of the violence occurred in Colombo, where Sinhalese mobs looked for 
Tamil shops to destroy. Unlike any previous ethnic riots in the island, the 1983 riots were 
marked by highly organized mob violence. From Colombo, the anti-Tamil violence 
fanned out to the entire island. Conservative government estimates put the death toll at 
400, mostly Tamils. At least 150,000 Tamil fled the island. This violence against the 
Tamils is recorded in history as Black July. As a result, the struggle became an 
international issue when Tamils began to seek refuge in Europe, Canada and Australia. 
After settling down in their countries of domicile, they began supporting the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to continue the ethnic war, with the aim of establishing a 
separate land for Tamils known as Tamil Eelam. Thereafter, ethnic violence has become 
a regular feature in Sri Lanka. 
 
For almost two decades (1983-2002), Sri Lanka was involved in civil wars that claimed 
substantial human lives.  Some 60,000 to 70,000 people are estimated to have died since 
July 1983, when a simmering insurgency campaign in the North escalated traumatically 
into war. In the late 1990s, almost a million people, amounting to one-third of the total 
population of the North-east lived as internally displaced persons (IDP’s), while one-
quarter of the total Sri Lankan Tamil population left the country, either as a direct or 
indirect result of the war. 
 
Indeed, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka can be characterized as the failure of economic 
policies and the actions of successive post independence governments. Inappropriate 
economic policies failed to address the relative deprivation between the majority and 
minority communities, thus leading to the ethnic conflict. In addition, the rise of ethnic 
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conflict in Sri Lanka was due to forms of economic development determined mainly by 
government policies promoted by politicians whose ultimate agenda was not necessarily 
the promotion of national interest.  
 
5.4.2 Inter-ethnic relation in Malaysia 
Though Malaysia maintained an open economic environment in the early period of 
independence, the laissez-faire economic system did not support economic development 
in the country and socio-economic status of all ethnic groups. The system was perceived 
as having widened economic and income disparities between ethnic groups, resulting in 
discontent and deprivation. As a result, ethnic conflict broke out in May 1969, reflecting 
the failure of the laissez-faire system. But later, with the help of appropriate economic 
policies and planning programs, the economic development of the country and socio-
economic status of all ethnic groups improved. This achievement is not fortuitous. 
Malaysia has had the more difficult challenge, but it has also had better conflict 
management.  
 
Early period of Independence: Unlike in Sri Lanka, there were high disparities between 
ethnic groups in Malaysia in the early period of independence. Although the open 
economic environment resulted in rapid economic growth, the trickle down process did 
not appear to work as expected. As pointed out earlier, there were soaring economic and 
income disparities between Malays or non-Malays due to the laissez-faire system. The 
failure of laissez-faire denied the majority Malays economic opportunities.  
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The poor economic condition of the Malays as well as the notable economic imbalance 
between Malays and Chinese was unsatisfactory to the Malays. There were strong 
criticisms of the government’s laissez-faire approach from the Malays. To the Malays, 
the government was too friendly to Chinese interests. Therefore, a more aggressive 
government intervention was advocated to speed the upward mobility of the Malays in 
education, employment and the economy of the country to keep them abreast with the 
non-Malays. On the other hand, the Chinese felt that the government was doing too much 
for the Malays and felt discriminated. The rising tension between both groups came to a 
peak with racial riots on May 13 1969 and saw hundred of Chinese killed by Malay 
mobs. As with most such events, there have been various views and interpretations as to 
the cause, or causes, of the riots. Earlier, government reports cited ‘political and 
psychological factors contributing to the conflict’. But a government White Paper issued 
in 1971 entitled Toward National Harmony stressed the ‘economic factor’ as the cause 
(Abdullah 1997). This view was later amplified in public comments by government 
leaders. They cited the failure of earlier economic policies to address the relative 
deprivation of the Malays in comparison to the non-Malays as being the underlying root 
cause of the crisis. Therefore, the unevenness of development between the fast-growing 
modern sectors of the economy dominated by foreign and Chinese interest and the 
traditional agricultural sectors dominated by Malays was identified as the major cause of 
inter-ethnic tension. The main factors for the prevention of ethnic conflict in Malaysia are 
investigated in the next section. 
 
Later period of independence: Once again it is necessary point out that because both 
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either minority or majority ethnic groups were economically worse off, their motivation 
to challenge each other group become serious. This was the main reason for ethnic 
tension and ethnic riots in Malaysia in the early period of independence. But as a result of 
appropriate economic policies and more economic opportunities for the minority ethnic 
group there was peaceful inter-ethnic relation in Malaysia.  
 
In this section, a diagram is utilized to explain how antagonistic inter-ethnic relations can 
be reduced by an appropriate economic policy option. The Diagram 5.2 below describes 
how Malaysia’s open economic environment and related economic activities prevented 
ethnic conflict with the implementation of discriminatory policies.  
 
The diagram shows that open economic conditions provided the opportunity for high 
economic growth and better quality of governance in Malaysia. This positive economic 
performance reduced on one hand the incidence of poverty and inequalities in income 
and employment and ownership of the ethnic communities on the other hand. Even 
though the country experienced very extreme discriminatory policies compared to other 
multi-ethnic developing countries, better economic performance and a high level of 
socio-economic status among the ethnic groups have reduced discontent but not the 





























Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
It is worth pointing out that while implementing the ethnic preference policies, Malaysia 
put in place appropriate economic policies and planning programs to ensure better 
standard of living, thereby leading to healthier economic performance and political 
stability. It must also be noted that while implementing ethnic preference policies 
designed to ensure proportional representation of Malays, the minority ethnic groups did 
not challenge the Malays, as it happened in Sri Lanka. The main reason is that the 
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From the above facts, we can conclude that Malaysia is a most successful multi-ethnic 
developing country in the world. While Malaysia’s economic performance was 
impressive by developing country standards, its achievements were particularly 
remarkable in terms of economic as well as other factors. This outstanding performance 
has been accompanied by high degree of economic openness, sustained economic 
growth, good governance, reduced unemployment, falling poverty, and reduction in 
income inequalities, active participation of public and private sector, and low inflation.  
 
The following economic activities are identified as the main factors that were influential 
in the current inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia.  
• The country formulated its economic policies and planning strategies (e.g. Open 
economic policy regimes, EPP) suited to its particular circumstances and requirements.  
• In order to achieve high economic performance, the Malaysian government maintain 
capable and effective public and private sector contribution, while closing the gap 
between the two; 
• The government of Malaysia implemented various development policies (NEP, NDP 
and Vision 2000) at exact time to reduce extensive and deep-rooted disparities of 
economic opportunities and incomes among communities. The avoidance or reluctance 
to undertake such initiatives may lead to social unrest and violence;  
• While maintaining high economic growth, the government of Malaysia strongly 
emphasized equitable distribution of development benefits in all communities. The 
early independence experience indicated that economic growth alone cannot guarantee 
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social harmony; therefore, successive governments emphasized equitable distribution 
of development benefits; 
• In order to ensure continued economic growth and political stability, the government 
of Malaysia and leaders were committed to national, not personal, interests over a 
sustained period of time; 
• The government of Malaysia adopted a multi-pronged approach in increasing 
productivity and income-generating programs. In the mean time, welfare assistance 
was limited in order to avoid implanting the dole mentality among the poor. 
• Finally, the people’s support was successful in the implementation of government’s 
policies and strategies in Malaysia.  
 
Thus, the avoidance of ethnic conflict in Malaysia can be attributed to the success of 
economic policies and the actions of successive post independence governments. As a 
result, all ethnic groups have managed to maintain better economic conditions and 
avoided relative deprivation.  
 
5.5 Summary 
From the above analysis, we can infer that the degree of economic activities and the level 
of socio-economic status of the people allowed considerable success and failure in 
economic performance and political stability at different periods (earlier period and later 
period of independence) in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. During the early period of 
independence in Sri Lanka, the appropriate economic policies and planning programs 
provided good socio-economic status of the people; therefore, there was no chance for 
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ethnic violence in the country. But later, because of inappropriate economic policies and 
planning programs the situation was changed, leading to a worsening of the socio-
economic status of the people, which in turn led to the ethnic conflict. In Malaysia, on the 
other hand, during the early period of independence, inappropriate economic policies and 
planning programs led to poor socio-economic status for the Malays; therefore, there was 
ethnic tension and subsequently ethnic violence. Fortunately, during the later period of 
independence, due to appropriate economic policies and effective planning programs, the 
socio-economic status improved, thus ensuring peaceful ethnic relations among the 
















Appendix 5.1: Sri Lanka: Social Welfare Expenditure 
Years Welfare expenditure Food Education Health Other Services 
1951-60 7.6 2.2 3.3 2.0 0.0 
1961-70 9.7 3.2 3.8 1.9 0.1 
1971-80 9.5 3.8 2.6 1.3 0.2 
1981-90 5.8 0.7 2.2 1.3 1.0 
1991-00 9.3 0.9 2.8 1.5 4.1 
Source: Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka (various annual reports) 1950-2001. 
 
Appendix 5.2: Average provincial contribution to the national GDP in 1981, 1990-
1995 and 1996-2000 
Average provincial contribution to the 
national GDP 1981
WES, 33.16






























Appendix 5.3: Sri Lanka Map: Important places and Provinces 
 
 









This thesis deals with the causes of ethnic conflict; it also analyzes the role of economic 
activities in inter-ethnic relations in multi-ethnic countries, especially in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia. In this concluding chapter, we summarize the major findings of the thesis and 
draw some policy implications.  
 
6.2 Summary of findings 
As indicated in Chapter 1, though Malaysia shared much in common with Sri Lanka in 
the 1950s in terms of economic, social and cultural factors (including ethnic composition 
and the inequalities between ethnic groups), the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations have 
changed in both countries. While Malaysia was seen as highly prone to ethnic tensions in 
the late 1950s and 1960s, Sri Lanka maintained peaceful relations between various ethnic 
groups until 1956. But cordial inter-ethnic relations among various communities in Sri 
Lanka gradually changed. On the other hand, in Malaysia, inter-ethnic relations among 
ethnic groups improved. Although previous ethnic studies have indicated that ethnic 
preference policies were the main reasons for the changes in both countries, we 
hypothesized that the degree of economic openness and its outcome were the major 
factors for the reverse case in both countries. In order to assure our claim we examined 
key concepts and the relevant literature in Chapter 2, ethnic preference policies and their 
outcome in Chapter 3, analytical explanation, theoretical, and empirical results in Chapter 
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4, and the impact of economic activities on inter ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia in Chapter 5.   
 
In Chapter 2, we observed that ethnic conflict cannot be attributed to one set of factors; it 
may be a mixture of economic, political, and social factors. In the case of economic 
factors, we alluded to that the degree of economic openness, the level of economic 
growth and development, and other macroeconomic variables are the possible causes of 
ethnic conflict in many multi-ethnic developing countries. At the same time, we found 
that the degree of democracy is the only political factor that has influence on ethnic 
conflicts. Finally, we observed that two social factors namely ethnic diversity and 
religious diversity are also associated with ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing 
countries. 
 
In discussing the origins, evolution and implication of EPPs in Sri Lanka and Malaysia in 
chapter 3, we found that both countries implemented EPPs to ensure proportional 
representation of the underprivileged ethnic groups. In both countries, during the early 
period of independence the minority ethnic groups were overrepresented in many 
economic activities. The group given favorable treatment in EPPs was the majority 
ethnic group that dominated the government. Further, we found that the trigger for EPPs 
in Malaysia and Sri Lanka differed from each other. In Malaysia, because of the high 
level of horizontal inequality among ethnic groups, the government recognized that none 
of its policies and planning programs could reduce inter-ethnic tension without the 
implementation of EPPs. But in Sri Lanka, there were no horizontal inequality among 
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ethnic communities; therefore, this situation did not warrant any kind of EPPs in Sri 
Lanka. Furthermore, we discovered that culture, education, and employment are the 
major EPP domains in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. In additions, we found that Malaysia 
implemented a more extreme EPP than Sri Lanka. We found that EPPs had positive 
effects in Malaysia but negative effects in Sri Lanka. Lastly what we found that ethnic 
preference policies are only mobilization tool for the current inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia rather than root causes.  
 
In Chapter 4, we first set forth an analytical explanation of economic activities with 
ethnic peace/conflict and then advanced our argument with a theoretical model. Finally, 
our hypothesis was tested with empirical data. 
 
In the section on analytical explanation, we examined the relationship between each 
economic activity and considered their impact on ethnic conflict. First, we examined the 
relationship between degrees of economic openness with quality of governance, 
economic growth, and ethnic conflict. The evidence revealed that a high degree of 
economic openness tends to lower the level of corruption and leads to good governance. 
Furthermore, on the relationship between quality of governance and other economic 
activities such as economic growth and poverty and inequality, we found that poor 
governance is a significant contributor to low economic growth and that lower level of 
economic growth leads to poor level of governance. In addition, the observations suggest 
that ineffective governance leads to poverty and income inequality. Obviously good 
governance is an essential ingredient of ethnic peace.  
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The available data on the relationship between economic growth and poverty & 
inequality indicate the positive and negative relationships between economic growth and 
inequality. Though the evidence provides ambiguous relationship between economic 
growth and ethnic conflict, the real world experience shows that ethnic conflict is 
becoming increasingly concentrated in multi-ethnic developing countries than in 
developed countries. In other words, economic growth facilitates, and may even be a 
necessary condition for the successful management of ethnic conflict. 
 
Lastly, this section examined the relationship between poverty and inequality with ethnic 
conflict. Even though there are different opinions about the impact of poverty and 
inequality on the probability of ethnic conflict, the evidence indicates that a high level of 
poverty and inequality among ethnic groups accompanies ethnic conflict. This is because 
marginalized and poor people are dissatisfied with their economic status, thus making it 
harder for multi-ethnic developing countries to achieve peaceful relations among various 
ethnic groups. Overall, the analytical explanation indicates ambiguous relationships 
within economic activities and between economic activities and ethnic conflict.  
 
 The second section of this chapter examined the relationship between economic 
activities and ethnic conflict via a theoretical model. Specifically, the purpose of this 
theoretical explanation was to identify the factors that determine ethnic peace in multi-
ethnic developing countries. For the purpose of our argument, we adapted a game 
theoretic model developed by Gershenson and Grossman. Instead of analyzing ethnic 
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peace or conflict via political dominance, we used the political options of different ethnic 
groups and their ‘economic satisfaction’.  
 
In the model we assume that there are two ethnic groups, namely majority and minority, 
struggling to succeed with their political options; the former one expresses support for 
political unity of the country, while the latter seeks to gain political independence. 
Further, the model shows that when one of the ethnic groups succeeds in retaining its 
political option, the decision of the other ethnic group, whether to agree or challenge, 
depends on their economic satisfaction. If both ethnic groups are economically well-off, 
they are eager to agree with the other’s option. Subsequently, there is a chance for ethnic 
peace; otherwise the situation leads to conflict. In order to achieve ethnic peace, the 
model suggests that the availability of resources is one of the necessary conditions for a 
country. In this context, the model indicates that a high degree of economic openness 
leads to an increase in a country’s resource availability. The situation provides better 
economic opportunities for all communities, resulting in improvement of economic 
satisfaction for both the majority and minority ethnic groups. The motivation for 
challenge between ethnic groups is then weakened; ethnic peace is the final outcome.  
 
In order to advance our argument in the empirical analysis, we selected 12 multi-ethnic 
developing countries from 1980 to 2000. To explain the relationship between economic 
activities and ethnic relations, we developed three econometric equations. The first 
equation presents the relationship between economic openness and economic growth; the 
second one explains the correlation between economic openness and quality of 
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governance; and the last one shows the impact of economic activities such as economic 
openness, economic growth, and quality of governance on ethnic conflict.  
 
In the first equation, the dependent variable is economic growth while the independent 
variables are trade openness, disciplined government, inflation, human capital, physical 
capital, population growth, democracy and ethnic-linguistic fractionalization. To estimate 
the equation, we utilized a pooled time-series cross-section method with individual 
effects. The results provide strong support to our degree of economic openness and 
economic growth hypothesis that a country that is integrated into the world economy 
experiences high economic growth. The results also confirm a strong relationship 
between other independent variables and economic growth.   
 
In the second equation, the dependent variable is disciplined government while the 
independent variables are trade openness, economic growth, inflation, democracy, and 
population size. As in the first equation, we utilized a pooled time-series cross-section 
method with individual effects. The findings strongly supported the positive association 
between economic openness and quality of governance. Besides, the findings confirm the 
strong link between other independent variables and quality of governance. 
 
In the third equation, we use ethnic conflict as the dependent variable and trade openness, 
disciplined government, economic growth, inflation, population size, democracy, and 
square term of democracy, ethnic-linguistic fractionalization, and square term of ethnic-
linguistic fractionalization as independent variables. Given the nature of the dependent 
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variable, we use a pooled time-series cross-section Logit model and a linear probability 
model with individual effects. The findings indicate that economic activities such as 
degree of economic openness, quality of governance, and economic growth are strong 
determinants of ethnic conflicts. Further, the findings reveal that political variables 
(democracy and square term of democracy) and social variables (ethnic diversity and 
population size) also matter. Therefore, Chapter 4 brings out the message that appropriate 
economic policies are unavoidable in the achievement of peaceful inter-ethnic relations 
among various ethnic groups.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of economic activities on inter-ethnic relations in Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia. In order to fulfill this task, we critically evaluate economic activities 
and their outcome in both countries and then assess the socio-economic status of ethnic 
communities. Five main issues such as the degree of economic openness, the role of the 
government, the level of macroeconomic stability, the rate of economic growth and the 
incidence of poverty and inequality were evaluated in both countries. From the 
comparison, it was found that lack of continuity of economic openness adversely affected 
economic growth and quality of governance in Sri Lanka while continuity of open 
economic policy led to an increase in economic growth and better quality of governance 
in Malaysia. Our comparison also reveal that the role of the Sri Lankan government was 
quite complex, compared with that of the Malaysian government. 
 
Though in the early period of independence good governance was noted in Sri Lanka the 
situation changed with the implementation of different socio-economic policies. Sri 
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Lanka failed to provide better economic opportunities for its people while Malaysia 
succeeded in doing so. The assessment also reveals that sustaining macroeconomic 
stability has been one of the characteristics of Malaysia’s economic and political success. 
On the other hand, Sri Lanka's record in macroeconomic stability is relatively weak. With 
respect to economic growth, Malaysian governments have followed a consistently activist 
role through appropriate policies to maintain high levels of economic growth. In contrast, 
successive governments in Sri Lanka have followed an inconsistent activist role through 
inappropriate policies, with the country failing to maintain relatively high levels of 
economic growth.  On poverty and inequality, we observe that the problem of poverty 
was common for all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka but in Malaysia the problem was more 
serious for the Malays than the non-Malays. In the early period of independence, poverty 
and inequality were much more severe problems for Malaysia than Sri Lanka. But the 
situation became worse in Sri Lanka, while it improved in Malaysia. The Malaysian 
experience suggests that a high level of economic growth and better governance were 
powerful means of reducing for poverty and inequality. On the contrary, a low level of 
economic growth and poor governance produced no meaningful attempt to alleviate 
poverty in Sri Lanka.   
 
Thus, the section shows that during the early period of independence, economic activities 
were more supportive in improving economic development in Sri Lanka than in 
Malaysia. However, in the later period the situation changed; economic activities were 
more supportive of Malaysia’s economic development than in Sri Lanka.  
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Further, this chapter uses two possible ways of looking at the socio-economic status of 
various ethnic groups. The first one is by taking the population figures of each ethnic 
group and measuring them against their share of social and economic attainments. The 
second one is by considering the geographical areas where particular ethnic communities 
are concentrated and to compare their levels of social and economic attainments. To 
analyze the first way, we selected some of the common socio-economic indicators such 
as educational achievement, employment pattern, ownership of capital assets and mean 
monthly income. 
 
Educational achievement has been one of the crucial issues in public debate in Sri Lanka 
and Malaysia since independence. From the available evidence, at the time of 
independence in both countries, the minority ethnic group had more educational 
achievement than the majority group. So, the socio-economic status of minority ethnic 
groups was relatively higher than majority ethnic groups.  With the introduction of EPPs, 
however, the majority ethnic group had better educational achievement; therefore there 
were more opportunities for the majority ethnic groups to improve their socio-economic 
status compared with the minority in both countries.  
 
Employment opportunity is another important issue which affected the socio-economic 
status of the various ethnic groups in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. In both countries, during 
the early period of independence, the minority ethnic group (Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri 
Lanka and the Chinese in Malaysia) in terms of their population size were 
overrepresented in the government service, compared to the majority ethnic groups. With 
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the introduction of EPPs, the trend changed: the minority lost their share of public sector 
employment while the majority share improved.  
 
Concerning ownership of capital assets, there were no reliable data on the various ethnic 
groups in Sri Lanka. But in Malaysia, it was one of the important issues which affected 
the socio-economic status of the various ethnic communities. Since independence, there 
has been a high disparity between the main ethnic groups in terms of ownership of capital 
assets. During the early period of independence, a large share of capital assets was in the 
hands of foreigners; later their capital share reduced while the share of Malays and 
Chinese share increased. These changes in turn also improved economic contentment of 
the local ethnic groups. 
 
On the mean monthly income in the various ethnic groups in both countries, the evidence 
reveals that during the early period of independence there was no significant disparity in 
levels of income between the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka. But in Malaysia, the data 
indicate that there was a high disparity in levels of income among ethnic groups. During 
the later period of independence, the disparities gradually reduced in Malaysia. Overall, 
the opportunity to achieve better educational, employment, and ownership of capital 
assets changed the socio-economic status of the majority and minority ethnic groups at 
different periods. 
 
This section also examines how different geographical areas can influence the levels of 
social-economic status of ethnic groups. The evidence suggests that the ethnic groups in 
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Sri Lanka are differentiated on territorial basis whereas in Malaysia ethnic groups are 
distinguished on rural-urban basis. We then compared the economic performance of 
different geographical areas in Sri Lanka, and found that the Northeast Province – where 
most of the Sri Lankan Tamils live – slightly differed from other parts of the country in 
terms of socio-economic characteristics. Further, the section briefly compared the 
economic performance of NEPR in the pre-conflict and post-conflict periods. The 
evidence reveals that the ethnic conflict dramatically affected the economic performance 
of the Northern Province. In the case of Malaysia, the rural-urban disparity clearly 
reveals the different levels of socio-economic status of Malays and non-Malays. During 
the early period of independence, a large percentage of Malays were found in the rural 
areas compared to non-Malays. Therefore, the Malays were relatively weak compared to 
non-Malays in term of socio-economic status. This situation gradually changed with the 
introduction of appropriate policies and planning programs.  
 
Finally, the chapter evaluates the records of inter-ethnic relations in Sri Lanka and 
Malaysia since independence. The records of inter-ethnic relations in both countries 
suggest two different periods; early period and later period of independence. The 
evidence shows that inter-ethnic relations in Malaysia and Sri Lanka changed during the 
post-colonial period in close relation to the changing nature of each country’s economy 
as well as its linkage to the global economy. During the early period of independence, the 
open market policy and related benefits were more supportive in improving the economic 
development and socio-economic status of the people in Sri Lanka. The result was the 
reasonable economic satisfaction among ethnic groups. Because of that, there was no 
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relative deprivation among ethnic groups, resulting in peaceful relations between the 
majority Sinhalese community and the minority community of Sri Lankan Tamils. 
However, the condition gradually changed with the introduction of close and restricted 
economic model of development in the country. The new economic system did not 
provide better opportunity to improve economic development and socio-economic status 
of the ethnic groups. With such a situation, the implementation of ethnic preference 
policies reduced the peaceful relationship among ethnic groups, and increased social 
discontent as well as deprivation among them. The final outcome was ethnic conflict in 
the country. 
 
The experience of Malaysia reveals that even though it continued an open economic 
policy option, the laissez-faire economic system failed to provide better economic 
contentment of majority ethnic group in the early period of independence. This led to 
increased discontent and deprivation among ethnic groups, resulting in conflict between 
Malays and Chinese in 1969. Since 1970, with the introduction of various economic 
development policies such as NEP, NDP and Vision 2020, Malaysia has managed to 
drastically reduce the incidence of poverty and minimized horizontal inequality while 
achieving rapid economic growth. From the Malaysian experience, we can conclude that 
economic development policies were the most successful factor that helped Malaysia to 
prevent ethnic violence since the 1970s.  
 
Overall, successive governments in the two countries have pursued drastically different 
policies toward ethnicity. We conclude that this divergence has had a major impact on 
current levels of inter-ethnic relations in both countries. In Sri Lanka, it is probably the 
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failure to continue with economic openness and chaotic government activities that 
explains its low level of economic performance. On the other hand, the main story of 
Malaysia’s success is the combined actions of an appropriate economic policy, 
particularly economic openness, together with active role of government intervention. 
The first factor has been instrumental in encouraging rapid foreign investment, setting the 
stage for export and investment-led growth. The second factor, at the risk of less efficient 
utilization of resources, has ensured political stability and social harmony, an obviously 
important pre-requisite for strong and sustained economic growth. Therefore, low level of 
economic performance and ethnic crisis are to a large extent found in Sri Lanka than 
Malaysia, resulting in relatively closed economic policies.  
 
6.3 Policy implications  
The purpose of this study was to contribute to the current debate on the relationship 
between economic activities and ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic developing countries, 
focusing on two Asian countries, Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Based on this study, there are a 
number of implications that governments in multi-ethnic developing countries, including 
Sri Lanka, need to consider in order to enhance inter-ethnic relations among ethnic 
groups.  
 
Inappropriate economic policies and inconsistent government activities damage economic 
contentment and cordial ethnic relations in a country. Therefore, to ensure better 
economic contentment with peaceful inter-ethnic relations, a multi-ethnic developing 
country must embrace and continue implementing  appropriate economic policies such as 
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on a path of economic openness  If a country opens up its economy to embrace trade and 
investment, just as Malaysia has done, it can improve on its broad-based growth and 
quality of governance, leading to increased employment (especially, in the private sector) 
and income opportunities for all people. More and better employment for the unemployed 
and underemployed, and more revenue for the government are essential to sustain 
progress in all areas and communities and to ensure cordial ethnic relations. Sluggish or 
inequitable growth will feed into potential ethnic conflicts.  
 
Though it is argued that high degree of economic openness, sustained economic growth 
and disciplined government are necessary condition for reducing ethnic conflicts, it needs 
to be acknowledged that all these three economic factors are not sufficient and that there 
is a need for a combination of various macroeconomic policies. Given the fact that each 
country is unique in terms of resources, culture and other socio-political environments, 
macroeconomic policies need to be tailored taking into account of these country-specific 
characteristics. One way of formulating such macroeconomic policies effectively will be 
through an ‘empowerment’ strategy that encourages active participation from different 
section of the society in decision making processes. Though some developing countries 
have taken initiatives to promote such dialogues between people and the government, the 
frequency and the locations need to be increased to facilitate wider participation of the 
people living in different areas, particularly rural areas. Further, private sector investment 
should be encouraged in the following three areas; sectors in which the poor 
predominantly work, which mean that labor intensive manufacturing, agriculture and 
rural development should be the priority areas of growth; area where the poor live, so that 
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a balanced regional growth is achieved ; and production of good and services that the 
poor consume. The interaction among these factors is bound to generate a large income 
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